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[Introductory, p. i]

# YANOMAMÖ WARFARE, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MARRIAGE ALLIANCES

By Napoleon Alphonseau Chagnon

121 The purpose of this analysis is to show that the large discrepancy (over 50%) between ideal marriage rules and actual marriage practice among the Yąnomamö Indians of Southern Venezuela is necessitated by the politico-military milieu within which marriages are contracted. The data
114 covered in this thesis were collected from November 1964 through February 1966 during which time the author lived with these Indians. Inter-village warfare was chronic while the
124 field work was conducted. All the data were obtained from the Yąnomamö in their language.

162 Census data on five Yąnomamö villages are presented
847 to show that the male/female sex ratio is high. The shortage
595 of women, initially caused by female infanticide, is compli-
834 cated further by the practice of polygyny and coitus taboos
721 and is shown to be the basis of both internal and inter-
182 village fighting. Detailed historical data on village movements and warfare, collected from native informants and explified by case materials on specific events that the author witnessed, are given to demonstrate the correlation of warfare to the shortage of women.

621 The imbalanced sex ratio is also shown to be the
613 basis of competition between co-residential patrilineal
578 descent groups, and how the members of these ally themselves
562 to other, patrilineal, local descent groups in order to maximize the number of women to which each group's members have access. When intra-village feuding over women becomes particularly intense, larger villages are shown to fragment into smaller, independent villages whose initial composition resembles a dual organization of inter-marrying patrilineal
000 descent groups. Genealogical data in both sociological and

[Introductory, R ii]

[Introductory, P. iii]

Genealogical data in both sociological and
128 biological form are given for one small village to demonstrate
613 the dual organization tendency. Similar data on two other
621 villages from which this sample village recently split are
602 628 presented to show that affinal ties between local descent
groups are structurally more stable than agnatic ties between
such groups, and that these affinal ties hold local descent
groups together when larger villages fragment, resulting in
the break-up of lineages and the redistribution of their
members into mutually hostile, independent villages.

128 726 The intensity and tactics of warfare are shown to
182 determine in large measure both the size of the village and
621 the political conditions that promote inter-village alliances
628 based on marriage. Finally, the techniques of slash-and-burn
128 horticulture are discussed to show how economic dependence
241 on cultivated food promotes the establishment of political
628 alliances based on marriage exchanges and determines the
182 963 direction of movement of relocated villages.

Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis.
128 First, the frequency of intra-village fighting and inter-
721 village warfare co-varies with the frequency with which
628 males may legitimately satisfy sexual desires; anything that
621 182 increases female/male ratio or the sexual activity of females
581 reduces feuding. Second, the degree to which marriage
162 practice conforms to marriage rules is predictable once the
128 conditions of warfare are specified. When warfare is
721 chronic, alliances between historically unrelated villages
582 require a breach of marriage rules when women pass between
183 these groups. Comparative data on Brazilian Yąnomamö social
182 organization are given to support these conclusions. Third,
628 the data bearing on Yąnomamö social organization support E.
121 R. Leach's contention that the political and economic con-
128 texts within which marriages take place must be considered
581 as part of the ongoing social organization and must be in-
613 cluded in analyses of the latter. By so doing, the analysis
[114] shows that integration between Yąnomamö lineal descent corp-
orations does not necessarily derive from inherent properties
cognatic kinship as argued by Meyer Fortes.

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

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[p. i]

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# YĄNOMAMÖ WARFARE, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MARRIAGE ALLIANCES

by
Napoleon Alphonseau Chagnon

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Michigan
1966

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[Title Page]

[P ii-A]

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000

[FrontisPiece]

Plate 1: Members of Allied Villages Chest-Pounding During a Feast.

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## INTRODUCTION

### A. Statement of Thesis

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582
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This is a functional study of one form of marriage practiced by the Yąnomamö Indians of southern Venezuela. The form of marriage considered here--recruitment of wives from other villages for the purpose of initiating and maintaining political alliances--constitutes a departure by the Yąnomamö from their preferred form of marriage. I wish to emphasize the point that these marriages constitute a predictable and necessary departure from the ambilateral cross-cousin preferences. I will show in the space below how a number of variables are related to each other to bring about the exceptional marriages.

The fact that normative rules of behavior and actual behavior differ considerably from each other in most societies has received little theoretical attention, particular in regard to analyses of marriage systems. For the most part we presume that exceptions to stated marriage preferences represent a measure of the breakdown of the society under consideration, [648] due to contacts with other societies. Yąnomamö exceptional marriages[1] cannot be dismissed with this line of

---

[1] Of 56 recently contracted marriages in three of the villages investigated, 31 cases were breaches of the preferred ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules for the purpose of establishing political ties between the groups of the spouses.

121 583 reasoning, as most of the Yąnomamö villages are presently
582 183 uncontacted, and those that are in contact with foreigners
648 have only recently (since 1951) entered into these contacts.

583 Yąnomamö marriages, even the preferred form, are
582 influenced by the milieu of inter-village hostility within
*628 613 which they are contracted. Marriages in this milieu have as their major function the promotion of social ties between the descent groups represented in the exchange and are best understood as the deployment of women between groups with the purpose of promoting political and military alliances. The groups in question may be of two kinds: the local patrilineages comprising a particular village, or the members of different villages as such. As the only corporate group among the Yąnomamö is the local lineage, marriages within and between villages are to be understood as alliances between different corporate groups.[1]

583 The variables affecting marriage practice--weakness
582 183 of descent as a solidarity-promoting medium, village size
*621 and instability, the chronic nature of warfare, the shortage
921 152 of women, attitudes about aggressiveness and demonstration of ferocity by individuals, and economic practices--are such that some deviation from the normative marriage rules is necessary to insure maximum survival chances for the resi-
583 dents of the various autonomous villages. Because marriage
582 *621 exchanges in general have political and military implications,

---

*[621] [1] Yąnomamö villages are not corporate groups.

583
582 actual marriage practices reflect the immediate political
*621 and military needs of a given village. If it is more
583 advantageous to dispose of a woman in a way that promotes
582
183 greater solidarity between allies, the marriage rule is not
*628 followed.[1] An eligible female, therefore, is given to a man
(perhaps unrelated) in another village if her kinsmen have
reason to believe that they may be required to take refuge
in or request military aid from that other village.

*628 An ally's demands are not to be taken lightly, for
574 to fail in an obligation to an ally may have the gravest
726
562 consequences for survival; one tactic of Yąnomamö warfare is
invitations to feasts during which a disgruntled group kills
the male guests and seizes their women. These treacherous
feasts (nomohoni) occur often enough, so that local groups
*628 are always suspicious of their allies. A dependable ally
583 is won at the expense of women. Failure to hand over enough
582
women creates a frustrated ally who is extremely dangerous.
Yąnomamö political behavior has largely to do with disposing
of enough women to make the ally loyal, but not to give more
women than is necessary to achieve this end; miscalculation
in this respect has serious consequences. As it is imperative for local groups, for reasons to be outlined below, to
have allies, it is likewise necessary for them to enter into
marriage exchanges with other groups.

---

[1] When women are given to men from other villages, the men rarely, if ever, are related to them as FaSiSo or MoBrSo. The exchange of women for purposes of alliance usually establishes the initial kinship ties between the groups of the wife receivers and wife givers.

000 marriage exchanges with other groups.

*621 *628 613 The weakness of kinship[1]

Few institutions promote solidarity between the local lineages of a village on the one hand and between 602 *628 allied villages on the other. Consanguineal kinship ties are weak; so weak, that the most bitter fighting usually takes place between villages comprised of closely related *621 622 578 kinsmen. The roles of leaders are poorly defined, and headmen can rarely reconcile dissident factions within their own *621 villages. Moreover, there are a number of factors constantly *578 [628] threatening the stability of local groups, and these factors likewise weaken political relationships between allied villages. Within villages fighting frequently breaks out [411] over food thefts and over sexual liaisons. In the latter [241] case the fighting takes the form of dueling with clubs, and [361] usually the result is that the village splits; one of the factions establishes a garden elsewhere and becomes an independent village. 361 *621 As the histories of selected villages will show (see below, Chapter 5), the settlement pattern of Yąnomamö villages is cyclical; it results from the splitting of larger villages, the renewed growth of the splinter groups into large villages, followed by recurrent splitting and growth *ad infinitum*. *621 602 Kinship as a medium for promoting solidarity within villages loses its efficacy when villages

---

[1] It is difficult to discuss each variable affecting marriage alliances as operating by itself, for they are intimately interconnected, and I list them separately only to point out their major features.

621 attain a certain size; beyond this point the causes of in-
602 ternal fighting are too numerous for peace to be maintained
effectively by kinship ties, and the village breaks up into
*621 smaller, more cohesive units. This affects the degree to
182 which deviations from the marriage norm occur: first, the
183
583 female cross-cousins of an eligible bachelor are usually in
582 villages that are hostile to his own, and he is obliged to
*623
seek a spouse in another, currently friendly, village.
Secondly, as his own village is now more vulnerable because
of its small size, some of its eligible females must be given
to men in other villages in order to promote military alliances.

121 Village size and demography

The significance of demographic data has only recently received recognition in analyses of social systems. The importance of such data in the analysis of marriage practices has been most tellingly illustrated by F. G. Rose's study of the Groote Eylandt Aborigines (1960). Rose was able to show that where men marry women who are considerably younger than themselves, two important consequences follow: primary marriages with father's sister's daughter is effectively prevented, as is the practice of sister exchange.

Similarly, Ackerman (1964), in a critique of Needham's analysis of Purum marriage, showed that demography-dependent data such as frequency of 'marriage acts' (ibid., p. 60) do not support Needham's contention that the Purum

121 have a prescriptive marriage system. What the Purum say
they do and what they actually do are two distinct things.

*621 As I mentioned above, after Yąnomamö villages reach
578 922 a certain, critical size, they tend to fragment into smaller
groups. The internal tensions that promote this instability
are to some extent offset by external military pressures:
members of a faction within a larger village may want to
establish their own independent village to avoid club-fighting
and to suppress more severe forms of violence; but
if their village is being raided by members of other villages,
[241] it may be impossible for them to do so. Occasionally a
village splits into several factions, each establishing its
own garden apart from the other, but the factions are forced
*621 to reunite because of raids mounted by other groups. Gen-
*628 erally, the process of village splitting precludes a later
722 583 recombination of the same factions because these remain
582 hostile to each other. Thus, the small, vulnerable villages
978 [602] that result from the fragmentation of a larger village are
constrained to make marriage alliances with other villages,
both to insure military assistance and because it is difficult
to obtain women from their kinsmen with whom they are now at
war. Village size and the balance of marriage exchanges
between villages indicate that numerically weak villages are
*621 coerced by their stronger partners to give up women. In
*628 722 some cases, the disposition of desirable trade goods may
583 affect the balance in the exchange of women between two
582 438 villages. In general it may be said that, when one village

*621 is allied to another which can provide it with more military
*628 assistance and desirable trade goods than the former can
722
583 give to the latter, an imbalance in the exchanges of women
582 will follow. The imbalance will favor the village that, for
438
reasons of size and of existing military patterns, least
needs the military aid of the other.

*621
*628 The character of Yąnomamö warfare is not as intimately related to village size as might be expected, although,
722
726 of course, larger villages are best able to conduct warfare
583
582 successfully over a long period of time from one location.
Larger villages are less likely to be forced to abandon their
location because of raids from smaller groups, whereas
smaller groups are markedly vulnerable in this respect.
Nevertheless, no one village is large enough to withstand
successfully military pressures from a cluster of smaller,
allied villages, and, therefore, the members of all villages
seek defensive alliances with their neighbors. Such alliances are based on the exchange of women.

*621
562 Other demographic factors, in addition to sheer size
162 of villages, affect marriage practices. The ratio of males
583
582 to females, for example, is high, partly because of the
182 practice of female infanticide. Moreover, the shortage of
[847]
[834] women is compounded by other factors; sexual intercourse is
[545] prohibited with pregnant women and those who have nursing
children, and polygyny causes an unequal distribution of the
*621 available women. It would be difficult to exaggerate the
578
*628 consequences for Yąnomamö social organization of this single
722
562
182

*621 578 *628 792 562 182

phenomenon: the feuds that lead to the splitting of villages and the cause of fighting between villages are largely the result of the shortage of women.

*621 578 834 837 602

Within villages, then, the bachelors and those men whose wives are either pregnant or are nursing children constantly threaten village stability by seeking liaisons with the wives of other men. The discovery of these liaisons usually leads to violent fighting between the group of close relatives of the woman's husband and that of her lover; and this frequently causes the village to split. The larger the village, the more likely it is that such liaisons will develop and that the subsequent fighting will lead to fragmentation of the village.

*621 182 *628 578 602 726

Village size, then, is limited by the capacity of the kinship network to regulate internal feuds, and by the nature of the actual or current warfare pattern of the neighboring villages. As the village grows in size, the

*621 *628 578 613 602 583 582

incidence of extra-marital affairs and club-fights appears to increase, while the ability of kinship to regulate the affairs of a multi-lineage village diminishes in proportion. Villages then split into smaller groups that comprise two or more small, cohesive, intermarrying local lineages; each group establishes an independent village and enters into marriage alliances with other villages. The prior existence of hostilities with other villages may delay the split, but

*621

does not prevent it. In short, the relationship of Yąnomamö village size to village solidarity nicely illustrates Leslie

*621 White's generalization that

> every society tends to behave in such a way as to achieve that balance between size and solidarity that will give it the maximum effectiveness in carrying on its life-sustaining activities. (1959:104)

*621 Belligerent ideology and aggressive behavior

*628
562 Village size plays an important role in the nature
583 of the political relationships between groups that are not
582 linked by kinship ties. As mentioned above, larger villages
721
tend to use their strength and dominance to upset the exchange balance of women. But the degree to which a powerful group is able to force a dependent ally to cede women is limited by the ability of the smaller group to raid the
*621 larger village successfully. In ideological terms the
*628
721 Yanomamö express this capacity to wage war by placing
152 emphasis on and valuing aggressive behavior. It is consid-
181
ered both proper and desirable to act ferociously, as this informs neighbors of the group's capacity to wage war and warns them that the group is willing to resort to war in political dealings.

*621 Members of small villages are consequently constrained
*628 to behave militantly toward larger neighbors to limit the
526
574 coercion that the larger group may be tempted to try. Their
152 fierce behavior takes the form of threat, bluff, chicanery
in trading and, most important, challenges to duels. Frequently, when villagers are invited to feast with an allied group, the invitation includes a challenge to a chest-pounding

*621
*628
622
578
152 duel. Such a duel functions to remind the allies that the host is strong and willing to display his strength to protect his sovereignty.

*628 The practical effect of this kind of behavior is that the solidarity of political alliances is constantly threatened. Allies are always suspicious of each other's intentions, and political ties between them are tenuous.

*629
583
592
152 Although the giving of women in marriage between allies serves to promote solidarity, the capacity for marriage to achieve this end in itself is limited by the constant displays of hostility and aggressiveness by both groups.

*621
593
152 The display of ferocity is manifest at the local, village level also. No insult is too slight to go unnoticed and unchallenged. Indeed, most individuals seize upon these opportunities to display strength. Thus, a legitimate way for men to display aggressiveness is for them to beat their errant wives, to burn them with fire brands, to cut their arms and legs with machetes or to shoot them in a non-vital part of the body with a barbed arrow. Men constantly intimidate their wives and respond cruelly to the slightest provocations, such as the wife's failure to act quickly on a husband's demand for food. Men who are brutal to their wives are feared and respected by other men, for the implication of this behavior is that the man will behave equally fiercely if insulted by another man.

[602] Men often prefer to have a wife from another village, upon whom it is easier--and safer--to vent ferocity and

*621 cruel actions; that is, the extent to which husbands are
593
.152 brutal to their wives is largely a function of the number
602 of kinsmen the women have within the village, particularly
brothers. Some men have even killed their wives in fits of
rage, but in all the cases for which I have complete data,
the women came from other villages and had no kinsmen in their
husband's village to protect them. Conversely, when women
have brothers within the village, their husbands exercise
restraint in their treatment of them, knowing that the
brothers of the women will use force to defend them. It is
[586]
[578] not unusual for a man to take his sister away from a cruel
husband and to give her to someone else; this inevitably
leads to club-fighting and frequently causes the village to
split.

181 Ideological considerations, therefore, promote
152 friction and fighting within villages and lead to village
621
*628 splits; and, the newly formed factions are obliged to seek
583 marriage alliances with other groups.
592

Economic practices

361
241 Local groups abandon residential and horticultural
722 sites only when forced to do so by the raiding pattern of
their enemies. For the most part, the Yanomamö are able to
predict the hostilities that will force them to abandon their
gardens, and they plan accordingly. The first act of a war
is frequently the clearing of a new garden at some distance
*621 from the presently occupied site. If hostilities develop
578
241 within the village and it is expected that these will

*621 578 241 escalate, the factions involved usually use the interlude
between a club-fight and actual killings to establish separate gardens.

*621 *629 24 36 722 Occasionally, however, a village suddenly becomes
embroiled in a war that it has not expected, or fighting
within the village immediately involves shooting to kill.
Then the only recourse for the group is to take refuge with
an ally and subsist on the produce of the ally's garden. If
the critical situation develops out of an intra-village dispute,
the smaller of the contesting factions is forced to
flee to another village where it has friends or relatives.

If all the members of a village are forced to take
refuge in another village, they proceed to make their own
garden apart from that of their hosts; then, when the garden
begins to produce, the refugee group moves to that site to
583 582 839 live. They do this because the price of protection is always
measurable in terms of the hosts' demanding access to the
women of the guests, either as spouses for their own men or
simply as temporary sexual partners.

Twice during the lifetime of my oldest Bisaasi-tedi
informants their group was obliged to flee to an allied
village to escape the raids of powerful neighbors, raids that
resulted from the development of intensive hostilities before
the group could establish a new garden of its own elsewhere.
On both occasions the refugees lost a number of women to
their protectors, and in neither case did they receive wives
*628 [illegible] 574 in return. Indeed, on the second occasion, the hosts planned

*628 726 to kill all the male guests and to abduct the women, but the 574 hosts themselves unexpectedly became involved in a war and required the aid of their guests.

*628 241 722 361 Yąnomamö dependency on cultivated foods, then, promotes political alliances with other villages; the warfare pattern is such that the members of a village may have to flee from their site to avoid the raids of their enemies. If they have not had time to establish a new garden, they need the support of an ally until they are able to support themselves.

.-*-*-*-*-.

121 583 582 The variables that affect Yąnomamö marriage practices are numerous and diverse and combine with each other in complex ways. I shall show in the chapters that follow how these variables actually affect Yąnomamö marriage practices. At this juncture the point to be made is that Yąnomamö social practice in real life can not be completely isomorphic with the stated marriage preferences because the milieu within which marriages take place simply precludes such a neat fit. A functional, rather than a structural analysis seems to be demanded by the nature of the variables in question. I shall also show the degree to which we can predict actual marriage behavior, given specific information about the variables.

[726] [182] Finally, I should add that the Yąnomamö constitute a significant case for ethnological inquiry: this society offers

121 us the opportunity to estimate the effects of warfare on the
583 582 nature of marriage practices among a people who are chronically
182 at war, a situation not frequently found in the present
726 ethnographic world.

## 128 B. The Data and Field Techniques

Several kinds of data are required to illustrate Yąnomamö marriage practices and the variables affecting them. The most important data are those I obtained from genealogies and the historical relationships between villages.

In total, I have genealogical data on some 3,000 individuals, living and dead, from 15 villages. Not all the data are comparable in quality and I shall confine my discussion to the populations of the five villages for which
128 my data are most complete. These five villages fall into
*621 *628 two groups with regard to their historical origins. Three
of them have a common history, separating initially about 1943 at which time two villages were formed.[1] One of these split again about 1954 to form two villages, giving a total of 3 separate but closely related villages. The other two of the five selected for this study also have a common history, but are distinct from the first three. For purposes of clarity I will refer to these two villages as Shamatari (see Chapter 5 for discussion). About 1960 the two Shamatari villages split from each other and are presently on good terms.

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[1] See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the historical relationships of these villages.

121 I did not attempt to collect data on all aspects of Yąnomamö culture. Hans Becher (1960) and Otto Zerries (1964) had already done this. I concentrated, rather, on Yąnomamö social organization, settlement pattern, warfare and ideology and gathered data that would permit me to analyze these aspects of Yąnomamö culture and how they were related to each other in determining marriage practices.

124 The collection of genealogies proved to be the most
551 important and the most difficult task of my field work. The
191 widespread taboo against saying the names of both the living
769 and the dead found in South America, particularly in the
124 Guiana area, was carried to an extreme by the Yąnomamö. Con-
128 sequently, much of my time was spent trying to discover which
of my informants were giving me erroneous information, a frustrating and time consuming task. It was not unusual to discover after I had spent weeks on particular genealogies working with data provided by crafty informants that I had to disregard most, if not all, of those data. The Indians soon discovered my interest and set about inventing names for everybody in the village--and learning them, making my task all the more difficult when I checked my genealogies with informants from other villages. Thus, I would arrive at what I considered an accurate genealogy for the members of the village I lived in only to be advised by an Indian from another village that most of the names were inventions. I was therefore unable to check the accuracy of the stated relationships between individuals with outside informants

124 until I devised techniques to overcome this informant reaction.
[128] I had ultimately to resort to using informants from
124 561 other villages to get much of the information, particularly
769 names, about the people with whom I spent most of my time, or,
578 to employ informants who had grudges against individuals within
the village; the greatest insult a Yąnomamö can give is
to say the name of a person's dead ancestor, and I capitalized
on this custom at every opportunity.

124 Once I obtained accurate names,[1] the task became
551 easier and I was able to use local informants once again,
769 although rarely would they mention names of their dead relatives.
Toward the end of my field work I managed to gain
the confidence of several older individuals who verified and
expanded on information I had collected by more devious means;
even so, they themselves would not mention the names of many
of the individuals in the genealogies, and I was constrained
by my bargain with these informants not to mention the names
124 of any of their closely related dead kinsmen. By utilizing
128 several informants who were not closely related I managed to
verify and correct the genealogies of the people with whom
I lived, and I am reasonably sure that the information is
accurate as far as it goes, although there are probably

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[128] [1] I was satisfied that the name was accurate when I obtained the same name from several of my most trusted informants. The best proof, however, was the reaction of an informant who was related to the deceased. If this informant became angry or upset when I whispered the name in his presence while checking a genealogy, I was reasonably sure that I had the right name.

124 omissions in ascending generations. The genealogies of
128 individuals from other villages were easier to collect, particularly if my informants had grudges against the members of those villages, but I employed the same techniques in these cases as well.

124 After I had established the genealogical relationships, I visited the various villages to make estimates of the ages of the individuals, as well as to collect other
124 kinds of information. This was always a touchy business, as
123 the Yąnomamö resent being called by their names, particularly
551 older and more influential individuals. Occasionally I would
554
769 say the name of an individual who had recently been killed in a raid; this always resulted in an unpleasant and possibly dangerous situation, as most of them were unable to understand why a complete stranger should want to possess such knowledge unless it were for harmful magical purposes. My guides were constantly reminding me not to mention the names of dead people of the villages I visited and of the disastrous consequences that would follow should I fail to heed this advice.

124 In short, the collection of the genealogies was an unpleasant, full-time task and left very little time for intensive study of other aspects of Yąnomamö culture.

114 The two monographs dealing with the Yąnomamö mentioned above are quite superficial in their treatment of social organization; to date no intensive analysis of Yąnomamö social organization has been attempted using data

114 similar to that presented here, and I regard my own efforts
in this area as supplemental to the generally excellent
ethnographic work of Zerries (1964) and Schuster (1958).
128 Without genealogical data it is not possible to estimate the
degree to which marriage practices deviate from stated preference,
nor to grasp the importance of these deviant cases
in Yąnomamö politics.

121 The histories of the five villages are equally
important, as they illustrate the role of warfare in determining
settlement pattern, the development of political ties
between villages, and the process of village splitting.
These factors provide the matrix within which the genealogical
data become meaningful.

128
133 Piecing together the history of these groups of
[174] villages proved to be a difficult task. The geographical
[127] area under discussion is unexplored and unmapped. Not even
major rivers are accurately known in their upper courses, so
that of two published versions of the Siapa River I have had
to choose the one most consistent with the account given to
823 me by the Indians. The major problem in this regard has
128 been the identification of a large river known to the Yąnomamö
as the Shukumöna-u, whose headwaters lie near the source of
[124] the Orinoco River. According to my Yąnomamö informants
(people who have either lived on this river or have visited
or raided villages located on it), the Shukumöna-u, in its
middle course, is nearly as large as the Orinoco at its
junction with the Mavaca River. It flows in a westerly

823 direction, and lies between the Mavaca River and a series of
128 mountains. At a few points the Shukumöna-u may be reached
from the Mavaca tributaries in less than a day's walk.

128 Early maps of Venezuela show the Siapa River extend-
131 ing nearly to the headwaters of the Orinoco River, as the
133 Indians claim the Shukumöna-u does, and lying between the
Mavaca River and the mountains that separate Brazil from
128 Venezuela. I have therefore used a 1936 edition of a map
133 published by the Venezuelan National Cartographic Office for
129 the course of the Siapa River, which I take to be the
[126] Shukumöna-u of the Yąnomamö. I have used more recent maps,
[114] also obtained from the same office, for the course of the
Orinoco, and have drawn the Mavaca River from information I
obtained from the Indians and my own exploration of this
river up to the village of Iwahikoroba-tedi, which I un-
successfully attempted to contact in September of 1965.
Maps B and C, pp. 54 and 148, are based on these sources.

126 In reconstructing the history of the village move-
174 ments, particularly in locating old habitation sites, I have
361 relied on a few well-known geographical landmarks along the
133 Orinoco River. Specifically, two large rapids have guided
me; Penascal, above Ruemi-u (Shuwimöwi-bora in Yąnomamö) and
Raudal Guaharibo (Karäbä-bora in Yąnomamö) near the present
village of Kashorawä-tedi.

126 I employed three sources of information to locate
361 present villages. First, my own knowledge for those villages
[115] I personally visited. Second, information from James P.
[797]

126 Barker, a member of the New Tribes Mission, who visited a 361 [116] larger number of villages in the course of the 15 years he [799] has lived among the Yąnomamö. Finally, on information [124] obtained from the Indians. Most of the Venezuelan Yąnomamö have not yet been contacted by outsiders, and informants' accounts necessarily must suffice to locate many of the villages. Thus, when I visited villages such as Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi or Patanowä-tedi, I had the residents point in the direction of other, uncontacted, villages; I made compass readings of these bearings, noting also the number of "sleeps" required to reach these villages.

174 Fixing the location of old sites geographically was somewhat easier than determining the date of occupation of those sites. A limiting factor in my attempts to obtain [802] detailed chronological movements of particular villages was the poverty of the Yąnomamö language in indicating numbers. The language can express only three numbers: one (moni, mahu, dahiabä), two (porakäbä), and more-than-two (bruka). In establishing dates of specific events, therefore, I have relied almost exclusively on my estimates of the ages of the Indians. By noting also their places of birth, I was able to estimate the length of time each site was occupied before being abandoned.

175 In reconstructing portions of the history of the five villages I have been guided by two historically known events. One event was the arrival of James P. Barker at Mahekodo-tedi in September 1950, the first foreigner to make sustained

175 contact with a Yąnomamö village on the upper Orinoco. Barker, a member of the New Tribes Mission, has been living continuously with the Yąnomamö since 1950, except for an occasional furlough to the United States. Three months after Barker arrived at Mahekodo-tedi, the members of that village took in a group of refugees from another village, a village that had just been the victim of a treacherous feast. Those refugees were the present residents of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi, the two groups with whom I spent most of my time in the field. The treacherous feast invitation and the subsequent events will be outlined in detail below; suffice it to say at this point that the event was an important one in the history of these villages and its date is known (1951).

175
648
726 The second dated event was the abduction of a Brazilian girl from her home in the upper Cauabury area by the members of two Yąnomamö villages, Kohoroshi-tedi and Karawatari-urihi-tedi. The history of Nabäyoma ("woman of the foreigners"), as she was called by the Yąnomamö, may be told briefly. The members of the village of Kohoroshi-tedi, a splinter group from Karawatari's village, moved down the Shukumöna-u and began to hunt in the area southwest of their new village site. Occasionally they came across signs of foreigners, whom they were interested in locating in the hope of acquiring steel tools. On one hunt the Yąnomamö saw the foreigners and discovered their house. The Indians returned to Kohoroshi-tedi and the headman of the village, Ohiriwä, organized a raiding party, which also included men from

175 648 Karawatari's village.

[726] The raiders attacked the foreigners at dawn but were
driven off by gunfire; a number of the Indians were killed,
among them a man called Hokohenawä, and some of the foreigners
were allegedly hit with arrows. The Indians managed to
capture a young girl, taking her back to Karawatari's village
on the Shukumöna-u. Shortly after arriving at Karawatari's
village, the abductors were in turn raided by another
Shamatari village, then on the Upper Mavaca River under the
leadership of Matakuwä, one of the two "original" Shamatari
men. Karawatari's group had split from Matakuwä's group
and was on hostile terms with it. The girl was taken by
Matakuwä's men on this raid and brought to the Mavaca River.
Matakuwä's village was on a branch of the Mavaca River called
Kedebaböwei-u when Nabäyoma was abducted from Karawatari's
[114] group. Zerries (1964:14) gives 1934 as the date of the
abduction of Nabäyoma, whereas Seitz (1963:21) places it a
little earlier.

[593] In Matakuwä's village, Nabäyoma was given to Yoyonahi's
[052] son; he shot her with a barbed arrow for disobeying him and
the girl fled into the woods to nurse her wound. At this time
Matakuwä's group was on friendly terms with the residents of
Patanowä-täka (who are now living in three distinct villages
and constitute the groups from whom most of my data were
*[628] taken). On one of their visits, the residents of Patanowä-
[574] täka found Nabäyoma in the woods outside Matakuwä's village
and took her home with them when they left after visiting.

175 648 At Patanowä-täka she was given to Husiwä, by whom she had two sons (Orakuwä and Kariunawä). The approximate date of *[628] [792] her move to Patanowä-täka is 1935; it could not be much later, because a war broke out between Matakuwä's group and the group at Patanowä-täka shortly after this date, and no visitors went between these two villages after hostilities commenced.

*[621] *[628] [796] When the Patanowä-täka group separted into two villages, Nabäyoma remained with the group that is presently called Patanowä-tedi. The two splinter groups entered into hostilities with each other shortly after they separated, and Nabäyoma's husband, Husiwä, was one of the first casualties. Nabäyoma, her co-wife (Shǫrökoma), and all their children fled from Husiwä's group and joined the other, cognate, group. Shǫrökoma, originally abducted from yet another Shamatari village, later returned to Patanowä-tedi, but Nabäyoma stayed with Patanowä-tedi's enemies. In 1951 *[583] [628] when the treacherous feast was pulled on the group to which Nabäyoma belonged and the group fled to Mahekodo-tedi for protection, Nabäyoma was given to a man in Mahekodo-tedi, Remoriwä, as part of the cost of the alliance.

[797] While Nabäyoma lived at Mahekodo-tedi, Barker and his colleague, David Landon, discovered that she still remembered how to write her name (Elena Valero). They informed the authorities in Puerto Ayacucho that a Brazilian woman was living with the Yąnomamö, presumable abducted by them from one of the settlements across the border, but

175 before action could be taken, Nabäyoma's new husband left
648 Mahekodo-tedi for his own village (Buinaböwei-tedi), taking
with him Nabäyoma, her two sons by Husiwä, and his own son
by Nabäyoma.

[997] The Salesian Mission in Puerto Ayacucho was authorized
to handle the affair and they sent a party of men to Buinaböwei-tedi. The Indians did not wish to lose one of their women and the Salesian Mission party had to resort to forceful but prudent measures to recover Nabäyoma. She was returned to her family in Brazil in late 1956. Remoriwä subsequently made two unsuccessful trips to Brazil to find her.

174 As indicated above, the histories as I have recon-
175 structed them are no more than approximations as far as
geographical locations and dates of occupation of the various
sites are concerned. I am fairly certain, however, that the
events themselves are accurately reported, especially those
having to do with the warfare and raiding, because I obtained
virtually identical versions from several informants on dif-
173 ferent occasions. The Yąnomamö are good historians when it
726 comes to warfare. They have to be, lest they accept invi-
*628 tations to visit villages that have old grudges against them.
All of them, even young children, know who killed their rel-
atives and the circumstances in which the killings took place.
These are the subject of constant discussion in the villages.
124 The first few descriptions I recorded of the 1950-51 feast
173 in which my group was victimized by a Shamatari village were
obtained from young men who could not possibly have witnessed

124 what happened. The later descriptions obtained from much
173 older informants were virtually identical with those I
originally recorded from the younger informants. I believe,
accordingly, that the accounts of the time period antecedent
to the life-span of even my oldest informants are accurate
in so far as their major features are concerned.

726 That the histories are filled with treachery, great
178 violence, and much bloodshed will be apparent. The nature
of Yąnomamö warfare, however, has not changed. It was being
[114] conducted as vigorously and in similar ways in 1964-1966
while I conducted my field-work.

# CHAPTER I

## YĄNOMAMÖ CULTURE AND EARLIER ANTHROPOLOGICAL WORK[1]

### A. Yąnomamö Culture

101

The Yąnomamö are discussed in the literature under such tribal designations as Guaica, Waika, Guaharibo, Makù, Schiriana, Xiriana, Kirischana, Shidishana, Shamatari, Sanema, and Yanoama. Most of the terms are derogatory names applied to the Yąnomamö by their neighbors and characterize the people as being monkey-like or as savages.[2]

[114] In the upper Orinoco and the Mavaca basin where I conducted my field work, the Indians referred to themselves as Yąnomamö, which at once defines their mode of life, language, origin, and includes all people who share this mode of life, language and origin. All non-Yąnomamö are collectively

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[114] [1] As there are very few reliable English sources describing Yąnomamö social organization and culture, I give a brief description of them here. The best source in English to date is Zerries' 1955 publication, but it deals only with particular traits of Yąnomamö culture.

[128] [94] [104] [2] The word Yąnomamö is nasalized on every syllable, but for ease of typing this manuscript, I have not indicated all the nasalization. The vowel /-ɨ-/ is written /-ö-/. I have written the /- ə -/ as "-ä-" and have indicated nasalization by /-,-/; whenever a Yąnomamö word has one nasalized syllable, all syllables in that word are nasalized.

101 called nabä--"stranger" or "foreigners." Nabä have degenerated from an original Yąnomamö stock and are regarded, therefore, with some contempt by the Yąnomamö, an attitude that is further manifested in the language; Yąnomamö in linguistic usage requires an honorific pronoun whereas nabä takes the common pronouns.

[128] I adopt the term Yąnomamö to refer to the entire group whose geographical distribution is shown in Map A,[1] using the term in a linguistic-cultural sense to define the tribe. Others have adopted the same usage with minor differences in spelling.

Several of the above-mentioned terms, Sanema, Waika, and Shamatari deserve further discussion, as they are used either as self-designations or in reference to local groups of Yąnomamö occupying specific geographical areas.

The term Sanema (Wilbert, 1963) is used in the upper Caura River as a self-designation. In this dialect the [194] initial phone /y/ has been replaced throughout the language by /s/, Sanema thus being a local pronunciation of Yąnomamö.[2]

The term Shamatari is used by all the Yąnomamö Indians on the upper Orinoco River to refer to the congeries of villages that occupy the large area south of the Orinoco River and adjacent portions of Brazil. Zerries (1964:19)

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[1] See next page.

[115] [2] Ernesto Migliazza, personal communication. According to Migliazza, the word Sanema is pronounced /Sanöma/.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 29 ]

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
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
CARACAS
CIUDAD BOLIVAR
GEORGETOWN
GUYANA
PUERTO AYACUCHO
SAN FERNANDO
ESMERALDA
SAN CARLOS
BOA VISTA
BRAZIL
Rio Orinoco
Rio Negro
R. A. Chagnon
1966

MAP (A)

YąNOMAMÖ AREA OF
SOUTHERN VENEZUELA
AND NORTHERN BRAZIL

SCALE IN MILES

100 0 100 200 300 400 500

R.F. = 1 : 10,000,000

101 [119] Zerries (1964:19) has included the groups I studied in the Shamatari classification on the basis of information taken from Mahekodo-tedi informants. The members of these groups, however, deny the Shamatari identity and distinguish themselves from their southern neighbors, some of whom visit them regularly and are married into their villages.

101 361 [103] [951] The Shamatari,[1] according to my Bisaasi-tedi informants, take their name from one of the headmen, Kayabawä ("big tree"), who lived north of the Orinoco River in a village then [951] called Shįhowä-tedi. Kayabawä was an unusually corpulent man and bore a second name, Shamatari, derived from their word (Shama) for the tapir, a large ungulate found throughout [103] tropical South America. Shamatari, when Shįhowä-tedi split, led his faction south of the Orinoco River and settled in the headwaters of the river known to the Yąnomamö as the Shukumöna-u (see above), where his village became known as Mokayäaba-tedi. Other villages, related to Shįowä-tedi, moved into the Shukumöna River and Mavaca River basins after Shamatari's village was established, ultimately spreading as far southwest as the Cauabury headwaters in Brazil. The 101 [174] Shamatari expansion into this area took place around the turn of the century, according to my reconstruction of Shamatari history (see below). This is also supported by meagre

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[1] There is another "Shamatari" group in the tributaries of the Upper Parima River of Brazil; these are not to be confused with the Shamatari under discussion here, although both groups are Yąnomamö. See Vinci, 1959, for an impressionistic account of his brief contact with the Parima Shamatari.

101 175 This[a] is also supported by[30] meagre historical evidence bearing on the aboriginal inhabitants of this area. Several distinguished Europeans explored portions of the area under consideration and all of them were familiar with the existence of the Yąnomamö in the Orinoco headwaters. None of them, however, reported that Yąnomamö Indians were living in the Mavaca Basin. Alexander [illegible] Humboldt, who ascended the Casiquiare Canal in 1800, discussed the area of the Mavaca headwaters as one frequently used by Indians of the 'Portuguese Missions' as the route between the Cauabury headwaters to Esmeralda (on the Orinoco River) by way of the Mavaca River. The aromatic seeds of [illegible] the puchery laurel were seasonally gathered near Esmeralda and sold in Brazil (Humboldt, 1281, Vol. 5, pt. 1, pp. 308-9).

175 427 So well known was this route that Robert Schomburgk intended to follow it in 1839 to reach the Rio Negro from Esmeralda, hoping to avoid the 200 miles that the Casiquiare route would have added to his journey. He was dissuaded from doing so by the residents of Esmeralda, who, knowing both the route and the seasonal variations in the river, assured him that the trip would be impossible at that time of the year (Schomburgk, 1840 :244).

Richard Spruce ascended the Paciba River, a branch of the Casiquiare Canal that has its source near the Mavaca River, in 1854 and found the upper reaches of the river inhabited by several Aruak-speaking tribes (1908:425, 427).

000 The first evidence that the Yąnomamö had penetrated

[a] [i.e. Shamatari expansion south of the Orinoco R. - Analyst]

101
175 The first evidence that 31 the Yąnomamö had penetrated the Mavaca Basin comes from a brief comment in Rice's account (1921) of his exploration of the Upper Orinoco. His guide, a Baré Indian, told him that the 'Guaharibos' had killed his brother ". . . near the sources of the Umauaca."[1] There is no historical evidence that the Yąnomamö occupied the Mavaca basin any earlier than this date (ca. 1915-20), save for scattered reports of unidentified 'wild tribes' alleged to dwell in these regions. My own data support this.

By 1925 the Yąnomamö were reported to be raiding settlements along the upper Cauabury River and soon were raiding the north bank of the Rio Negro itself. The Brazilian 648 settlers eventually abandoned this area because of the raids (Seitz, 1963:19, 20, 21; Zerries, 1964:14).

The historical evidence suggests, then, that the Yąnomamö have entered this large area only recently. This is supported by the accounts given to me by the Yąnomamö, who further describe the occupants of the area as Shamatari, a usage based in part on the historical interconnectedness of the villages that spread into the area, and in part on geographical considerations. Yąnomamö villages unrelated to the original group led by Kayabawä (Shamatari) have entered this area, and their northern neighbors refer to them as Shamatari, even though these villages are not historically related to Kayabawä's and their members deny being Shamatari.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 341.

101 The term Waika or Guaica is used in much the same way as the term Shamatari, i.e., in reference to a geographical bloc of villages that have a common history. I have no knowledge concerning the origin of the term except its etymological derivation from the verb waikaö: "to kill something that is already wounded," "to finish off an animal that is dying."[1]

The term Waika, or variants of it (Guaica, Uaica), has been in the literature the longest, appearing in Caulin's 1779 work. Zerries has adopted its usage, along with the term Schiriana, to refer to the entire Yąnomamö group; ironically, members of the village in which he conducted his field work, Mahekodo-tedi, denied to me that they were Waika, explaining that the Waika lived further up the Orinoco River and inland.

Insofar as designations more precise than Yąnomamö are required, the Indians themselves simply use their village names. The terms Shamatari and Waika do not refer to political entities, and the boundaries of the geographical zones including so-called Waika or Shamatari villages are difficult to fix. Only the members of those villages that are related historically to Kayabawä's group are properly designated as Shamatari. All of the Indians of this large area, however, regard themselves as Yąnomamö, no matter what others call them, and I adopt this term to refer to the entire group.

000 Numerically, the Yąnomamö are one of the largest

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[114] [1] Zerries, 1964:3, gives the same derivation for the term.

131 Numerically, the Yąnomamö[33] are one of the largest
161 unacculturated tribes in South America, having a total popu-
lation that approaches 10,000 in both Venezuela and Brazil.
Most Yąnomamö live in Venezuela, occupying the area drained
by the upper Orinoco, Mavaca, Manaviche, Ocamo, Padamo and
Ventuari Rivers in the state of Amazonas, and the headwaters
101 of the Caura and Paragua rivers of Estado Bolivar. In several
199 drainages (Paragua, Caura, Ventuari and Padamo) the Yąnomamö
439 are in contact with other tribes speaking Carib languages
(Makiritare and Arekuna or Taulipang), from whom the Yąnomamö
have traditionally obtained steel tools in trade and from
whom a number of culture traits have been borrowed. Zerries
has painstakingly analyzed these traits in his 1964 work.

114 No systematic census has been made of the entire
161 Yąnomamö language family, although James P. Barker was
commissioned by the Venezuelan Government to compile a census
of the Yąnomamö occupying the Amazonas territory of that
country. By both actual head-count and estimates of village
size for groups that topography prevented him from visiting,
Barker presently estimates the Venezuelan Amazonas Yąnomamö
population to be well over 7,000.[1]

161 The population in Amazonas is distributed in some 80
162
*621 to 100 villages, averaging between 60 and 100 people per
village.[2] Villages occasionally contain as few as 40 people

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[115] [1] Personal communication. See Zerries (1964:5) for a discussion of Yąnomamö population size. He concludes that the Yąnomamö are ". . . the largest yet unacculturated aboriginal group in tropical South America." (Ibid. My translation.)

[[88] [2] The relationship to warfare tactics and village size is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

161
162 and as many as 250, but the lower extreme is uncommon because
#621 of military vulnerability and the upper extreme occurs only
when particularly intense warfare retards village splitting
or leads to the coalition of several related villages.

361 Villages that are on peaceful terms may be found
#628 living within a few miles of each other, whereas mutually
722 hostile villages rarely are located less than a day's march
apart; even then, one of the villages may move to reduce the
possibility of raiding.

361 The village itself is circular or oval in plan, is generally surrounded by a palisade of upright logs and, depending on the number of people living in the village, has a diameter ranging from 15 to 70 yards.

361
342 The village is hardly more than a continuous, circular lean-to roof, open at the center. The roof starts at ground level (occasionally one or two feet above ground level), rises at an angle of 30° to 40°, reaching a maximum height of about 25 feet. The un-partitioned segments of the continuous roof are built by the families who occupy them, brothers and their dependents living next to each other. The materials used in construction are long, slender poles, vines to secure the pole frame and a thatch made from leaves.

351 There are usually several entrances to the village, each located at a point marking the boundary of one segment of the roof with another, and are merely un-thatched sections of the otherwise continuous roof. Most of the entrances are only 3 feet high, although there usually is at least one

351 large entrance, that leading to the river or stream. All
entrances are covered with dry leaves and brush in the evening
and the slightest movement of the covering creates sufficient
noise to alert the dogs.

133 The Yąnomamö occupy a relatively homogeneous geograph-
[137] ical region of low-lying tropical jungle interrupted by
densely-wooded hills that sometimes reach an altitude of 2,500
feet, some 2,000 feet above the elevation of the general
361 terrain. Larger hills are more common in the headwaters of
[133] [484] the Orinoco and along the boundaries separating Brazil from
Venezuela, but the Indians prefer to make their villages in
the lowlands on small streams, as all of their travelling is
[179] done on foot. Only recently have the Yąnomamö begun moving
to the larger rivers, where they may obtain canoes and steel
tools from foreigners. In 1950 there was only one Yąnomamö
village, Mahekodo-tedi, on a navigable portion of the Orinoco
River; since then at least seven or eight villages have moved
to the Orinoco or one of its larger tributaries in order to
gain access to trade goods (axes and machetes) foreign to
their culture. The overwhelming number of Yąnomamö villages,
[221] however, can only be reached by walking to them. During the
[484] wet season (April-September) travel all but ceases between
villages because the trails linking villages are inundated.

241 The Yąnomamö are slash-and-burn horticulturists,
subsisting mainly on plantains and bananas, of which they
cultivate four or five varieties each. Following these crops
in economic importance are several root crops, including taro,

241 sweet-potatoes, bitter and sweet yucca (manioc), and two varieties of another root crop known in Venezuela as mapuey. Next in importance is the seasonal crop of peach palm fruits (pijiguao), groves of which are cultivated by the Yąnomamö. [222] Contrary to some accounts, the Yąnomamö never collect this crop from wild trees, although they do return to abandoned gardens to collect the fruit. Other economically significant crops include maize, sugar cane, papaya, pineapples, avocados, peppers and gourds. Also grown are cotton, tobacco, arrow cane, drugs, pigment (bixa), and a large assortment of plants [433] used for magical purposes only. Both their feasting practices [527] and their warfare pattern[1] stimulate the Yąnomamö to grow more [722] than they require for subsistence purposes alone.

241 361 Occasionally the gardens of a particular village may have a preponderance of yucca (manioc) and maize as compared to plantains and bananas. This is usually the result of the distance between the last occupied site and the new one; it is easier to carry seeds and cuttings of maize and yucca than the heavier plantain and banana shoots, and a village that moves any distance usually establishes its new garden largely from cuttings and seeds of these plants taken from the old [262] garden. Eventually, however, the plantains and bananas spread, and a mature garden will always have a preponderance of these crops, the preferred staple of Yąnomamö diet.

222 Wild palm fruits are important additions to the diet

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*[628] [1] The Yąnomamö are occasionally obliged to take in refugee members of an allied village, and they plan their gardens accordingly.

222 in particular seasons; the most important are manaca, seje,
moriche and yagua. The hearts as well as the fruits are
eaten, and the Indians usually return to trees they have
felled to collect the large, fat, white grubs that mature in
222 the decayed pith. In general, a great deal of energy goes
241 into the collection of these palm fruits in proportion to
146 the caloric return and, even during the peak of the wild
fruit harvest, the Yąnomamö still depend heavily on their
cultivated foods.

224 Two kinds of hunting techniques provide the Yąnomamö
with most of their meat; the occasional kills made by their
dogs provide the rest. The first, called *rama*, is the
desultory individual hunting that goes on around the villages.
These hunts rarely last more than one day. The second kind
of hunting, called *heniyomou*, involves as many as a dozen
hunters who set up a temporary camp a day's walk or more away
[527] from the village and use it as the base of operations. This
[574] kind of hunting may last five days or more and occurs immediately
before a feast, as the etiquette of feasting requires
that guests be given fresh meat to eat on their way
home after the feast.

Game animals most commonly taken include several species of monkeys, two species of wild pig, tapir, armadillo, agouti, anteaters, wild turkeys, and a small alligator-like reptile (*babilla*, Spanish). Other game animals taken with less enthusiasm and less frequency include deer, turtles, parrots, snakes, capibara, guinea-hens and a large rodent (*lapa*, Spanish).

000 (lapa, Spanish).

222 The collection of small fruits, spiders, ant grubs,
wild honey, crabs, mushrooms and fish also contributes variety
to the Yąnomamö diet.

241 Cultivated foods contribute the greater proportion
262
[146] of calories to the Yąnomamö diet, probably upwards of 85%,
[177] although this figure would vary seasonally. Again, those
Yąnomamö villages living close to Makiritare settlements
cultivate much more yucca (manioc) than platanos, refining
it in some cases to meal as do the Makiritares. Elsewhere
[252] the Yąnomamö eat their yucca roasted or boiled or make cassave
bread by a technique quite distinct from that employed by the
Makiritare.

222 Yąnomamö material culture is very much attenuated by
[422] comparison with, for example, Makiritare. The Yąnomamö like
to limit their possessions to an amount that is readily
transported by the women, because the entire village may be
obliged at any given moment to abandon its site to avoid
raiders, or may be invited to a feast at another village.
[422] They do not like to leave possessions in their village when
[574] they leave it, as visitors from other villages would take
them. And, their warfare pattern precludes the possibility
of leaving a few people behind to guard the village, as they
[361] would be easily overwhelmed by a raiding party. When just a
portion of the village leaves to visit another group, those
that stay behind move into the jungle some distance from the
village and live in well-concealed huts until their co-

722 villagers return from their visit, returning only to fetch
361 food from the garden. When the men are away on a raid, the
women and children are concealed in these temporary sites
221 until the men return. During the dry season when raiding and
361 574 feasting are common, villages are frequently deserted; the
722 men are away on a raid and the women and children are hiding
in the jungle, or the entire village has gone off to participate in a feast at another village. This pattern has rather
unfortunately been described as nomadism, or semi-nomadism,
by a number of students of Yąnomamö culture. I wish to
emphasize that the Yąnomamö population movements, annually or
over a longer period of time, are almost exclusively a function
of their warfare pattern and not economic considerations, as
is implied in the use of the terms nomadism and semi-nomadism.

422
484 All males above 13 or 14 years of age have a bow,
[411] arrows, a bamboo case for carrying extra arrow tips, a fire
[415] drill, and several 'knives' made from the incisors of the
[372] agouti rodent. Both sexes have either a cotton or a vine
[237] hammock. These possessions are easily carried by the owner
[352] [123] on long trips and are rapidly packed. Whenever I wanted to
accompany a group of people on trips to other villages they
always complained about how much of a burden I would be. It
always took me several hours to prepare my packs, and I
always took more than I could comfortably carry myself, having
484 to hire some of them to assist me. They, on the contrary,
could be ready to depart within ten minutes of their decision
to leave, having only to roll up their hammocks and pack a few

484 plantains to eat en route. Most of the time they did not even carry their hammocks, as these could be easily manufactured from bark strips in a matter of minutes.

[462] [285] Women make several kinds of baskets, including ones to carry the family possessions when the group moves. When the entire village moves, progress is slow and only a few
[888] miles are covered each day. The reason for this is that
[758] older people and those who are sick travel very slowly,
[855] children must be carried by their parents, and food in large quantities must be transported to provision the moving group. Thus, a trip that a group of young men could easily make in one day would require two or three days if the entire village moved that distance.

415 323 The only non-portable[1] (as well as the only durable) item made by the Yąnomamö is a large, heavy, poorly fired
[184] clay pot. These are manufactured by only a few villages,
[443] which serve as trading centers for this industry. They are
[462] made by men and are their property since women are too clumsy
[422] [562] to be permitted to handle and use them and would probably break them. When a pot does break, the fragments are used as mortars for grinding drugs, small stone celts, found in the woods by the Yąnomamö, serving as pestles. The larger fragments of a broken pot are used as cooking plates in the
[197] manufacture of cassave bread. Despite the fact that most of the Yąnomamö villages have not been contacted directly, the

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[1] The pots are concealed in the garden when the group moves.

415 323 clay pots are rapidly being replaced by aluminum ware sup-
179 plied to the few villages in contact with foreigners. These
[437] aluminum pots enter the exchange networks and ultimately
[438] reach virtually every village, as do machetes, axes, knives,
glass beads, and fishhooks.

291 Clothing for men is limited to cotton strings around
the wrist, ankles, knees, and waist; the foreskin of the
penis is tied to the waist string. Occasionally men wear a
string around their upper torso that crosses at both the
chest and the back, and a thick cotton belt, circular in
301 cross-section, around the waist. Scalps of wild turkeys are
237 worn as fore-arm bands, to which are tied clusters of feathers
[304] that dangle from a string a foot or so in length. Men per-
forate the lower lip and the ear lobes; they wear a small
feather in the lip and short pieces of arrow cane through
their ear lobes, occasionally embellished with colored
302 feathers. Both sexes cover their bodies with red pigment and
shave the tops of their heads, the latter being more common
[164] among the women. The men shave the tops of their heads to
[551] display their numerous scalp wounds, evidence of fierceness
in club fights.

291 Younger women wear a cotton waist band, thick cotton
armbands, circular in cross-section, a harness of cotton
strings on their upper torso that crosses between the breasts
and at the back, and single strings around their ankles and
[304] below their knees. Women pierce their ear lobes, the corners
[301] of their mouth, lower lip, and nasal septum. Arrow shaft

291 segments or fibres from the seje palm leaf are worn through
[304] the ear lobes. Small sticks are inserted in the lip and
[301] nasal peforations, but, as the women get older, these are
discarded. Older women wear only single strings around the
wrists, ankles, knees, and upper torso, or, like the children,
nothing at all.

796 Other than the social feasts held during the dry
527 season, ceremonies are limited to female puberty rites, puri-
881 fication rites for men who have killed other men in raids, a
727 vision-quest rite to induct shamans, and mortuary feasts
783 756 during which the pulverized bones of the dead are consumed
764 266 in a soup made from boiled ripe plantains.

796 The puberty rite for females and the purification
881 rite for killers are almost identical. The initiate is
783 727 confined to quarters that are covered over with a specific
kind of palm leaf, the cotton garments and cotton possessions
belonging to the initiate are discarded and replaced with new
ones, special sticks are used to scratch the body and to pick
up food, and straws are used to drink water. The shedding of
blood, of considerable mythological importance to the
Yąnomamö in validating their ferocity and warfare, is
ceremonially expressed in two of five rites.

756 The induction of shamans involves drug-taking, fast-
[796] ing and meditation. The candidate is forbidden to walk any-
[784] where except on a set number of paths in and around the
village, and he is distinguished in the village by a staff to

756
784 which is tied a bundle of feathers.[1]

*621 Besides shamans, of which there are several in
622 every village, there are influential 'big men.' The number
613
[956] of big men in a village depends, on the one hand, on the
size of the village and the number of local patrilineages
comprising it, and, on the other, on the number of men who
622 are personally qualified to lead. The qualities that deter-
156 mine leadership are personal courage, fierceness, the ability
*628 to be outraged by even the slightest insult, marksmanship,
584
diplomacy in trading with representatives from other villages,
the ability to arrange marriages for male supporters with
females from other villages, cunning and inte[illegible] in
dealings with allies, the ability to attract young men to
live permanently in the village by promising them wives, and
the defense of group members who get into difficulties with
other village members.

622 Individuals who possess all these attributes are
[602] considered leaders only if they have a large natural following, i.e., brothers and sons living with them in their village. Otherwise, such men have only just a little more

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[171] [1] To give a more comparative statement on the poverty of Yąnomamö culture, they possess only 11 traits of the 354 listed in the 4th edition of Carneiro and Tobias' "Trait List to be Used for the Study of Cultural Evolution by Means of Scale Analysis," (1963, mimeograph). By contrast, the Siriono have 8, the Andamanese 10, the Jivaro 22, the Nuer 28, the Siuai 39, the Iroquois 64, the Bemba 100 and the Tahitians 140. (Carneiro and Tobias, 1963:201.) In the classification developed by E. R. Service (1962), the Yąnomamö are "tribal."

622 influence within the village. A leader's functions are few and ill-defined. Generally, he initiates activities that the [701] entire group has already decided to undertake. His major function and concern is with organizing and leading raiding parties and with investigating the village neighborhood when raiders are likely to be present, a dangerous and undesirable [529] [574] [439] task. Moreover, he represents the village and frequently initiates feasts to honor other villages, and he often supervises the trading that normally follows a feast, permitting enough possessions to pass into the hands of the guests to assuage their greed, while at the same time ensuring that his [529] [241] followers are not impoverished. Because of his role in initiating feasts, his garden is usually larger than that of his followers and he produces the greater portion of food [578] [621] [627] given away during the feast. During club-fights within the village, the leaders of the factions involved in the fighting stand by and attempt to keep the fighting innocuous, using both diplomacy and threats to effect a relatively peaceful end to the fighting. When diplomacy fails and someone is badly injured or killed in the fighting, the headmen are the first to start firing arrows at the offenders.

629 721 554 The headman's role as leader is enhanced in proportion to the intensity of warfare. Some headmen deliberately seek to prolong wars by spurning offers of peace from their enemies, or go so far as to initiate new raids against some unsuspecting village on the pretext that they are practicing harmful magic against his followers, or simply to abduct women.

622 [554] women. During relatively peaceful times headmen are hardly more than equals among their followers and their ability to command respect and issue orders diminishes accordingly. [62[illegible]) Political commitments to aid other villages in raiding, however, usually precludes long periods of peace and, should a village fail in such an obligation, its allies quickly turn on it and force it to participate. Thus, political circumstances are continually forcing villages into situations that require leadership.

114

## B. Anthropological Work On the Yąnomamö

So far four anthropological expeditions have had an opportunity to study Yąnomamö groups, but only two of these spent an adequate amount of time in the field to collect data that substantially increase our knowledge of Yąnomamö culture. I refer to the expeditions of the Frobenius Institute in 1954-55 which brought Otto Zerries and Meinhard Schuster to the village of Mahekodo-tedi for some 10 months, and the expedition of Hans Becher in 1955-56 to the upper Demini River in Brazil, where he studied two villages for 9 months. The expeditions of Koch-Grünberg in 1911-12 and Johannes Wilbert in 1958 and 1960 made only brief contacts with Yąnomamö.

The results of Koch-Grünberg's contact with two groups of Yąnomamö are summarized in his Vom Rorima zum Orinoco. He met two "hordes" of "Schiriana" in 1911 on the upper Uraricuera (Parima) River of Brazil. One group, whose village was on the upper Uraricapará, a left tributary of the Uraricuera, visited his camp on the Purumamé Rapids of the Uraricuera.[1] The second group, which he met about a month later, was settled on a small stream (Motomotó) off the Parima River near the Marutani Mountains. The latter group fled shortly after he contacted them; they feared the photographic equipment and firearms carried by the members of the expedition. Most of Koch-Grünberg's material comes from his contact with the first group and is limited to brief descriptions of physical type, material culture, house styles, body decorations, and a short vocabulary of the language (1923: 300ff; 1928). He was the first to conclude that the Guaica, Kirishana, Guaharibo, and Schiriana were in all probability the same group:

> We can admit with great probability that the Guaharibo are very closely related to, if not the same tribe as, the Schirianá of the Uraricuéra, just as the Waikas of the Parima Mountains may not be a group distinct from the tribe bearing that same name on the upper Uraricuéra. (My translation. 1923:299. See also pp. 290, 291 and his 1922 work, p. 225.)

As significant as this accurate conclusion in the development of Yąnomamö ethnography is his inaccurate vignette of the economy and settlement pattern of this large group:

> In view of entire culture content (Habitus) I should like to consider the Schirianá and Waika as an extremely old population layer of these areas that, similar to the more primitive Makú of the Rio Negro area, is found scattered in small, mutually hostile bands having no fixed habitation site in the headwaters of the upper Uraricuéra tributaries and beyond to the upper Orinoco, and lives only on hunting,

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[1] This is the group studied more recently by Migliazza, 1964.

> fishing and collecting forest fruits. (1923: 299-300. My translation. See also 1922:226.)

[224] [226] [222] His assertion that the Yąnomamö lived only on hunting, fishing, and collecting wild forest fruit was unsupported not only by the existing accounts but also by his own observations; and it has never been verified by any field worker who has spent more than a few days with the Yąnomamö.[1] Nor was the conclusion warranted that the Yąnomamö had no fixed habitation sites; Koch-Grünberg was visited by one of the groups and the other had a garden site a short distance from where he met them. Finally, the antiquity of the group as a "population layer" is something that can only be speculated about at best; indeed, the concept 'population layer' is itself an analytic construct presupposing a considerable amount of knowledge concerning tribal distributions over a period of time which, at least for this area, is entirely lacking.

The expedition of the Frobenius Institute in 1954-55 conducted the first anthropological inquiry in this area that concentrated exclusively on the study of the Yąnomamö. The members of the expedition, Otto Zerries and his assistant, Meinhard Schuster, spent 10 months in the village of Mahekodotedi. They selected the Yąnomamö because of their interest in hunters and gatherers; the literature, especially the work of Koch-Grünberg, described the Yąnomamö as such. They

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[1] "It is surprising to notice, that the Waica, formerly reported as a hunting and gathering tribe by visitors who had only superficial contact with them, are actually horticulturists." (Zerries, 1955:78.)

114 initiated their work among this group, in Zerries' words, ". . . to come a step closer to the problem of the world's oldest cultural layer of the hunter and collector."[1] On arriving at Mahekodo-tedi, however, Zerries was surprised to discover that the Yąnomamö were not in fact hunters and gatherers, but horticulturists:

> To our great surprise we were obliged to conclude right from the start of our investigations that the Waika are above all dependent on the cultivation of the plantain (platano) to a considerable degree. (1958:177. My translation.)

114 174 224 222 241 Although Zerries acknowledges the current horticultural status of the Yąnomamö, his work is frequently characterized by attempts to portray the Yąnomamö as hunting and gathering people who have only recently adopted cultivation and are still in transition from a pure hunting and gathering stage to a purely horticultural one. Thus, Zerries argues that the Yąnomamö divide their year into seasons fixed by the ripening of individual species of wild fruits (which I have not been able to verify), implies that peach palm (pijiguao) was recently a collected rather than a cultivated fruit, describes the Yąnomamö settlement pattern and annual cycle as half-nomadic or semi-nomadic, and generally emphasizes the role of hunting and collecting in determining the cultural status of the Yąnomamö in South American culture history, all of which detract, I believe, from an understanding of their culture as it exists at the present time and probably has

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[1] 1964:1. My translation.

114 194 224 222 241 existed for the past several hundred years. At many points the data used by Zerries to infer that they were until recently hunters and gatherers lend themselves to other interpretations: b

> [192] Finally, the Waika connect the general word for food, "ni," with the word for archery, "niai," out of which results that in their conceptual world, subsistence itself in the last analysis results from hunting--which is symptomatic of the way of life of the hunting and gathering heritage of the Waika. (1958:180. My translation.)

114 194 192 224 222 241 The word *nii* (not *ni*) usually refers to vegetable food, most of which is cultivated by the Yąnomamö and generally does not include meat. The word for the latter, *yaro*, conversely, does not apply to vegetable food. Again, there are two words to describe hunger; *ohi* refers to that kind of hunger that can be satisfied by eating vegetable food, whereas *naiiki* is a kind of hunger that can only be satisfied by eating meat or fish. And, it is possible for individuals *not* to be *ohi* but be *naiiki*. One could easily argue that subsistence and cultivation are intimately linked, as their word for one form of hunger (*ohi*) is similar to their word for taro: *ohina*. The similarity, then, between the word for archery (*niaö*) and vegetable food (*nii*, not *ni*) tells us nothing about the cultural status of the Yąnomamö either in the past or at the present.

114 In general, Zerries' data are excellent and his conclusions sound; and his major work (1964) will remain the basic ethnographic source on the Yąnomamö for many years.

The Frobenius Expedition was followed by the work of

114 Hans Becher, who conducted field work in two Yąnomamö villages on the upper Demini and the Aracá rivers (Pakidái and Surára) from October 1955 to June 1956. His results are summarized in his 1960 monograph, a general description of all aspects of Yąnomamö culture.

114 619 His analysis of Yąnomamö social organization is inadequate and misleading, particularly his treatment of the political organization about which he asserts that the Yąnomamö are divided into two large, antagonistic political blocs:

> The suggestion of the Surára headman is significant in this connection, according to which there are, within the Yanonámi People, two powerful tribes that constantly make war upon each other; first, the Xiriána, whose name for themselves is "Harateri," and, secondly, the Waiká. All of the smaller tribes are on the side of one or the other, but are at the same time liable to them for tribute and war duty. (1960:6. See also p. 73 and his 1957a:119 and 1957b:115 comments. Zerries [1964:1] expresses his dissatisfaction with this interpretation also. My translation.)

114 In 1958 and 1960 Johannes Wilbert briefly visited Yąnomamö (Sanema) villages in the upper Ventuari River and upper Caura River, summarizing his results in his 1963 publication.

Although Wilbert regards the villages he visited as representative of the Yąnomamö villages described in the works of Zerries and Becher, his reports are somewhat at variance with the accounts of the latter, particularly with respect to economy and aspects of social organization. On these topics Wilbert tends to accept Koch-Grünberg's state-

114 ments rather uncritically, largely because they support his own theory that 'Paleo-Indian' culture, Chibchan language, and low Diego gene frequency are correlated in South America. In treating Yąnomamö economy as 'Paleo-Indian' in nature, Wilbert ignores the only data based on field work bearing on Yąnomamö economic life--that reported by Zerries and Becher in the two monographs mentioned above.

Again, it is difficult to determine when Wilbert is reporting facts, when he is making theoretical conclusions, or when he is guessing. 114 601 This is particularly true of his comments on social organization and data relevant to analyzing it:

> We did not succeed, for lack of an informant, in obtaining a list of kinship terms. Our impression is that it would be an Hawaiian System. (1963:211. My translation. [His statements in other publications are quite emphatic on this point: "The kinship system is of the Hawaiian type." Layrisse, Layrisse, and Wilbert, 1962:82.])

The kinship terminology of the groups in the area visited by Wilbert is bifurcate-merging (Iroquois) in type (Migliazza, 1964), as it is in the upper Orinoco area.[1]

114 In addition to the field work conducted by these ethnologists, numerous travelers, adventurers, botanists,

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[1] Migliazza's publication was not available to Wilbert when the latter concluded that the Yąnomamö have an Hawaiian kinship terminology. A part of the discrepancy between Wilbert's data and that reported by Zerries (1964) and Becher (1960) stems from the fact that Wilbert's Sanema differ appreciably from the more southerly Yąnomamö groups. Wilbert, however, intends his generalizations on the Sanema to apply to all the Yąnomamö. I might point out that my own analysis applies to the Upper Orinoco and Mavaca River Yąnomamö. See Conclusions, Chapter 6.

geographers and explorers have from time to time passed through or near the Yąnomamö area. Their observations have not materially increased our knowledge or understanding of Yąnomamö culture except, in a few instances, in a geographic-distributional sense. Koch-Grünberg (1922) and Otto Zerries (1964:7 ff.) have summarized the results. Finally, a number of missonaries or linguists employed by missions have made significant contributions to Yąnomamö ethnography. Of major importance are the works of James P. Barker (1953, 1959) and Ernesto Migliazza (1964, Migliazza and Grimes, 1961).

## CHAPTER II

## THE DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS OF WARFARE, POLITICAL ALLIANCE, AND SETTLEMENT DYNAMICS[1]

### 128 A. The Shortage of Women and Feuding

623 621 721 562 162 578 As outlined in the Introduction, the shortage of women among the Yąnomamö has far-reaching consequences in almost every aspect of their social organization. In this chapter I will establish the general functional relationship between this demographic fact and the dynamics of village feuding, village splitting, and village re-location. These phenomena will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, particularly with reference to the kinship system.

847 - The Yąnomamö practice male and female infanticide. There are a number of reasons accounting for this practice. 847 854 853 [843] First, young couples do not relish the prospect of a long period of celibacy that pregnancy and lactation taboos impose on them. From the time a woman discovers she is pregnant until the time she weans her child, she is not allowed to have sexual relations. The time period involved varies from

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 65]

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[128] [114] [1] The data discussed in this and subsequent chapters are drawn from the 5 villages, listed in Table 1, in which I spent most of my time. The historical and genealogical relationships of these villages are given later in the text. My generalizations on Yąnomamö culture and social organization are applicable to those groups occupying the Upper Orinoco and the Mavaca River basis. (See Map B, next page.)



MAP B:

SOME MAVACA & ORINOCO YANOMAMÖ VILLAGES

Iyäwei-tedi
OCAMO R.
Widokaiya-tedi
Buinaböwä-tedi
Saiyariwä-tedi
Makolima-tedi
Karohi-tedi
MAATA R.
Boreta-tedi
Bisaasi-tedi
Daiyari-tedi
Mahekodo-tedi
Shashanawä-tedi
ORINOCO RIVER
Yabitawä-tedi
Kashorawä-tedi
Monou-tedi
Mömariböwei-tedi
MAVACA RIVER
Patanowä-tedi
Hasaböwä-tedi
Ashadowä-tedi
Reyaboböwei-tedi
Iwahikoroba-tedi
Möwäraoba-tedi
N
scale in miles:
0
10
20

N.A. Chagnon 1966

847 834 853 two to three years, as women nurse their children until they are at least two years old. Faced with this prospect, young couples may decide to kill their child, irrespective of its sex.[1]

847 Infanticide is effected by a number of techniques. Most commonly, a woman strangles her child with a vine as soon as it is delivered. In other cases the child is allowed to suffocate if it does not begin breathing spontaneously. If the child begins to breathe, the mother may simply abandon it where it is born, or throw it into the jungle. A case of attempted infanticide came to my attention by way of the New Tribes Mission. A woman in one of the villages on the Padamo [797] River threw a new-born daughter into the jungle. The missionary living with the woman's village found the baby and took it into his own home. The woman had either struck the child on the head with an instrument, or the child had hit something when the mother threw it into the jungle, as there was a severe bruise on the side of the baby's face.[2]

[848] In another instance, a husband forced his wife to kill a child because he was certain that he did not sire the

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[1] Occasionally the woman will arrange to have an abortion when the foetus is in an advanced state of development. The most common practice consists of rupturing the amnion by trauma: a pregnant woman will lie on her back and have someone, usually a female friend or kinswoman, jump on her abdomen. More rarely, she will have her husband rupture the amnion by squeezing her around the abdomen by an arm lock.

[2] The missionary ultimately adopted the infant and brought her to England when he left Venezuela.

847 [848] child: he had scrupulously observed the coitus taboo during lactation--the wife had not.

Most cases of infanticide take place when a couple already has a small child. Sickness takes a heavy toll during the early months of a child's life, and women are reluctant to jeopardize a child that has already survived the first two years. So, they frequently kill the new-born so that their older child will have no competition for milk. Bahimi, a woman of some 30 years, killed a new male baby shortly after I started my fieldwork in Bisassi-tedi. She explained, tearfully, that she did not feel that she could successfully raise the new child because she still had a son that was nursing.

847 562 162 These cases do not, however, explain why there is a consistent bias to kill females rather than males. When I discovered how significantly the sex ratio diverged from the expected value of 1.0 in some villages, I tried to get an explanation from the Yąnomamö. I was surprised to find out that they were ignorant of their own bias in killing children. [842] What did come to light, however, was the fact that Yąnomamö prefer to have a male baby for their first child and, if it turns out that the first child is a girl, they will frequently kill her. If, however, a couple prefers to have a girl and the first child is a boy, they generally do not kill the boy.[1]

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[114] [582] [1] Whatever the reason may be for the preference toward males as eldest children, there is one structural effect that deserves further enquiry. Rose (1960) effectively showed that where males tend to marry females that are younger than them-

847 562 Several kinds of demographic data suggest that the
162 rate of female infanticide is high. Table 1 gives the sex
ratios of five Yąnomamö villages. The sex ratio for the total
population sample (576 individuals) gives a more meaningful
estimate of the rate of female infanticide, as there is considerable variation by village in the value of the sex ratio.
The excess of males in the total population (8%) gives a first
562 approximation of the frequency of female infanticide. The
162 628 variation in the sex ratio by the village, on the other hand,
722 expresses the political relationships of the villages to
[583] their allies. That is, the distribution of women in these
five villages is a function of the military requirements of
the particular villages in the marriage alliance network.
Thus, the cline in sex ratio from Reyaboböwei-tedi to Bisaasi-tedi (ignoring the Patanowä-tedi, who are not allied to the
other groups) reflects a dominance gradient in politico-
125 military requirements of each village. The total sample of
847 576 individuals must be considered in order to estimate the
162 628 frequency of female infanticide among the Yąnomamö, but the
562 political relationships between the villages must be understood to account for the variation by village of the value

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 59]

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847 selves, it is highly unlikely that men will marry a FaSiDa,
562 despite the kinship terminology. Rose did not, however,
162 consider the possibility that sibships may have a systematic
bias in their composition; if males tend to be older than
114 their sisters considering all sibships, the probability that
582 a FaSiDa is of marriageable age is increased. I specifically questioned the relationship between female infanticide and FaSiDa marriage, and the Yąnomamö denied any correlation between the two practices. There can be no doubt, however, that the occurrence of FaSiDa marriage among the Yąnomamö is made more probable by female infanticide.

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*621
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**Table 1**: Village Size, Male/Female Sex-ratio, and Percentage of Excess Males.

| Village Name | Size | Males | Females | Sex-Ratio | % Excess Males |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reyaboböwei-tedi | 77 | 47 | 30 | 1.6 | 22 |
| Mömariböwei-tedi | 85 | 47 | 38 | 1.2 | 11 |
| Patanowä-tedi | 212 | 122 | 90 | 1.4 | 15 |
| Monou-tedi | 66 | 34 | 32 | 1.1 | 3 |
| Bisaasi-tedi | 136 | 62 | 74 | 0.8 | -9 |
| Totals: | 576 | 312 | 264 | | |

$\frac{312}{264}$ .....1.2 Total Male/Female Sex-ratio

$\frac{48}{576}$ .....8% Excess of Males

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847 of the sex ratio, and the distribution of the women among
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*628 them.
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In Chapter 5 I will show how the two Shamatari vil-
*628
529 lages, Reyaboböwei-tedi and Mömariböwei-tedi, participated in
594 a treacherous feast during which they killed a number of
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361 their kinsmen from Möwäraoba-tedi. This feast committed the two Shamatari villages to an alliance with the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi in which the latter two villages were, in a political-military sense, less dependent on the support of the Shamatari than the Shamatari were on them. The Mömariböwei-tedi and the Reyaboböwei-tedi represented the front of the Shamatari expansion into the unoccupied Mavaca River area. The territory they abandoned as they expanded to the west was subsequently occupied by other Shamatari villages, the members of which were historically related to them.[1] By participating in the treacherous feast and becoming enemies to their congeners, the two Shamatari villages subordinated themselves to the interests of the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi. Since they formed a buffer between the villages of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi on the one hand, and the Shamatari village of Möwäraoba-tedi on the other, they bore the brunt of the raids mounted by the latter in
*628 revenge for the treachery. In short, they had only two
583 dependable allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi.
162
562 Their dependence on these allies was transformed into an im-
*621

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[1] See Chapter 5, "The History of Paruritawä-tedi."

Their dependence
*628 on these allies was transformed into an im-
583 balance in the exchange of women between the two groups of
162
562 villages, accounting for the variation in sex-ratio given for
*621 the villages in Table 1.

*628 The degree to which each village is dependent on its
583 allies is roughly indicates in Table 1. The Reyaboböwei-tedi,
726
722 being closer, geographically, to the Möwäraoba-tedi, suffered
more from the revenge raids of the latter. In other words, they needed military aid from their own allies to a greater extent, and have, accordingly, lost far more women to their allies as a consequence. But the true situation is even more remarkable than suggested by the sex ratio for the Reyaboböwei-tedi; a large percentage of the women in their village have been abducted by them in raids against the Möwäraoba-tedi, i.e., they have actually lost more women to their allies in exchanges than is suggested by the sex-ratio alone.

*621 Again, the sex ratios for the Bisaasi-tedi and the
162
*628 Monou-tedi are misleading without additional information.
583 These two villages would seem, from Table 1, to have gained
a remarkable number of women in the political alliances they
162 made with their Shamatari friends. This, however, is not the
*628
*621 only reason they have such a high percentage of women in
726 their populations. In 1950 these villages were victimized
527
165 by the Möwäraoba-tedi and the Iwahikoroba-tedi in a treacherous feast. They lost approximately 15 men. Were two-thirds of these men alive today, for example, the resultant sex ratios for the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi population would more accurately reflect the dominance gradient, measured

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#628 in terms of women ceded to them by the Shamatari, that they
#621
726 maintain over their Shamatari allies.

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165 The sex ratio data give a rough idea, then, of the
162 extent of female infanticide and, in addition, reflect the
165 political relationships of the villages to each other in
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583 terms of the flow of women. Other demographic data, however,
847 suggest that the practice of female infanticide is even higher
#628
than the sex ratios alone indicate. Table 2 gives the stated cause of death of 240 adult individuals. These individuals are related to the living members of the three villages of Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi. It is immediately apparent that more men die in warfare than women,[1] implying that the frequency of female infanticide is substantially higher than the 8% suggested by sex ratio data.

838 There are several ways the Yąnomamö remedy their
883 woman shortage. Young bachelors, for example, practice
sodomy (bei kä bosi kuwemou, bei kä bosi waumou) with each
[572] other. These relationships develop into a 'buddy' system
(äwä) and promote ties of friendship that extend into adult
[839] life. Some of my informants confidentially told me that
particular young men had been known to copulate with dogs in estrus, but this was regarded with contempt by all who knew about it. Homosexuality, however, was not considered despicable, but it was thought to be infantile. Most of the

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 63]

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[1] Twenty-two per cent (31/138) of all male deaths were due to warfare, while only 6% (6/102) of female deaths were due to this cause.

Table 2: Causes of death of 240 (adult) ancestors of the Namowei-tedi.

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| Stated Cause of Death[1] | Males | Females | Total | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malaria & Epidemics | 58 | 72 | 130 | 54.2 |
| Dysentery, Diarrhea | 16 | 5 | 21 | 8.8 |
| Warfare | 31 | 6 | 37 | 15.4 |
| Clubfights | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0.8 |
| Snakebite | 2 | 3 | 5 | 2.1 |
| Sorcery (2) | 15 | 10 | 25 | 10.4 |
| Tigers | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.4 |
| Chest infections | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1.7 |
| Hayaheri[3] | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1.2 |
| "Old age" | 4 | 0 | 4 | 1.7 |
| Pains in groin | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1.2 |
| Childbirth | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1.2 |
| Other | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0.8 |
| Totals: | 138 | 102 | 240 | 99.9 |

[115]

[1] These diagnoses were made by the Yanomamö. Some of the biological implications of these statistics have been brought to my attention by Dr. James V. Neel; I intend to discuss them in a later publication.

[731]
[753]

[2] These deaths were probably due to such pathological causes as malaria. When malaria first reached epidemic proportions in some of the Yanomamö villages in the middle 1950's most of the deaths were attributed to the practice of harmful magic on the part of enemies.

[3] This is a peculiar sickness associated with intense pains in the upper abdominal region; the pains may last several days. In most cases the Indians recover from this illness.

838 unmarried young men in Bisaasi-tedi were having homosexual
863 relationships with each other, but no stigma was attached to
this behavior. In fact, most of these bachelors joked about
it and simulated copulation with each other in public. The
men involved in these affairs, however, were hardly more
than teenagers; I have no cases of adult men satisfying their
836 sexual needs by homosexuality. By the time a young man is
837 20 to 25 years old, his sexual interests focus on women, and
he is constantly attempting to establish liaisons with women,
[554] whether or not they have husbands. In some respects, a man's
[627] status depends on his ability to successfully carry on
[578] clandestine affairs which, when discovered, force him into
[64] club-fights. The number of scars he has on his scalp is a
[554] measure of his sexual prowess.

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835 Rarely, a man will permit his brother to have sexual
relations with his wife. In the village of Mömariböwei-tedi
732 there is an achodroplastic dwarf, Yoyosiwä. Being 'ugly'
(*wanidiwä*), he can not find a wife. One of his normal
brothers permits him sexual access to his own wife. In
general, however, men are jealous of their adult brothers
595 and do not permit such affairs. Occasionally, if a man has
593 several wives, the wives themselves may put pressure on the
husband to give one of them to the man's younger brother;
co-wives, too, are capable of being jealous of each other
and often resent having to share food, particularly meat.
Several young men in Bisaasi-tedi have obtained their wives
from older brothers because the latter could not keep peace

595 in the family. The transfer of the woman from the older to
593 the younger brother was, in some of the cases, quite gradual. Thus, Kąobawä gave Hantoami to his younger brother, Shadadama, because his other two wives complained about not having enough game to eat. Kąobawä continued to have sexual relationships with Hantoami after she had become Shadadama's wife, and sired two of her children.

*628 Another form of permitted affair is called nohimou--
722 "to befriend" or "act like a friend" to a woman. This type
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837 of relationship might occur, for example, when the members of a village have to take refuge with an ally. The allies invariably enter into nohimou relationships with the women of the refugees. The refugees are reluctant to give their women as wives to the men of the host village, but they are obliged to permit them to have sexual access to the women. These kinds of affairs also develop within a village between a man and the wife of a friend, or, with single girls. Again,
*629 when men go on visits to other villages and bring trade goods,
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438 they frequently are permitted to have affairs with the hosts'
837 women, particularly if the men have brought goods that are
836 highly prized by the hosts.

835 Incestuous affairs between classificatory siblings are quite common.[1] One of my female informants used husband

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[1] Incest, to the (male ego) Yąnomamö, is any sexual relationship with a member of one's lineage or with mother, mother's sister, mother's mother, and mother's sister's daughter. Failure to avoid a woman of the mother-in-law category is also incestuous in the eyes of the Yąnomamö, but only if the woman is sexually active. Menopausal women of

835 terms for a number of men that were, genealogically, her
distant agnates. She explained the usage by the fact that
she had incestuous relationships with several of them when
she was a young woman. Kąobawä told me that he had incestuous
relationships with Hayamamasimi, his FaBrDa, but did not
want the others in the village to know about it. In another
case, a man married three girls who were his FaBrSoSoDa, i.e.,
his 'granddaughters.' The Yąnomamö explanation of this case
illustrates the relationship of the woman shortage to warfare
*621 and alliance. The people in question all live in Patanowä-
*628 162 tedi, a village that has numerous enemies, only one ally,
562 and a serious woman shortage. The parents of the girls in
*628 question did not want them to marry into the village of the
584 582 allies, as they had given a number of women to the allies
601 already. The man, Ishiweiwä, had no spouse and could not
835 183 get one from the allies. So, the parents of the girls stopped
calling Ishiweiwä by the appropriate consanguineal terms and
began calling him by affinal terms suited to the marriage of
the three girls to him. The girls, in turn, stopped calling
him grandfather. Ishiweiwä married just one of the girls at
first; after she died, he married the other two, as he already
called them 'wife' by virtue of the fact that he had married
their sister. The initial marriage was the major hurdle.
After he married the first girl and the kinship terms were

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835 the mother-in-law category are not avoided, nor are FaSi or MoBrWi. The implications of this last fact for Homans and Schneider's work are obvious.

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582 appropriately adjusted, he had no difficulty marrying the
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835 remaining two.
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684 The close ties between siblings of the opposite sex
[593] and between brothers-in-law are also reflected in the fact
[607] that incestuous relationships are not severely punished. Thus, Kąobäwä was known to be having an affair with his classificatory sister, Krãõmi, but her husband overlooked the matter. Incest is not severely punished. The Yąnomamö
[775] rely on the internal sanctions of shame and conscience,
[784] bolstered supernaturally by the fear that incestuous affairs prevent the release of the soul of the guilty party during
[766] cremation. As a counter measure, they dismember the body of someone known to have committed incest during his life time, and burn the parts of the body a much longer time than
835 they normally would have otherwise. Some of the Yąnomamö avoid incestuous affairs, according to Kąobawä, because one of their ancestors turned into a sloth (ihama) after having committed incest. Kąobawä himself initially denied having incestuous affairs because incest (yaweremou), as he put it, ". . . is the most despicable thing possible." Later, he
[123] confided that he had fornicated with his FaBrDa on a number of occasions and did not seem particularly concerned about the matter, except his fear that I would tell his wife. Other data suggest that incest, far from being feared, is
[601] widely practiced. In particular, kinship usage varies con-
[183] siderably from the expected usage predictable from genealogical data and the Iroquois terminology. Whenever I

835 601 183 investigated discrepant kinship usage I found that the terminology changed because of incestuous relationships between my informant (or his close kinsman) and the members of the local lineage in question. I have not investigated all discrepant usages, but the high incidence of the terminological aberrations suggests that incest is widely practiced.

835 601 183 582 [162] [562] Incestuous affairs and marriages occur largely because of the woman shortage. I have already mentioned that Ishiweiwä of Patanowä-tedi married his three 'granddaughters' because he could not find a wife of the appropriate category. A similar situation occurred in Bisaasi-tedi. Reromawä, one of the important men in the lower group of Bisaasi-tedi, has redefined a number of his classificatory daughters as sisters,[1] thereby making it possible for his sons to marry their children, otherwise incestuous marriages. His oldest son, Bäkäböwä, technically married his FaDaDa, but because his father had redefined the mother of Bäkäböwä's wife as 'sister,' the marriage was appropriate within their marriage rules.

837 *621 578 [721] The woman shortage is remedied by illicit affairs within the village. These affairs are the major cause of feuds and village splits. During the 15 months covered by my field work five club-fights occurred. Four of them were over women who had been caught in illicit affairs, and in one case, the village split into hostile factions that began

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[1] See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of this.

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*621
578 raiding each other.[1]

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*621 That the shortage of women is the basis of internal
578 feuding is illustrated by a practice recently adopted by
797 members of the New Tribes Mission working in the village of
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834 Kosholowä-tedi, a small village on the Padamo River. The
[837] missionaries had a major problem with club-fighting within the village, most of which developed out of sexual liasons between married women and married men. The missionaries began an active campaign aimed at changing the coitus taboos during pregnancy and lactation. They were successful in their efforts, and the major result was that fighting was
[163] almost completely stopped. (Another result was a sharp increase in births.)

*621 Village size and composition have an effect on the
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162 number of sexual liaisons within a village, as illicit af-
837 fairs are more difficult to discover in large villages. The
578 Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi, as can be seen from Table 1, have less of a woman shortage than the other villages. Nevertheless, fights over women do break out in these villages. One of the clubfights I witnessed took place between two groups of Monou-tedi men in the village of Bisaasi-tedi. One of the Monou-tedi men had wanted to carry on an affair with the wife of Konoreiwä, another man of his village, but was unable to do so while the Monou-tedi lived in their own village. Once when the Monou-tedi moved to Bisaasi-tedi to

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[1] See Chapter 5, Tables 5 and 6, for a summary of the causes of village splits and hostilities.

*624 avoid the raids from the Patanowä-tedi, the man in question
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162 used this opportunity to have an affair with Konoreiwä's
837 wife, presuming that he would not be discovered because the
578 village was filled with people. He was discovered, despite
his discretion, and challenged to a duel by Konoreiwä. The
[164] entire village participated in the club fight. Konoreiwä
[884] punished his wife by hitting her in the mouth with a glowing
fire brand, severely burning her lips.

162 Finally, and most drastically, the woman shortage is
562 remedied by raiding other villages to abduct women. This,
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*628 however, is war. The ever-present possibility of this
583 occurring, however, is a constant threat to the stability of
political alliances, for allies occasionally turn on each
other with the intent of seizing females. It is largely for
this reason that allies cede women to each other peacefully
527 by contracting marriage alliances. In November 1964 the
574 Patanowä-tedi arrived at Bisaasi-tedi to participate in a
*628
72 feast. This was the first time the groups had gathered as
361 groups since they separated from each other on hostile terms
in ca. 1944. They intended to make peace at this feast, but
a party of men from Monou-tedi, a village that also formed
part of the group before the 1944 split, arrived uninvited
and abducted seven women from the Patanowä-tedi. This ultimately provoked a war between the Patanowä-tedi and Monou-tedi, and determined the settlement pattern of both groups,
as well as their political activities, all during my field
726 work. The war was still being actively prosecuted when I
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726 left the field in February 1966, and had by that time in-
114 volved the Bisaasi-tedi.

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## B. The Effects of Warfare On Settlement Pattern and Economic Practices[1]

628 When feuds, usually over women, can not be resolved
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578 peacefully, club fights between the supporters of the woman's
721 lover and husband develop, leading to village splits and the
[241] establishment of mutually hostile, independent villages. The timing of the split, however, is determined by the nature of Yąnomamö agriculture: unless a large village has two gardens separated by a considerable distance, the factions in the feud can not separate to form independent villages.

*628 The situation is similar with respect to inter-village
726 warfare and village movement. The Yąnomamö depend to such an
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241 extent on their cultivated foods that their pattern of warfare
361 necessitates the formation of political alliances with other groups. Occasionally members of a village find themselves in a situation where they have no choice except to move into the village of an ally and depend on the produce of the latter's garden. For the most part, the Yąnomamö attempt to avoid

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[241] [1] Yąnomamö economy deserves intensive treatment, as
[361] certain groups of Yąnomamö practice 'pioneering' slash-and-burn cultivation, i.e., are moving into unoccupied territory.
[171] In this, they exhibit some interesting parallels to, and differences from, the Iban of Sarawak (Freeman, 1955. See also
[128] Carneiro, 1956 and Conklin, 1961 on shifting cultivation). For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I am concerned only with the general limitations that Yąnomamö economic practices impose on settlement pattern and how these practices affect Yąnomamö social organization.

*628 these situations[1] by establishing new gardens as new wars
786 develop; occasionally, however, the wars take on unpredict-
782 able intensity before new gardens can be established, and
241 the members of the villages concerned necessarily seek refuge
361 with their allies.

786 241 361 To the Yąnomamö, gardens (hikari) are the fount of subsistence. They acknowledge the relationship between chronic warfare and village relocation by being constantly on the lookout for new lands to settle. Men are always discussing the agricultural merits of the forested areas in which they hunt, and most new sites are selected on the basis of information collected by hunters. Thus, when the Namowei-tedi split up at Patanowä-täka, the Bisaasi-tedi faction moved to Shɨhota, an area they knew well because they customarily hunted there.[2] In 1965 the Monou-tedi cleared a new garden
[114] at Moyanaböwei for the same reason. I accompanied hunting
[521] parties from Bisaasi-tedi on several occastions to new areas not normally frequented by these hunters, and the topic of agriculture invariably came up during the evening résumé of the day's experiences.

*628 361 241 Other factors besides density of jungle, type of floral association, and general topography are considered by

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[1] They avoid these situations because the hosts usually
[839] demand either sexual access to the women of the refugees, or
[583] wives for their bachelors. The refugees, of course, are reluctant to do either, but are frequently obliged to do both. The cost of the alliance, once again, is measured in terms of women lost.

[2] See Map C, and Chapter 5.

*628 361 241 the Yąnomamö when they make new gardens. The relative location of friendly and hostile villages with respect to the new site is very important. The Monou-tedi moved west in 1965, clearing their new site in the direction away from their major enemies, the Patanowä-tedi. Their allies, the Mąmariböwei-tedi and the Reyaboböwei-tedi, lived to their west. Furthermore, their old enemies, the Möwäraoba-tedi and Iwahikoroba-tedi, lived to their southeast, a direction the Monou-tedi wished to avoid. Finally, by moving to the west, the Monou-tedi crossed a large river (Mavaca), a natural barrier that would interfere with the retreat of raiding parties that initiated in the east.

361 241 245 Another factor influences the choice of site when the members of a village must abandon their existing garden: the location of a previously cultivated site. Old gardens are desirable sites because they continue to produce peach palm long after they are deserted. As the fruit of this palm seasonally provides an important and desirable addition to the diet of the Yąnomamö, they prefer to move into an old garden rather than start a new peach palm grove from seedlings. The Yąnomamö frequently return to their old, abandoned sites
361 241 245 114 *628 in order to harvest the peach palm crop. This is usually a dangerous undertaking, as their old enemies are also aware of the fruit, and exploit it themselves. In February 1965 I accompanied a group of Bisaasi-tedi men to Barawä-täka,[1]

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[1] See Map C, and Chapter 5.

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241 abandoned in about 1959, to harvest the peach palm of that
245 garden. We approached the site with great caution lest we
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*628 run into a group of Patanowä-tedi. We discovered that somebody, probably the Patanowä-tedi, had beaten us to the garden and harvested the fruit.

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361 During 1965 raids were so intense on the Patanowä-
241 tedi that they were forced to abandon their site at Patanowä-
*628 täka. The Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi predicted that the Patanowä-tedi would make their new site at one of two possible locations: Shɨhota or Shamata, two abandoned gardens. Their predictions were right on both counts, for the Patanowä-tedi began utilizing both sites because peach palm was to be found at either. By occupying two sites, the Patanowä-tedi were also better able to avoid their enemies by moving frequently from one to the other.

The several variables to be considered in re-locating villages during especially hostile wars may be briefly summarized: (1) the members of a village will make their new garden site in a direction away from their major enemy; (2) if the members of a village have allies, they tend to make their new garden in the direction of these allies, provided that the direction brings them no closer to their enemies; (3) if abandoned villages whose gardens contain producing groves of peach palm are to be found in a suitable direction from the old site, these will be the ideal choices for new garden sites.

The cultivation practices of the Monou-tedi in 1965

722 illustrate how village shifts are related to warfare, and
361 how foresight in establishing new gardens serves to facilitate
241
*628 village movement in anticipation of wars. The Monou-tedi planned to raid the Patanowä-tedi after the latter had recovered five of the seven women abducted by the Monou-tedi in November 1964. The Monou-tedi, of course, expected to be raided in turn by the Patanowä-tedi, so they began making a new garden in a direction away from their enemies, anticipating the revenge raids they knew would follow. In short, the Monou-tedi prepared for the war by initiating work on a new garden in a more defensible area--closer to their allies and across a large river--an action they hoped would permit them to remain completely independent of the largesse of their allies.

*578 The graded violence pattern[1] of the Yąnomamö may be
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241 viewed from the standpoint that such a pattern facilitates
182 the establishment of new gardens while villages split. Thus,
152 grievances may be temporarily settled by club-fighting, and the estranged factions may utilize the interval between club fighting and more violent hostilities to establish new gardens. This is also consistent with the political philosophy of the Yąnomamö: chest pounding duels and club fights function to permit the aggrieved to demonstrate their ferocity in acts of violence, while the existence of several levels of

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[1] The forms of fighting, in increasing degree of violence, are: side-slapping duels, chest-pounding duels, slapping of either the side or the chest with the flat side of a machete, club-fighting duels, spear-fighting duels, raiding with the tactic of ambush, and treacherous feasts. I have discussed this pattern elsewhere. Chagnon, 1967.

578 violence simultaneously permits the expression of hostility
*621
241 in such a way that the groups can split from each other on
182 relatively peaceful terms. The particular form of violence
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employed in settling grievances is determined by a number of
considerations, one of which is the likelihood that the resulting
factions will be victimized by the raids of a powerful
578 enemy. Thus, in the splitting of villages, the gradations in
*621
*628 forms of violence permit of settlement patterns suited to
241 given military situations. Villages torn by internal conflicts
361
722 may find it easier to split into two relatively peaceful
182 factions and remain geographically close to each other. In
152 this way, they can reunite into a single unit should either
be attacked. Conversely, the violence pattern may also facilitate
the separation of a large village into hostile groups
that have no intention of reuniting: it permits suitable means
for the temporary solution of a feud that will be carried to
further ends after the two groups have separate gardens. The
separation of the Monou-tedi from the Bisaasi-tedi is an example
of the former, and the separation, at an earlier date,
of both of these groups from the Patanowä-tedi is an example
of the latter. Thus, while the bellicose behavior and values
constrain co-residential groups to respond violently to
affronts perpetrated on them by their co-villagers, their
agricultural requirements can be accomodated by a graded
system of violence that permits temporary solutions, albeit
violent, while new gardens are cleared by the principals in a
feud.

*628 722 The politico-military situation in which the Patanowä-tedi found themselves during 1965 dramatically illustrates the importance of allies, i.e., neighbors upon whom one can depend for both military and subsistence items in times of crises. The Patanowä-tedi had been at war with a number of groups to their east and north for several years prior to my arrival in 1964. They managed, however, to hold their own in the wars against these villages, as they were a large group.[1] Earlier wars, and the latent hostilities resulting from these, precluded alliances with the Shamatari villages to their south. Their congeners, the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi, lived to the west of them, but the nature of the circumstances leading to their separation prevented alliances with these groups. Nevertheless, the Patanowä-tedi made peace overtures to the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi from time to time, and sporadic visiting between them began after 1955. In late 1964 the [721] Patanowä-tedi managed to convince the Bisaasi-tedi of their sincerity to renew friendship and visited them, but the Monou-tedi shattered this attempted rapprochement by abducting seven women from the Patanowä-tedi. The events subsequent to this 926 *628 incident drew the Patanowä-tedi into yet another war, the proportions of which exceeded the defense capabilities of the Patanowä-tedi: they could no longer remain at one site and prosecute both wars effectively. They were surrounded on all

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*[621] [1] They had attempted to split into three small groups before getting into the war with their northern and eastern neighbors, but the war forced the three groups to re-unite for defense purposes. See Chapter 5.

726 sides by villages that were actively raiding them. Fortunately,
*628 however, they had one ally, the Ashadowä-tedi, a large group
(ca. 200-250 people) living two days' walk to their south.
[722] The Ashadowä-tedi allied themselves to the Patanowä-tedi because of their own interest in raiding the Hasaböwä-tedi, from whom they themselves separated on hostile terms in the recent past. Furthermore, the Ashadowä-tedi had penetrated Shamatari territory, and needed allies in the event that the Shamatari villages began hostilities against them.

721 The abduction of the seven Patanowä-tedi women by
726 the Monou-tedi precipitated a war of such intensity that the
361 Patanowä-tedi were immediately obliged to abandon their site.
*628 Under 'normal' circumstances, the Patanowä-tedi would have been able to resist a small group like the Monou-tedi, but their other war against the Hasaböwä-tedi detracted from their capacity to do so. When the Monou-tedi initiated raiding against the Patanowä-tedi, the allies of all the villages hostile to the Patanowä-tedi jumped, so to speak, on the
726 'band-wagon.' These allies were supporting Patanowä-tedi's
*628 enemies only half-heartedly up to the entry of the Monou-tedi into the war, for prior to this, the Patanowä-tedi were able to threaten these villages. When, however, the Monou-tedi and their allies (the Bisaasi-tedi, the Mömariböwei-tedi, and the Reyaboböwei-tedi) began raiding the Patanowä-tedi, it became immediately apparent that the offensive potential of the Patanowä-tedi was greatly reduced. Thus, villages at some distance from the Patanowä-tedi began to raid the latter,

726 knowing that they would not be raided in return; the Patanowä-
*628 tedi simply could not conduct the war on that immense a scale.
The participation of these peripheral villages in the war
against the Patanowä-tedi conferred three advantages on them.
First, the probability was good that they would benefit mate-
rially in the raiding by capturing women. Secondly, they
demonstrated their solidarity to their allies at little cost
or danger to themselves, thereby putting these allies under
obligation to reciprocate the favor at a later time. Finally,
the peripheral villages were able to demonstrate their
ferocity to their neighbors by going to war, although the
726 danger to themselves was almost negligible. In total, about
722 a dozen villages began raiding the Patanowä-tedi in mid 1965,
*628 forcing them to abandon their garden before they could
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241 establish a new one elsewhere. The Patanowä-tedi had no
alternative but to take refuge in the village of their allies,
the Ashadowä-tedi. Without the aid of the Ashadowä-tedi, the
Patanowä-tedi would have been forced to colonize from their
single site and sustain very heavy losses from the incessant
raids of their enemies. As the situation turned out, the
Patanowä-tedi lost a large number of people in the raiding,
despite having this ally, but the losses would have been
much heavier without them.

162 **Summary**

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[847] The practice of female infanticide leads to a shortage
[583] of women. The Yąnomamö attempt to overcome the shortage,

162 sexually, by the practices of sodomy, wife sharing, incest,
562 83 and permitted affairs. However, two ways in which the problem
162 is resolved--clandestine affairs within villages and raiding
562 583 to abduct women between villages--create political situations
847 that favor the development of political alliances for the
721 722 purposes of defense. Since these involve the transfer of
*628 women between the allies, the practice of female infanticide
constitutes a functional component in the marriage alliance
system.

*621 The process of village splitting, growing out of feuds
*628 over women, results in the establishment of small, militarily
578 241 vulnerable villages. The timing of the split is conditioned
722 by the agricultural requirements of the village on the one
hand, and the nature of its politico-military relationships
with other villages on the other. The graded system of
violence permits flexibility in the settlement pattern and
the precise conditions of a village split. Because the
Yanomamö rely heavily on cultivated foods, alliances may be
interpreted as an attempt to maximize the chances of survival
of groups of kinsmen as independent groups; the possibility
always exists that a given group may be forced by its enemies
to seek protection and provisions in the village of an ally.

# CHAPTER III

## DESCENT, MARRIAGE, KINSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

*621 As noted in the introduction, the largest Yąnomamö
*628 political unit, the village, is structurally unstable and
tends to fragment into hostile factions once the population
of the village reaches a certain size.[1] Village splitting
[583] results in the establishment of smaller villages the members
of which, for considerations of defense, make alliances with
other villages, basing the political ties on the exchange of
*621 women. The dynamics of village splitting can be illustrated
128 in a number of ways. In Chapter V the histories of particular villages are set down in some detail, illustrating the nature of the causes of internal struggles. In this chapter, however, I shall discuss the aspects of Yąnomamö descent, marriage, kinship and political ideology that illustrate the role each plays in determining the nature of feuds. This will provide the background for the next chapter, the analysis of village splitting in terms of the genealogical composition of recently established villages.

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### A. Yąnomaö Corporate Lineal Descent Groups and Marriage

Corporate lineal descent groups tend to be closely

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[128] [1] Village size is discussed in the next chapter.

613 associated with control over real property in most tribal
421 societies. Among the Yąnomamö the corporate estate consists
[562] of rights in disposing of females; property does not play
any role in the functioning of the descent group.

613 The relationship between males in regulating the
602 disposition of the descent group's women is ambiguous, for
562 their rights in particular women vary, largely with gene-
584 alogical distance and the size of the descent group in question. And, rights in women are intangible. Thus, local descent groups[1] among the Yąnomamö, despite the fact that they are corporate, are not cohesive, solidary units because of the ambiguous way male members are related to each other.

613 Patrilineal descent is virtually non-functional out-
*621 side the local descent group. There are no corporate descent
[614] groups other than those that exist at the village level, i.e.,
[616] the Yąnomamö do not have clans or moieties. Hence, agnates not only enter into competition with each other because of the nature of their rights in the women of their group, there are no other institutions based on agnatic descent that promote amity and solidarity among them.

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[1] "The core of such a group is composed of the adult males of a kin group all resident in one place . . . the corporate group of persons who have the most decisive say in bringing about an arranged marriage is always a group of co-resident males representing, as a rule, three genealogical generations, namely: the old men or grandfathers, the normal adults or fathers, and the young adults or sons." E. R. Leach, 1963:56. Among the Yąnomamö, the generation of grand-
[603] fathers is only rarely represented in the local descent group.

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In addition to genealogical distance and size of descent groups, demographic factors promote ambiguity in the relationships between males within a local descent group. For reasons of differential fertility, infanticide, warfare mortality, or chance, some local descent groups are larger than others (contain more males) and are, therefore, more powerful. Others may be relatively large, but contain more females than males. Still others may be very small and contain either all males or all females. Since Yąnomamö kinship terminology is classificatory (Iroquois), all agnatically related males of the same generation call each other 'brother'; parallel cousins, no matter how remote genealogically, are not terminologically distinguished from brothers. Despite the terminological usage, relationships between such agnates varies considerably.

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Problems of agnatic priority in the disposition of females arise, for example, when a man with no actual brothers gives his daughters away in marriage. If he has sons, the sons would prefer that the girls be given to members of other local descent groups who are most likely able to reciprocate with women. As the father has no actual brothers, his more distant agnates put pressure on him to give the girls to a descent group to which they themselves are linked by marriage ties, for they stand to benefit by future reciprocities. Situations such as this arise when a single man finds himself in the same village with a group of agnates that are distantly related to him, but who themselves constitute an important political bloc within the village. Although the agnates are

613 602 his brothers, terminologically, they have more in common with
*621 each other than they do with him. As he depends on them for
584 582 support within the village, he is under obligation to them
and can not take their suggestions lightly.[1]

*621 Again, if there are two politically important descent
613 groups of the same lineage within a large village, and if
602 562 there are, in addition, a number of agnatically related
584 females not belonging unambiguously to either one, problems
736 arise over the disposition of the women; there will be
rivalry between the two descent groups concerning the marriages (or remarriages) of these women. Situations like these arise when the father and brothers of the women are killed in raids or die of other causes, or when the woman's first husband dies after her (deceased) agnates arranged her marriage. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, split into two villages, each led by members of the same lineage. They had been victimized by a Shamatari group which killed a large number of men during a treacherous feast. There were a number of women, consequently, who were ambiguously related to the surviving males of the Upper and Lower halves of Bisaasi-tedi. One of the descent groups in what is now Lower Bisaasi-tedi managed to gain the upper hand in the

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[583]
[1] There seems to be a marked tendency for the daughters of such men to be given to men in other villages when alliances are made. I am unable to say, on the basis of my present data, whether such alliances are forced on these men by their agnates, or whether these men in fact prefer to dispose of their daughters in this way. This practice tends to keep such men more isolated from their agnates and prevents them from establishing strong affinal ties within the village.

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*621
602 disposition of these women and their children, a factor that
562 did not contribute to the amity of relationships between the
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736 two agnatically related descent groups.[1]

582 A girl's marriage is arranged by her close male
584 kinsmen. Her father has the greatest influence in the
593 decision as to which man she will be given. If the man had
*621 adult sons, their opinion can overrule the decision of the father. If a girl marries within the village, she can depend on her agnates for protection against a cruel husband. Ideally, a woman prefers to marry her FaSiSo or her MoBrSo.[2] If the marriage rule is not followed, women prefer to be given to a non-kinsman within the village.

583 Men are obliged to perform bride service in the vil-
591 lage of their inlaws, after which they may take their wife
584 back to their natal village. Occasionally a woman leaves
602 her natal village to seek a husband in another village, but
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*628 this is always against the wishes of the girl's agnates. Such situations usually develop into wars between the village of the girl and the village that took the girl. The war between

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[128] [1] See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this incident.

[601] [2] By FaSiSo I do not exclusively mean the biological relative, although he, too, would be included. By extending their kinship terminology, the Yąnomamö also include non-consanguines in these categories of relatives. For example, a young man in Bisaasi-tedi married his FaBrWiBrDa while I was in the field. To him, the girl was his MoBrDa because FaBr was 'father' and 'father's wife' was 'mother'; the girl, therefore, was MoBrDa.

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721 the Namowei-tedi and the Boreta-tedi (Chapter V) developed
*628 out of a case such as this.

*628 When women are given to men in allied villages, the
583 local descent group of the girl (her father and adult brothers
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593 and, to a lesser extent, the girl's more distant agnates)
613 decides which patrilineage of the foreign village should
*628 have her. Smaller villages are more prone to enter into al-
682 liances based on marriage exchanges than are larger villages,
since smaller villages require allies to a greater extent
*621 than larger ones.[1] Local descent groups in small villages
613 are more cohesive than descent groups in larger villages
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602 because they usually comprise a man and his adult sons; if
*628 there are distantly related agnates in small villages, these
are incorporated into the local descent group. In small
villages, therefore, local descent groups are more corporate
because all the adult agnates of the girl have a say in her
marriage. Ideally, they give the girl to a member of the
politically strongest descent group of the allied village, for
this group is the one from which aid will come or, conversely,
the one most likely to make the decision to initiate hostilities
against the smaller village.

*628 The longer an alliance endures, the more likely it
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583 is that the exchange of women balances. The two largest
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[1] Larger Yąnomamö villages can make visiting alliances
594 with other groups that do not lead to marriage exchanges, as
it is relatively unimportant to them to stabilize such alliances by ceding women to militarily inferior groups.

*628 lineages in Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi have
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583 exchanged women with each other for a number of generations.
613 Male members of the Hor lineage entered into 29 marriage acts[1] with women of the Sha lineage.[2] An identical number of acts involving Sha men with Hor women also took place. In the exchanges between Mǫmariböwei-tedi and their two allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, there is presently an imbalance in the exchange of women, although reciprocity appears to be developing; a number of women from the latter two villages are promised to members of Mǫmariböwei-tedi--to members of lineages that have already given women to the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi.

*628 An imbalance in the exchange of women implies a dif-
613 ference in political strength between the two groups that
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583 exchange women, and the mechanics of the exchange are shaped
591 by this difference in political strength. Post marital residence is viri-patrilocal after the groom performs bride service, but the length of the bride service is determined by the relative political strength of the two villages concerned. If the village of the groom is more powerful than that of the bride, the groom may be able to return to his village with his wife after just a few months of bride service. If the

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[1] See Ackerman, 1964, for a definition of marriage act.

[128] [2] Ya̧nomamö lineages are not named. I have named them for expediency of analysis after the oldest identifiable member of the lineage, abbreviating the name to three letters. "Sha" lineage, therefore, is the name I have adopted for the patrilineal descendents of a long since dead individual called Shamashiadima.

*628 613 582 583 591 bride's village is stronger, the girl's parents may be able to press the groom into a prolonged bride service--five or six years. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, are politically stronger than the Reyaboböwei-tedi, one of their Shamatari allies. They have obtained a number of women from this group, and the men involved all returned with their brides after brief periods of bride service. So far, not a single Bisaasi-tedi woman has gone to live in Reyaboböwei-tedi, although one girl is married to a man from that village. The man has already spent several years in Bisaasi-tedi, and will probably spend at least as many more before being permitted to return home with his Bisaasi-tedi wife. The military and political superiority of the Bisaasi-tedi is so conspicuous in this alliance that one Bisaasi-tedi man literally dragged a woman, previously promised to him, out of the Reyaboböwei-tedi village, against the wishes of both the woman and the woman's agnates. He was not prevented from doing this because the Reyaboböwei-tedi need the political and military support of the Bisaasi-tedi and could not afford to react violently [721] to the affront. Had the two villages been politically equal, the incident would have resulted in a war.

*628 583 584 Women involved in exchanges between villages have no say whatsoever in their fate. Most of them abhor the possibility of moving to a strange village, largely because they fear that they will be mistreated by their husbands. Should a girl refuse to abide by the decision of her agnates, she has no alternative but to flee the village. Koima, a girl of

*628 Koima, a girl of
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591 some 15 years, was promised to Rerebawä, a young man from
583 Karohi-tedi, an ally of the Bisaasi-tedi. Rerebawä had
606 already been given Koima's older sister, Shɨhotama, by whom
he had two children. Rerebawä wished to return to his own
village, as he had performed a lengthy bride service. His
parents-in-law, however, wanted him to remain in Bisaasi-tedi
permanently, as they had no sons to help them with the
gardening or to provide them with meat. Rerebawä began
making frequent trips to his own village. His wife's parents
feared that he might not return, so they kept his wife's
children in Bisaasi-tedi, knowing that she would return even
if her husband did not. This coercion was not working effec-
tively, and Rerebawä was growing impatient. His parents-in-
law, therefore, promised him Koima, their second daughter,
584 provided that he remain in Bisaasi-tedi. Koima, however,
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591 refused to go to Rerebawä, suspecting that he would not keep
578 his promise to remain in Bisaasi-tedi. She preferred, instead,
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613 Bäkotawä, her classificatory FaSiSo. She began an affair with
*621 Bäkotawä, making no attempt to be discreet. This infuriated
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Rerebawä, who challenged Bäkotawä to a club fight. Bäkotawä
belonged to one of the important lineages in Bisaasi-tedi
and was cognatically related to the members of the headman's
[626] descent group, another important lineage. Public sentiment
was on Bäkotawä's side, but the girl belonged to a descent
group over whose affairs Bäkotawä's supporters had no claims.
Rerebawä's challenge was legitimate, for the girl was prom-
ised to him by her agnates: Bäkotawä was, in effect, having an

584 583 affair with his wife. The parties in question armed them-
591 selves with sharpened clubs and faced each other in the
578 center of the village, but actual fighting was averted. De-
835 613 spite the legitimacy of Rerebawä's claims, no one stepped
*621 forward to take his side in the feud, so he backed down.
627 After this incident, Rerebawä threatened to kill Koima, but
[602] the headman dissuaded him. Koima and her mother then fled
to Monou-tedi and took refuge with kinsmen there, reducing
the probability of Rerebawä shooting Koima. Her mother
tried to coax her into abiding by the wishes of her kinsmen
and go to Rerebawä, but she obstinately refused. She
ultimately eloped with Bäkotawä, and the two of them fled
to a distant village on the Padamo River. Rerebawä discovered where they had gone and attempted, unsuccessfully,
to recover Koima. If she returns to Bisaasi-tedi she will
be given to Rerebawä, who will have ample reason to thrash
her soundly.

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## B. Yąnomamö Kinship[1]

The structural relationships between descent groups within Yąnomamö villages can be expressed in terms of dyadic kin ties. Considerable theoretical attention has been devoted to this analytical procedure in recent structural treatments

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[601] [114] [128] [1] Migliazza (1964) published a kinship diagram for the Uraricaa Yąnomamö. Although the terms differ from those current among the Upper Orinoco Yąnomamö, the pattern (Iroquois) is the same. I defer discussion of the complete kinship terminology to a later publication, as there are enough peculiarities in usage to warrant a more complete treatment than would be appropriate here.

602 of social organization,[1] and in analyses of particular societies.[2] [114] It is not assumed here that the nature of the social organization itself stems from the nature of the sentiments associated with particular dyadic kin ties, as was implied in Homans and Schneider's work (1955). Dyadic ties are a product of political, military, ideological and economic forces that shape Yąnomamö social organization, and reflect, rather than cause, that organization.

Of the large number of logically possible kinship dyads, only a few have structural relevance to this analysis. In particular, ties between agnates and ties between brothers-in-law must be considered to render intelligible the mechanics of Yąnomamö social organization.

602 + 621 578 Ties between distantly related agnates are the most ambiguous, and the ones that usually break when villages split. Conversely, ties between closely related agnates are strong and less likely to be severed in village splits.

607 Of the affinal ties, those linking brothers-in-law to each other are of the greatest structural importance and are often stronger than ties between distantly related agnates. 606 601 Secondarily, ties between a man and his son-in-law are strong, but have fewer structural consequences than either brother-in-law (*shoriwä*) or brother (*aiwä*, *osheya*) ties.

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[1] Levi-Strauss, 1963, Ch. 2; Needham, 1962, Ch. 2.

[2] Leach, 1957.

## 1. Marriage Ties

602 593 Marriages bind the groups of the spouses to each other
581 in a system of exchanges involving goods, services, and the
583 promise to reciprocate women at a later date. Yąnomamö
[609] marriage is peculiar in that the ties between husband and
wife are very weak, but that ties between a man and his
sister's husband are strong. The significance of marriage
as an institution that initiates (or continues) alliances
between non-agnatic groups stems, therefore, from the nature
of the ties that it creates between the male members of the
allied groups.

593 Ties between spouses are usually very tenuous, due
largely to the fact that men are constantly suspicious of
their wives' motives whenever the women leave the village unescorted.
Men always suspect their wives of infidelity, and
will even beat them if there is the slightest suspicion that
837 the women have been seeing other men. A certain amount of
593 trysting goes on in all villages, but it is more frequent and
more easily accomplished in larger villages. Discovery of
[578] liaisons by the cuckold inevitably leads to club fighting
593 between the factions of the lover and the husband. The woman
684 involved usually suffers more than either of the male principals
in the fighting that follows, as women are severely
punished by their husbands. The punishment usually consists
of a beating with a club, but men frequently shoot their unfaithful
wives with barbed arrows in a non-vital area of the
body, such as the buttocks or leg. In one instance I witnessed,

593 684 the enraged husband struck his wife in the face with a burn-
ing log, severely burning her mouth. Burning is a common
punishment, and many women bear immense scars from wounds
inflicted by enraged husbands. Just before I left the field
[578] a fight developed in Patanowä-tedi between a man and his
wife's lover. The lover was killed in the fight and the
woman's husband punished her by cutting off her ears with a
[166] machete. Some women have been killed by enraged husbands,
but in most of these cases, the deaths resulted from wounds
that were not intended to be fatal.

607 Despite the fact that the tie between spouses is
613 weak, marriages create strong ties between a man and his
*621 *628 sister's husband. This tie is of great significance in the
[593] social organization of the Yąnomamö, as it is stable, well
defined, non-ambiguous and politically important. The
brother-in-law (shoriwä) tie is the key link in alliances
between local descent groups, both within and between vil-
lages.

609 The term **shoriwä** (brother-in-law, MoBrSo, FaSiSo,
601 friend) is used constantly by Yąnomamö men when they address
any new male acquaintance. **Shoriwä** implies a set of obliga-
tions and duties between the speakers. One can depend on his
**shoriwä** for material goods and gifts, and a request for such
items from a **shoriwä** is not easily denied: **shoriwä** is, in
addition to goods-giver, wife-giver. The Yąnomamö use this
[797] [609] term for foreigners as well; they use it so frequently that
[101] the Salesian Missionaries who have recently contacted a few

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601 groups of Yąnomamö have begun referring to the entire tribe
799 as "Los Shori." The Yąnomamö address the missionaries with
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601] this term hoping to maximize their chances of obtaining
desirable manufactured goods such as machetes and axes.

607 Men who are not related by blood constantly remind
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601 each other of obligations when they use this kinship term.
A brother-in-law deserves respect, fair treatment, and gratitude. As the term is reciprocal, a conversation between two *shoriwä* is punctuated frequently by these constant reminders that each owes the other goods, services and respect by virtue of the fact that they stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other. Such conversations, usually about material goods or women, strike the outsider as something of verbal contests to determine which of the two speakers is more of a *shoriwä* than the other, i.e., who owes the other more goods, services, gratitude and generosity. One who has actually given a sister to the other's group has an advantage, in a trading sense, as he can more legitimately claim goods from the wife receiver.

*628 When men visit the village of an ally to beg, trade or
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609 participate in feasts, they call all non-related men of that
601 village 'brother-in-law,' emphasizing the fact that they
583 stand in wife-giver relationship to them, and deserve, therefore, the generosity of the hosts.

*628 Alliances between villages involve, in addition to
527 military aid, mutual feasting and trading. It must be
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583 remembered that alliances, no matter how many marriage ex-
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changes bind the villages to each other, are weak and unstable. The more frequently allies visit and feast with each other, the less likely treachery will take place, as a certain amount of trust and friendship is generated by visiting and feasting.

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The tendency for Yąnomamö villages to create artificial shortages of certain manufactured items is related to feasting and the creation of organic solidarity of a sort. After Yąnomamö villages enter into alliances, they tend to adjust their economic production of such items as bows, arrow cane, spun cotton, tobacco, baskets, cultivated drugs, dogs and clay cooking pots. Any village is capable of producing all of these goods, but allied villages create shortages of some of these items so that they can become dependent on the productivity of their allies, thereby having excuses to visit and trade.

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One of the most significant relationship in trading between villages is the *shoriwä* tie, and these men trade with each other whenever they visit. As a trade frequently involves feasting, the specialization in production of specific items leads to greater solidarity between allied villages. Although it would be an error simply to identify the role of *shoriwä* with that of trading partner, this aspect of the *shoriwä* tie, particularly between men of different villages, is by no means negligible in accounting for the solidarity this relationship promotes in inter-village political ties.

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The way the trading is conducted also contributes to

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438 inter-village visiting and solidarity, for one trade is usually
527 the prelude to another. For example, the Bisaasi-tedi obtain
574 much of their spun cotton and curare arrow points from their Shamatari allies. It takes considerable time and labor to accumulate these items. When the Shamatari are visited by the Bisaasi-tedi, the latter make known their desire to have these items, and their hosts promise to produce them. When the items are accumulated, the Shamatari visit the Bisaasi-tedi to inform them their cotton and arrow points are ready. A feast is arranged and the items are given over to the Bisaasi-tedi after the celebration terminates. The Shamatari then request specific items from their hosts, and the cycle continues. Neither village is completely 'paid up' regarding goods it owes to the other, so that each exchange as Mauss
[433] (1954) argued, brings forth another.[1] The imporant point is that Yąnomamö trading is not stimulated by naturally occuring shortages or monopolies on resources; artificial shortages are created and these promote visiting between allies. In Durkheimian terms, the division of labor, irrespective of the causes, promotes organic solidarity between allied villages.
[607] And, the kinship category most intimately involved in the trading is the brother-in-law.

000 . . . Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their

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[171] [1] The parallel between this and bride price payment in
[192] Burma is striking. See Leach, 1957. It is worth noting at
[431] this point that the Yąnomamö have no word for 'free' or
[437] 'gift'; the closest they can come to it is: "something given without cause." But nothing is given without cause, and they shrewdly keep track of all debts.

*628 581 607 Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their ability to promote solidarity between the allies to the obligations, duties and trading relationships that marriages impose on brothers-in-law.

607 602 *621 591 Within villages, brothers-in-law have similar obligations to each other. The strength of the co-residential *shoriwä* ties, however, is influenced by other factors besides promises to exchange goods, women, and services. First, co-residence itself promotes a certain amount of amity between all classes of kin. Second, co-residential *shoriwä* are usually cognatically related because their respective agnatic groups have exchanged women in ascending generations, i.e., many of them are related to each other as MoBrSo or FaSiSo. So, in addition to mere promises to give women to each other, co-residential *shoriwä* ties are strengthened by ties of cognatic kinship and co-residence.

609 602 *621 613 582 584 The strength of the ties between co-residential *shoriwä* is best illustrated by contrasting it to the weakness of the agnatic tie between two local descent groups of the same lineage. In anticipation of the discussion of agnatic relationship, I will point out here that the political interests of local descent groups focus on acquisition of women from other descent groups within the village. When a village has two or more agnatically related descent groups, the men in these respective groups are *de facto* rivals for the women in the village. Simultaneously, these distantly related agnates are frequently competitors in the disposition of some female agnates who do not belong unambiguously to one or the other local descent groups.

000 *621 613 602 598 groups. In a large village comprised of two large lineages, each having two or more local descent groups, the particular local descent groups of each lineage will have stronger ties with non-agnatic descent groups within that village than with groups of distantly related agnates. When there are feuds within the village, the groups that have most in common with each other are those linked by affinal rather than agnatic ties, and these affinally linked groups stick together should
[607] the feud lead to a village split.[1] While the tie between closely related agnates is stronger than that between brothers-in-law, the latter are usually stronger than the ties between distantly related agnates.

606 609 *621 613 578 582 Finally, the son-in-law tie complements the brother-in-law tie in binding local descent groups to each other within villages. Older adult males of local descent groups can depend on the support of brothers, brothers-in-law, and sons-in-law in village feuds, more so than on the support of distantly related agnates. In the competition for women, affines in a faction exchange women rather than compete for them; just the opposite is true of the relationships between distantly related agnates.

593 *621 2. Agnatic ties

One of the two most important consanguineal ties having structural concomitants among the Yąnomamö is the tie between siblings of the opposite sex. These are not as

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[128] [1] See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of the structure of village factions.

593 *621 important in the organization of village life as ties between male agnates, but a man's sisters prefer to stay in his faction when the village splits.

593 601 Males consider their role as sister's protector with some seriousness, and are prompt to defend her against sever mistreatment. The amity between siblings of the opposite sex is reflected in kinship usage. A man will frequently refer to his sister, despite her age, as *owasimi*, a term that may be translated as 'darling little female relative.' The term is used by both sexes to refer to their female children, nieces, sisters, daughters and granddaughters. There is a corresponding term for younger male kinsmen, *owasiwä*, but a man never uses it to refer to post-pubescent brothers, with whom he is generally reserved and whom he treats with coolness.

593 561 Brothers are close to each other, in an affective sense, only when their relative ages are considerably different. A man is indulgent to very young brothers, but as they enter into manhood, behavior toward them changes gradually 884 [881] to reserve and respect. Although there is no *rite de passage* for males, one can tell when a boy is approaching manhood; the first indication is the young man's display of anger when someone uses his name. The surest indication that a boy has entered manhood is name avoidance; when no one dares use his name in reference or address, the boy is an adult. Young men tend to be touchy and impulsive, as they are obliged to demonstrate their manhood by their ability to coerce others with threats of fierceness, and the use of

284 personal names provides an adequate excuse to exhibit rage and ferocity.

593 Personal relationships between brothers, therefore,
561 tends to be one of mutual respect and reserve when the brothers reach adulthood. Age, however, confers a certain amount of status in Yąnomamö society, and an older man can command a younger adult brother to do tasks for him, provided their ages are considerably different. An older brother is expected to defend a young sibling in fights and assist him
[583] in obtaining a wife. A number of young men in Bisaasi-tedi
[595] obtained wives from polygynous older brothers. Young men, on the other hand, assist and support older brothers more willingly than they will a brother of similar age, as siblings of similar age deliberately demonstrate that they can not be bossed around by an equal.

*621 Co-residence influences the strength of the tie
602 between distant agnates in some instances. If, for example,
591 a man has no close agnates in a village but there is a group of more distantly related agnates, the man tends to be absorbed
*[628] as an equal in that group. In fact, he may be affectively closer to his co-residential agnates despite genealogical distance than to close genealogical agnates who live in other
*621 villages. Upper Bisaasi-tedi, for example, is led by Kąobawä
613 of the Sha lineage. All agnates in his following are at least one
602
591 degree of blood removed from him[1] but they behave as if they were
[622]

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[1] See Figure 3, "Upper Bisaasi-tedi, Chapter IV.

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613
602 full brothers and constitute a local descent group by virtue
591 of their co-residence.

602 The relationship of age differential between agnates
613 and the strength of the agnatic tie can be illustrated by
561
574 Kąobawä's relationships to the men in his descent group. Two
521 of them are much young than he (Shadadama, 22; Shararaiwä, 18).
554 Whenever Kąobawä organizes a feast, these two young men do much
571
622 of the laborious work of preparing the food and cooking it, going on the 5-7 day hunt to obtain the meat, and making the bark trough to contain the cooked food. Another agnate, Nadesiwä, 45 years old, does nothing to assist in the preparations for feasts. He is about 5 years older than Kąobawä. The two remaining agnates, Rapeawä, 45, and Shiimima, 28, each participate to a very limited degree in the work. Shiimima, the younger of these two, does more work than the other, and usually takes charge of the hunting and directs the labors of the two youngest men in preparing the food. The two youngest agnates, however, do more work than all of the older ones put together. They, in turn, do even less work than Kąobawä's adopted son, a Shamatari boy of 15 years. A great deal of the work is done by Kąobawä's nephew, Bäkotawä, 18 years old.

622 Kąobawä's ability to command his agnates to execute
602 tasks varies inversely with the ages of these men. Once
613
561 Shiimima took my flashlight. I discovered by devious means
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954 who the culprit was, and asked Kąobawä to have Shiimima
571 return it to me, presuming that he could order him to do so.

622 602 Several days went by and I still did not have the item, so I
613 asked Kąobawä what he had done about it. He said he had
561 123 spoken to Shiimima, but the matter then rested with him: "He
554 will give it to you if it is his desire to do so." I ulti-
571 mately had to resort to my own means to recover the flashlight, as Kąobawä could not force Shiimima to return it. When I questioned Kąobawä about this ineffectiveness, he explained: "Shiimima is already fierce and I can not order him around." Thus, while he could command his youngest siblings to do things, he had to rely on example and suggestion
622 to get older agnates to do the same things. Before every
613 602 feast, for example, the village clearing is cleaned by scrap-
529 ing up the weeds and debris that accumulate, and hauling them
574 351 out of the village. As the younger agnates are busy prepar-
554 ing the food for the feast, they can not clean the clearing.
591 561 Kąobawä usually goes to the center of the village and begins cleaning up the debris himself. After a while, his older agnates join him, and perhaps their spouses as well. They would be inclined, however, to refuse to do the work if Kąobawä requested them to do it, for acquiescence in this regard implies that one is being bossed around.

*621 Within a local descent group, therefore, the relative
613 602 age of the agnates is crucial to the solidarity of the group
561 and the effectiveness of its leadership. If the father of
593 602 a group of brothers is alive, he will be the leader, and the
613 group functions quite smoothly. When he dies, however, the solidarity and strength of the group diminishes, as adult

593 602 agnates of similar age tend to compete, rather than cooperate,
613 with each other in the affairs of the group. Each behaves in
such a way that it is obvious to all that he is not being
*[621] bossed around by his equals. Finally, this competition and
lack of solidarity is even more pronounced when there are
two or more local descent groups of the same lineage within
the village.

*621 Co-residence as a factor in promoting solidarity can
601 be illustrated by kinship usage. One of my female informants,
*628 591 Kąobawä's wife, used affinal terms for a number of Patanowä-
124 tedi men who were technically her agnates. I was certain
that my genalogies were correct, so I re-investigated the
usage. I discovered that she used 'distant' kinship terms
for these 'brothers' because they lived in a different village, but that she had called them by brother terms when they
lived together in Patanowä-tedi. She explained that she would
again use brother terms if the two villages were to re-unite.
Although the terms for agnates normally do not change when a
distant agnate joins a local descent group, the co-efficient
of solidarity does.

*628 The weakness of the tie between distantly related
602 agnates can also be demonstrated with data on fighting. After
613 726 the Patanowä-tedi separated from the Bisaasi-tedi and the
Monou-tedi in the early '40s, hostilities between the two
groups developed. Each group, however, was similar in composition[1] in that each comprised local descent groups of the

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[1] See Figure 3, Chapter IV, and Appendix A for the breakdown of the populations of these villages by lineage membership.

+628 same lineages. The warfare between the two groups, therefore,
602 was largely a struggle between groups of distantly related
613 726 agnates. Kąobawä, the headman of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, parti-
[622] cipated in the raiding against the Patanowä-tedi. In one
skirmish, he shot his classificatory brother, Rakoiwä, but
Rakoiwä survived the wound. This man is as closely related
to Kąobawä as most of the men that presently constitute his
agnatic following in Upper Bisaasi-tedi, again illustrating
the significance of co-residence in determining the strength
[583] of the agnatic tie. Two young men from Patanowä-tedi recenlty
joined the Bisaasi-tedi to obtain wives. After they arrived,
the Bisaasi-tedi and the Patanowä-tedi resumed their old
[606] hostilities. The fathers-in-law of the two men recruited
[593] both of them into raiding parties that attacked the Patanowä-
tedi, and both men participated willingly, despite the fact
that their actual fathers and brothers live in Patanowä-tedi.
One of the young men, Sirorowä, told me that he would have
avoided shooting his own father (Yoyosiwä) and actual brothers,
but would have shot more distant agnates.

+628 That the brother-in-law tie is stronger than the tie
726 between distantly related agnates is also illustrated in the
602 609 history of a war between Mahekodo-tedi and Yabitawä-tedi.
622 These two villages are led by men who are classificatory
brothers. The war stated when a man from Boreta-tedi, a
brother-in-law of the headman of Mahekodo-tedi, was killed by
the Yabitawä-tedi headman in a club fight. As the slain
man's sisters were married to the Mahekodo-tedi headman, the

*628 726 602 607 622 latter felt obliged to revenge the man's death by raiding his classificatory brother's village.

*624 578 593 Similar cases occur in internal village fighting. Hunobawä, an Upper Bisaasi-tedi man of some 50 years, gathered a stalk of bananas from his garden and hung them in the roof of his hut to ripen. His son, Dikawä, 18 years old, discovered the ripening bananas and ate a large number of them without the consent of his father. When Hunobawä discovered the loss, he went into a rage and attacked Dikawä with a club. Dikawä got his own club and began assailing the old man. This precipitated a general free-for-all in the village, as large numbers of men took one side or the other in the melee.

*628 602 578 613 583 Club fights between historically related but separate villages also pit agnates against each other. When Bisaasi-tedi's Lower Group seized a girl that the Monou-tedi had abducted from the Patanowä-tedi, a club fight was arranged to settle the dispute. But, the most important factions in Monou-tedi and the two Bisaasi-tedi groups were local descent groups of the same lineage, and their headmen were classificatory brothers. Although the dispute and club fight ultimately involved all the able-bodied men of each village, the fight was initiated by distantly related agnatic groups of the same lineage.

602 578 Some dyadic kinship ties are more stable than others. It is not possible to say, however, that any one in particular is so inherently stable that fighting between such kinsmen can not occur. Certain kinds of violence, however, are not

602 578 likely to take place between agnates of a certain degree of
blood relationship, or between affines that are cognatically
593 related. While a father and son may club each other, it is
not likely that the fight will escalate to spear thrusting
or shooting with arrows. The same may be said of full brothers,
593 but with less conviction. That is, full brothers occasionally
*621 *628 end up in different villages when a larger village splits,
726 particularly if they are the only males in the sibship. Should
a war develop between the two villages, there is a possibility
that they might kill each other in the raiding; it is not
always possible, in Yąnomamö warfare tactics, to pick a victim
out of a crowd of people, as the Yąnomamö occasionally shower
a village with arrows in raids. Chances are that brothers
would not deliberately kill each other, but the fact that one
has a brother in an enemy village by no means constitutes
sufficient reason to desist in raiding that village.

*621 602 Club fights within villages frequently pit close
578 agnates against each other, but when club fights escalate to
*628 613 killing by spear thrust, it is not likely that such agnates
726 will fight against each other. Distantly related agnates,
however, occasionally do fight against each other with the
intent to kill. Much of Yąnomamö warfare involved hostilities
between villages that contain as the dominant political bloc
local descent groups of the same lineage.

602 Perhaps the most important structural difference between agnatic and affinal ties is that the former tend to grow weaker as the kinsmen get older, whereas the latter are

602 capable of becoming stronger in time. When two descent groups
602 618 exchange women with each other over several generations, the
588 583 cognatically related members of the two groups have strong
ties with each other. Further exchanges between these groups
is largely a validation of the previously existing implicit
60 obligations to exchange women. MoBrSo is, whether or not you
582 marry his sister, a *shoriwä*. When the marriage rule is followed,
and it is a number of times each generation, the ties between
*shoriwä* are correspondingly strengthened by the exchange.
602 Agnatic ties do not have the potential of increasing in solidarity;
the tendency seems, in fact, to be just the opposite.

602 The major components in the variation of the strength
561 of agnatic solidarity are genealogical closeness, relative
*621 128 age, and co-residence. To provide a crude measure of the
591 relative importance of these variables, I have arbitrarily
assigned values to the components in Table 3. A strong tie
is scored as "***" and a weak tie as "---". By adding the
number of asterisks in each possible combination,
a rough measure of relative solidarity of agnatic type is
given. For example, agnates who are closely related genealogically ($A_1$: "***"), who differ significantly in age ($B_2$: "***") and who live in the same village ($C_1$: "**-") represent a class of agnates having the greatest relative solidarity. The sum of the asterisks for this combination is 8.

In Table 3, combinations whose scores are 3 and 4 respectively constitute the class of agnates having the least

Table 3: Components of Agnatic Solidarity.

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| Genealogical | | Age | | Residence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| close | remote | similar | discrep. | same | different |
| $A_1$<br>••• | $A_2$<br>•— | $B_1$<br>•— | $B_2$<br>••• | $C_1$<br>••– | $C_2$<br>•— |

| Possible Combinations | Associated Value |
|---|---|
| $A_2B_1C_2$ | 3 |
| $A_2B_1C_1$ | 4 |
| $A_1B_1C_2$; $A_2B_2C_2$ | 5 |
| $A_1B_1C_1$; $A_2B_2C_1$ | 6 |
| $A_1B_2C_1$ | 7 |
| $A_1B_2C_1$ | 8 |

amount of relative solidarity and are the groups most likely to enter into conflicts with each other. The combinations whose scores are 5 and 6 respectively potentially have more solidarity in the agnatic class, but the agnates represented by these combinations are ambiguously related to each other regarding rights in women. The combinations whose scores are 7 and 8 respectively characterize the groups of agnates have the strongest ties.[1]

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*[628]

[1] It will be noted that the combination whose score is 7 involves the component of non-co-residence, i.e., that the agnates are in different villages. This is a possibility when, for example, a man goes to another village to obtain a wife. Such possibilities also occur when members of two different villages trace their origin back to a common group but went to separate villages to obtain spouses, or ended up in separate villages when their common group split.

602 561 It is not easy to represent affinal ties in this
*621 fashion, as there are too many factors that determine the
*628 strength of the relationship between such kin types. A few
observations, however, will provide a contrast with the
analysis given in Table 3 above. Among affines, age differential
is relatively meaningless so far as internal village
stability and strength of inter-village alliance is concerned.
[606] When the age differential corresponds to a difference in
genealogical level, the affines, such as son-in-law, tend to
be related by stable roles based on avoidance, bride service
obligations, etc., but these derive not from age differential,
[606] but from the generation difference. A son-in-law is subordinate
to a father-in-law despite his age, and inter-personal
behavior between such kinsmen is not greatly influenced by
[591] age differentials. Second, co-residence is largely irrelevent
unless it reflects cognatic ties that came about through previous
marriages in ascending generations. Again, current
political relationships between the two villages of the
affines is important in determining the strength of the tie,
or whether the affine intends to return to his own village.
*628 Affinal ties do not necessarily imply previous historical
*621 relationships between the groups of the affines, whereas
602 583 agnatic ties presume a common history. When members of two
historically distinct villages enter into marriage alliances
with each other, affinal ties between the respective villages
are weaker than affinal ties between members of two villages
that have a common history and have exchanged women in the

*628 past. Finally, there is no way of scoring 'promises' to
*621 exchange women, and the strength of the shoriwä tie between
602
583 members of two distinct villages is largely a function of
such promises.

*621 Summarizing the difference in agnatic and affinal
602 ties, the important point is that affinal ties have the
613 potential of changing in their coefficient of solidarity when
exchanges between two descent groups continues over time.
It is largely for this reason that villages reduce to clusters
of affinally related dual organizations (paired patrilineal
local descent groups) that have exchanged women in the past
and will probably continue to do so in the future.

### C. Ferocity and Bellicosity

773 According to the Yąnomamö Moon Myth, Uhudima, a
828 Spirit, shot Moon with an arrow. The drop of blood that
fell to the earth flowed over the surface, causing all
Yąnomamö to become fierce. Ever since that time the Yąnomamö
have behaved fiercely, because they were born in blood.

828 The Yąnomamö regard themselves as being violent,
577 coercive, crafty and quick to display aggressiveness; they
829 value this behavior. Yąnomamö contacts with other tribes
648 and with civilized foreigners have been consistently hostile
until about 1955. They have succeeded in exterminating one
tribe,[1] and have caused a number of villages of another tribe
to relocate in order to avoid the attacks mounted on them by

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[1] The Makú; see Migliazza, 1965.

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648 the Yąnomamö. This process is still going on.

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152 Ferocity and violence is further reflected in Yąnomamö cosmology. In their conception, the human soul has three [753] parts. One of these parts, the ngreshi, is capable of leav- [761] ing the body; when it does so, the person becomes ill and dies unless it (the ngreshi) returns. The ngreshi are inherited patrilineally for males and matrilineally for females. [825] Each human ngreshi has an animal or bird counterpart whose life is coextensive and coterminous with that of the human to which it corresponds. Many of the ngreshi are types of animals commonly taken by hunters. Thus, when the Yąnomamö kill game animals, they believe they also kill the human being to whom that ngreshi corresponds.[1] Hence, hunting in the eyes of the Yąnomamö is behaving fiercely, for every ngreshi animal killed also results in the death of some human, usually an enemy.

(754) Shamanism also deals in ferocity, for the Yąnomamö [756] shamans all claim to take mysterious trips to the villages of their enemies and eat the ngreshi of the enemy's children.

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152 The complex of ferocity has an important consequence in Yąnomamö social organization, as aggressive behavior detracts from the solidarity of alliances between villages and creates tension within villages. Men are constrained to act ferociously and seize on every opportunity to coerce others in order to display aggressiveness. Most of the display of

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[1] They are not concerned about killing their own ngreshi, for humans and their ngreshi animals live in complementary distribution.

*621 Most of the displays of
156 ferocity have to do with cruelties inflicted on women, partic-
152 ularly wives, as this is both a safe and a legitimate way of
593 displaying aggressiveness.

*628 One of the corollaries of this ideology is to take
721 advantage of weak neighbors, for in so doing one can display
562 ferocity and gain materially (by abducting women). Villages that have many enemies are particularly good targets, for other villages can participate in the raiding against these disadvantaged villages with little fear of retaliation (see Chapter V). This attitude is also manifest in the political dealings with allies. Whenever allied villages differ markedly in size and strength, the weaker of the two is at a disadvantage, for the larger village will coerce it out of women. Since women are greatly prized, there is the constant threat that an ally will turn against its friends if the circumstances indicate that a substantial number of women can be abducted. Members of allied villages that have recently entered into alliance never really trust each other, as each fears that the other may turn on it to seize women. Whenever the men of the village go on raids, they conceal their women and children in the jungle in case a group of men from an allied village unexpectedly visit and find the poorly guarded women too much of a temptation to pass by.

*628 Political dealings between allies are such that each attempts to demonstrate to the other that it is completely sovereign and capable of defending itself. No group can afford to permit the notion among allies that it is weak and

*628 can be pushed around. Thus, even the strongest alliances are tenuous at best, as the possibility is ever present that one of the allies will treacherously turn on the other.

*628 152 57 627 In February 1965 the Bisaasi-tedi held a feast for the Mahekodo-tedi and Boreta-tedi. The visitors arrived earlier than scheduled, ate excessively, stole food from the gardens at night, and refused to go home after the feast terminated. The Bisaasi-tedi had not alternative but to challenge the guests to a chest-pounding duel; failure to have done so would have implied that they could be easily coerced. When the guests were challenged, they packed and departed. For a while the Bisaasi-tedi felt that they had successfully coerced their guests into leaving, presuming that their guests departed out of fear. However, the guests returned that evening to meet the challenge, lest the rumor spread that they themselves were weak and could be intimidated. Just before I left the field a rumor was circulated that the Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi had accused the Bisaasi-tedi of weakness, and wanted to fight them to show them they were stronger. The rumor asserted that the Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi intended to challenge the Bisaasi-tedi to a chest-pounding duel. The Bisaasi-tedi were enraged when they heard of this rumor, and immediately sent a delegation of men to Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi to challenge the men of that village to a fight. But, to show that they were not only not cowards but exceptionally fierce as well, they challenged the Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi to a duel with axes! The Mǫ̈mariböwei-tedi denied the rumor and the duel never took place.

000 never took place.

*621 One of the functions served by the levels of violence
*628 in Yanomamö fighting is that the Yanomamö are able to exhibit
156 their ferocity in relatively benigh forms and thereby live
152 up to their claims of fierceness. But, since any form of
violence can escalate to a more serious form of fighting,
the system of violence itself constitutes a strain on the
solidarity of relationships between and within villages.

*628 One peculair feature of this syndrome of fierceness
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574 is that smaller villages tend to be the most aggressive in
578 their dealings with outsiders and with allies. The reason
152 seems to be that smaller villages are more compelled to dis-
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play their tenacity, as they are more obviously the weaker
members in alliances. The expression of violence by members
of allied villages, ironically enough, takes place during
feasts. Thus, grievances that may have developed between
members of allied villages since they last feasted together
are satisfied during the course of the next feast. Thus,
during the situations most likely to promote solidarity,
allies frequently display their capacity to fight, informing
their allies that they are sovereign, friendly, but fierce.
The form of violence associated with feasting is usually
chest pounding, but if someone is injured, the duel may
escalate to side-slapping with the flat side of a machete.
It smacks of the ridiculous to witness groups of men beating
each other violently in such duels, and shortly thereafter
embrace each other around the neck and chant, each man

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527 promising the other to be a faithful friend, to give goods,
574 and to provide the other with women.
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*628 Thus, canons of political behavior and the high value
*621 placed on ferocity have the effect of creating a considerable
182 amount of tension both within and between villages. In short,
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156 Yąnomamö philosophy regarding ferocity and the associated
721 behavior reduces internal village solidarity and weakens
political alliances between villages. Indirectly, it promotes
village splitting and warfare.

## CHAPTER IV

## VILLAGE COMPOSITION, STRUCTURE, AND SIZE

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### A. Village Composition and Structure

This thesis deals specifically with Yąnomamö marriage alliances. However, village structure and the dynamics of village splitting must be discussed before alliances as such can be understood; we must comprehend the nature of the groups that ally themselves to each other before attempting to make sense of the 'alliances.' In many respects, the process of village splitting provides the circumstances under which alliances are both desirable and necessary, for the circumstances of village splitting usually result in military situations whose solutions are best effected by the creation of affinal (marriage) ties with new groups. Newly-established villages are usually militarily vulnerable because they are invariably small, and the members of such groups are constrained, by defense requirements, to enter into alliances with their new neighbors after they split from their agnates. In most instances, the agnates from whom small groups split are in fact the group posing the military threat.[1] Yąnomamö village dynamics over time (the process of village splitting and establishing alliances) is, therefore, a function of

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[1] See Chapter V on the histories of particular villages.

*621 internal feuding that promotes splitting, and threat of raids
*628 from other groups that inhibits village splitting and/or
602 promotes the establishment of alliances with other groups.
121 These two forces shape the composition and structure of
182 Yąnomamö villages; that is, these two forces impinge on kinship relationships and together with these latter determine the nature of the Yąnomamö village.

*621 I will show in Chapter V that larger villages fragment
*628 into smaller groups when internal feuding becomes particularly
722 intense, but are occasionally forced to re-unite when warfare threatens the splinter groups. Yąnomamö villages would remain small if there were no military forces working on them. The Patanowä-tedi, for example, attempted to split into three groups after separating from the Bisaasi-tedi;[1] the three factions re-combined, however, when one of them was attacked by the Hasaböwä-tedi. Similarly, the non-Patanowä-tedi faction of the split (Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi) likewise split into smaller factions after the threat of raids from the outside subsided. Again, these recombined when threat of raids was imminent.

*621 Irrespective of the conditions of the splitting,
582 the newly formed villages approximate a dual organization of inter-marrying moieties in structure. This form of organiza-
[801] tion is implicit in the Iroquois kinship terminology, sister
*621 exchange, and ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules. Dual

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[1] See Map C and Chapter V.

*62) organization is only approximated, however, as an examination
of the genealogies given in Appendix A will show. The
smaller the village, the more conspicuous is the tendency for
[613] the composition to approach a moiety-like structure. Larger
villages are more composite and may contain as many as four
or five distinct lineage segments.[1]

*62) 613 The tendency for small villages to be characterized
by two (and only two) dominant lineage segments, each linked
to the other by marriage ties, recurs with sufficient frequency
to permit me to use a simple dual organization model as the
[829] basis of the analysis of village structure. The model given
in Figure 1 should be taken as only a heuristic devise in
the discussion of Yąnomamö village structure that follows;
the Yąnomamö do not conceive of their villages as being bifurcated
into two groups, for in most instances they are not.
And, small villages soon lose their moiety-like structure as
they begin to include males and females from villages with
which marriage ties are made.

602 The relationships between kin discussed in the previous
607 chapter are all given in Figure 1. The adult males in
582 583 Generation 1 exchange sisters[2] and are, therefore, related to
each other as *shoriwä* (brother-in-law). This is a well-defined,
stable, non-ambiguous relationship; the males in

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[128] [1] See Appendix A for a discussion of village composition. Details of one small village are given in the Appendix, but the composition by lineage is summarized for three other villages.

[2] In Figure 1, $A_{1.1}$'s wife is the sister of $B_{1.2}$.

602 607 582 583 Generation 1 have essentially solidary relationships to each other, at least in terms of the model.

The males of Generation 1 are related to the females *[621] of that generation as either husband or brother. Ties between siblings of the opposite sex are affective and promote village solidarity.

613 602 Males of lineage A in the second generation are simultaneously sister's sons and daughter's husbands of male $B_{1.2}$, both relationships being conducive to solidarity. They are [583] bound to $B_{1.2}$ by affective ties and obligations to perform bride service. An analogous set of relationships binds the Generation 2, lineage B males to $A_{1.1}$. The males of both lineages in the second generation are related to each other as either brother or brother-in-law, both relationships being stable within the assumptions of this model (see below). The

*[621] FIG. 1: Ideal Yanomamö Village Composition



613 602 ties between males of opposite generations within each lineage, father and son, are stable and affective; in short, the males of the village are linked to each other by relationships that are non-ambiguous and essentially amicable. Similarly, the relationships between males and females between and within generations are, excepting the husband-wife tie, well-defined by the incest taboo and/or affective ties that contribute to the solidarity of the group.

128 Certain assumptions are made about the Yąnomamö by reducing their social organization to a model of this sort. First, I have drawn the model with a sex-ratio of 1.0. Second, sibships are shown to be equal in size and identical in composition, i.e., each contains an equal number of males and females. Third, all individuals are married to a single person. Fourth, no deaths and remarriages have taken place. Fifth, the model does not specify whether or not any of the women are pregnant or nursing. Sixth, no military pressures from the outside are shown, nor are political commitments to cede women to allies. Seventh, all males are presumed to have similar political ability and do not compete for village leadership. The list of assumptions could be extended, but would not add to the point made by the seven already given: factors external to the model constantly impinge upon the relationships described in the model, causing the relationships to alter according to the stresses brought about by the external forces.

By adding a few more individuals to Generation 1 and

128 extending the model one more generation, maintaining the
pattern already shown in the model, the numbers of individuals
included in the new figure would approach the size of a small
Yanomamö village. But, by extending the model one generation,
we begin to put stress on one of the relationships, the tie
between agnates of the same age, if we simultaneously intro-
duce additional factors such as a sex ratio greater than 1.0.
128 593 595 583 835 837 I can illustrate the same stress in Figure 1 by assuming that
polygyny occurs. Presume that individual $A_{2.1}$ is older than
his brother and is given both of the daughters of $B_{1.2}$ for his
wives. As individual $A_{2.2}$ gets older, he will have no sexual
alternative but to seek liaisons with the wives of his older
brother, as all other women in the diagram stand in incestuous
relationship to him. In Figure 1 $A_{2.1}$ and $A_{2.2}$ are drawn as
full brothers. When situations of this sort occur, the older
brother may give one of his wives to the younger brother, or
at least permit him to have sexual relationships with one of
128 162 602 595 562 598 them until he procures his own wife. If, however, we extend
Figure 1 by another generation and specify the same conditions
in Generation 3, the males involved are one degree of relation-
ship more remote from each other. Were we to introduce the
factor of woman shortage in addition to polygyny, the rivalry
between agnates for the women in Generation 3 would increase
accordingly, and fighting would likely result: distantly
related agnates of the same age are ambiguously related to
each other regarding both the disposition of women and
acquisition of women for spouses.

---

128 *621 Thus, while Figure 1 serves as a rough model of the ideal Yanomamö village, it does so to only a very limited degree; we are obliged to make faulty assumptions concerning the factors that influence the relationships between individuals included in the model.

128 *621 613 Figure 2 gives the simplified genealogical structure of Lower Bisaasi-tedi, the smallest village for which I have adequate genealogical data.[1] This village is divided into two factions, shown as A and B in Figure 2.[2] Faction A is comprised of a local segment of the Sha lineage, a man and his adult children (4 sons and 1 living daughter), and the individuals or families that are attached to this group. Faction B, similarly, is a composite group consisting of the descendents of a man who married into the Sha lineage in the distant past. For sake of convenience, I will call the core political group of Faction B a local segment of the Tom patrilineage, for it behaves as such.[3] It should be noted

[Text Continued on Page 123]

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[1] Not all individuals of this village are shown in Figure 2. Appendix A gives the complete genealogies of all individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi. The numbers shown on Figure 2 correspond to the numbers given in the list of residents and genealogy in Appendix A.

[2] Figure 2 takes into consideration classificatory aspects of the kinship system. That is, some of the relationships indicated in the figure are biologically incorrect. The reader will have to refer to the genealogy in Appendix A for purely biological relationships among the individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi.

*628 [3] The Tom (from Tomorowä) is not represented in any other Namowei-tedi village, although females of this lineage have married men who are presently living in other Namowei-tedi villages such as Patanowä-tedi, where their living descendents are presently found. (See Appendix A genea-

[Footnote 3 Continued on Page 123]

FIG. 2 FACTION STRUCTURE BY KINSHIP TIES IN LOWER BISAASI-TEDI

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*621


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Faction A
Faction B

128 *621 613 that Lower Bisaasi-tedi approximates a dual organization of
two intermarrying lineages, Sha and Tom.

162 There are two senses in which Lower Bisaasi-tedi is
*621 not representative of the typical Yąnomamö village: the sex
*628 562 ratio is nearly 1.0, i.e., there are about as many females as
583 there are males in the village, and the group is politically
stable and cohesive; not a single fight took place within
this group during the 15 months of my field work. The sex
ratio is explainable by several factors. First, the members
of this village have been particularly successful in forcing
their Shamatari allies to cede women to them while at the
same time have managed to avoid reciprocating the exchanges.
Secondly, a large Shamatari family from Mömariböwei-tedi
recently took refuge in the village, a family that comprises
[529] two males and four females. Finally, many of the men killed
[578] in the 1950-51 treacherous feast were from this faction of
[726] Bisaasi-tedi.

*621 The solidarity of Lower Bisaasi-tedi stems from a
622 number of factors. First, all adult men are married. More
613 602 importantly, the core lineages (Sha and Tom) are linked to
each other in three generations by marriage ties, and the
leader of this village, Reromawä, has astutely manipulated

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128 logy.) The Tom lineage is the dominant political group in a
*621 number of villages north of the Orinoco River in the vicinity
*628 of Maata-u (see Map B, Chapter II). These villages trace
613 their origins back to a single group (indicated as Husirawä-urihi-tedi on Map C, Chapter V) to which the members of Namowei-tedi were allied about 1900. All living members of the Tom lineage found today among the Namowei-tedi are in Bisaasi-tedi's lower village, where they constitute a major political bloc in the affairs of that group.

* 621 622 613 602 the kinship system to his advantage, putting all adult men in the village in a subordinate position to himself. Let us briefly examine the composition of this village.

Figure 2 shows the ties between the two lineages over three generations: the individuals in both lineages are tied to each other by consanguineal as well as affinal ties. In a negative sense, the village is characterized by an absense of remotely-related agnates that might constitute a challenge to Reromawä for leadership. All agnates within each faction are closely related to each other, and their mutual rights and obligations in the political affairs of the village are well defined. The hangers-on, on the other hand, are related to males of the two core lineages by stable, but subordinate, affinal ties such as son-in-law or brother-
[156] in-law. Reromawä is a particularly capable leader on the basis of his personal qualifications alone.[1] His position as leader is bolstered by the nature of the ties that link him, individual by individual, to every adult male in the
[593] village. He has four adult sons to support his position.
[601] Equally significant, he has manipulated the kinship system
[554] [183] and 'changed' the generation of a number of his kinswomen so
[582] as to advance his position as leader. He redefined two classificatory daughters as 'sisters,' making it possible to arrange marriages between his own children and the children
[136] of these women. He was able to do this because many of the

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[998] [1] His son, Bäkäböwä, is gradually assuming some of the functions of leadership, as Reromawä is getting old.

* 621 622 actual brothers of these women were killed in the 1950-51
613 treacherous feast,[1] and the women therefore had few agnates
602 736 to contest Reromawä's actions; his rights to dispose of these
601 554 women increased after their brothers were killed in the feast.
183 Because of the previous marriages between the members of the
582 Sha and Tom lineages, Reromawä was already MoBr to the
politically most important males in the Tom lineage, and he
could command respect from them by virtue of the fact that he
was of the ascending generation and principal wife-giver to
582 them. He in fact gave two daughters to one of these men.
601 When he re-defined one of his classificatory daughters as
183 582 sister, he advanced his position in two ways. First, he
then became shoriwä to the man that was married to this
sister (the man was already SiSo to Reromawä), compounding
the cognatic tie (SiSo) that linked them with an important
affinal tie (shoriwä). Second, he was able then to claim a
daughter of this 'sister' as a wife for his own son (despite
the fact that it was incestuous), creating additional stable
ties between the two lineages on another generational level.

601 In another, similar, case, Reromawä re-defined a
183 different classificatory daughter as 'sister,' making it
582 possible for her son to marry his daughter. This was a
strategic move, for the man involved was of the Hor lineage,
a dominant political group in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi. Thus, by manipulating the kinship system, Reromawä
advanced his own position as village leader and managed to

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[1] See Chapter V.

*621 622 613 602 subordinate his potential competitors by the way in which he disposed of the women and/or their children.

*621 613 602 562 582 583 There are a number of individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi who are not related agnatically to either the *Sha* or the *Tom* lineages. These individuals do not, however, constitute a political bloc; each is tied by marriage to the two lineages, and are therefore subordinate (by virtue of obligations to their wife-givers) to the members of that lineage. Most of these individuals are females, and do not represent a political factor in the affairs of the village. Some of them were abducted from Shamatari villages in the past, and a larger number of them were obtained in marriage alliances from other Shamatari recently. The six adult males of this non-agnatic group who might pose a threat to the stability of the village by making liaisons with married women are all married themselves. With the exception of two brothers, they are unrelated to each other. One of them is married to Reromawï's daughter, another is married to his son's daughter, and the two brothers (actual WiBrSo to Reromawï) are married, respectively, to Reromawï's classificatory son's daughter in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and will move there while he does his bride service, and a classificatory brother's daughter.[1] The remaining two men are in Faction B. One of these joined Reromawï's group before 1945 to get revenge against the

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[1] This woman is one of the seven abducted by the Monou-tedi from the Patanowï-tedi and taken, in turn, by Reromawï's group from the Monou-tedi. Technically, then, Reromawï is her 'father' and the man to whom she was given is 'son-in-law' to Reromawï. See Chapter V.

*621 members of his own village, Hasaböwä-tedi, who killed his
613
602 father. Reromawä's group was then actively raiding Hasaböwä-
562 tedi. The man was given a wife in Reromawä's village, the
582 widow of a Tom man killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast.
583
The man's two daughters are married to Sha men.[1] The last
man and his family joined Reromawä's group in 1965 to take
refuge from his own villagers, the Mǫmariböwei-tedi, some
of whom wanted to take his wives away from him for being
brutal. He had previously given a daughter to a Tom man and
when he was forced to flee from his own village, took refuge
with his son-in-law. Appendix A gives more details on each
individual discussed above.

*628 Lower Bisaasi-tedi has political ties with a number
582 of villages. It has recently (since 1960) entered into al-
583 liance with two Shamatari villages, Reyaboböwei-tedi and
Mǫmariböwei-tedi, and has managed to obtain a number of
women from the latter village as wives for young bachelors
*628 in the group. The Mǫmariböwei-tedi visit them frequently to
527 feast and trade, and the members of Lower Bisaasi-tedi
574
438 reciprocate the visits. The ties between Lower Bisaasi-tedi
602 and the Mǫmariböwei-tedi are nearly as strong as the ties
between Lower Bisaasi-tedi and any of its cognate villages
to whose members the Lower Bisaasi-tedi are agnatically re-
*628 lated. Of the villages that are cognate to Lower Bisaasi-tedi,
602 Moncu-tedi is perhaps the most dependable ally, because the

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[1] Reromawä's actual son, and Reromawä's classificatory son in Upper Bisaasi-tedi.

*628 [602] Lower Bisaasi-tedi gave its members refuge during the times when the Monou-tedi were threatened by raids from the Patanowä-tedi. [361] [613] The closest neighbor, geographically, to Lower Bisaasi-tedi is Upper Bisaasi-tedi (a mere 400 meters upstream), the dominant political group of that village being a segment of the Sha lineage. The two villages, however, behave quite independently in their alliance patterns. Lower Bisaasi-tedi's political interests are in the Mömariböwei-tedi at the present time, whereas Upper Bisaasi-tedi's interests are in the *628 726 Reyaboböwei-tedi, Karohi-tedi, and Widokaiya-tedi. In the war against the Patanowä-tedi, both the Lower and Upper Bisaasi-tedi aid the Monou-tedi by providing warriors for the raiding parties, and by giving refuge to the Monou-tedi when raiding is particularly intense.

*621 162 562 571 Lower Bisaasi-tedi is a cohesive, well-integrated, stable village. Much of the stability and cohesiveness derives from the fact that there is not a shortage of women and there are well-defined patterns of behavior for all members *628 722 vis-à-vis others. But, Lower Bisaasi-tedi is not a militarily viable group. It could not last long as an independent village if the warfare situation became intense; the group is not completely independent of the Upper Bisaasi-tedi village. At least once during my field work the Lower Bisaasi-tedi group coalesced with the Upper group when a raid from the Patanowä-tedi seemed imminent. And, if raiding from the Patanowä-tedi began, the group would have to merge with Upper Bisaasi-tedi for defense purposes. When I began my field work in 1964,

*628
722 the Upper Bisaasi-tedi had a large village and two small villages. The two smaller villages were occupied by the two factions of the Upper group; the large village was unoccupied. It was used only when threat of raid existed, during which time the Lower Bisaasi-tedi re-joined their group and all moved into the large village. In 1965 the large village was rebuilt, but for the first time the Lower Bisaasi-tedi did not participate in the reconstruction of the common village. A few individuals who feared raids, however, did build a section in the village for themselves.

Lower Bisaasi-tedi, then, would re-unite with Upper Bisaasi-tedi in time of war, although each group pursues its own political ends and remains independent of the other in times of peace. One of the major reasons this is so can be explained in terms of the dyadic relationships discussed in
[128] the last chapter. Figure 3 gives the simplified lineage structure of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, Lower Bisaasi-tedi, and
*621 Monou-tedi. These three villages were one in 1958; Monou-
*628
678 tedi split from the group to found their own village. In 1960 Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Lower Bisaasi-tedi split from each other, but remained geographically close to each other. The reasons given for the splits were that the groups were always fighting over women and, to reduce the frequency of club fighting, they simply parted before hostilities became intense. Even at the present time there is considerably more fighting in the village when the groups coalesce for defense
[602]
[622] purposes. In terms of the kinship dyads, the problem can be

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 131]

FIG. 3 LINEAGE STRUCTURE


3.
2.
1.
(tom)
Bisaasi-tedi (lower)
(klo)
Bisaasi-tedi (upper)
(sha)
(hor)
Monou-tedi
Patanowä-tedi

*621 reduced to the weakness of the tie between remotely related
*628 agnates of the same age, and their rivalry for both women
578 602 and leadership. The leaders of the three villages are all
622 members of the same lineage.[1] It can be seen in Figure 3
that the headmen of the villages (indicated as 1, 2, and 3)
are all agnates, each belonging to a different local segment
of the lineage.[2]

*621 As was shown in the last chapter, the ties between
622 distantly related agnates of the same age are probably the
602 613 most ambiguous and weakest ties in Yanomamö kinship. The
578 feuds that developed within the large, composite village
could not be satisfactorily resolved by the leaders of the
village, as each leader's segment had more important and
stronger ties with local segments of other lineages, and local
segments of the same lineage aligned themselves with their
affines in disputes against the factions of their agnates.
*621 When the village split, it separated along the weakest lines:
*628 602 agnates that were distantly related dispersed to different
613 villages with the groups to which they were more closely
bound, their affines. The same is true of the separation of
Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi from the Patanowä-tedi. Factions
A and B of Lower Bisaasi-tedi, when put into the larger,

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[1] In 1965 the Sha headman of Monou-tedi was killed by the Patanowä-tedi in a raid.

[2] The Sha lineage is shown on the left half of the diagram; it extends to Patanowä-tedi, as does the Hor lineage shown on the right side. Patanowä-tedi's composition is simply an enlarged version of any of the other villages shown in the diagram, and its headmen come from the Sha and Hor lineages.

*621 *628 602 613 composite group shown in Figure 3, would behave as a single faction as *opposed to* all other groups in the composite village, for the ties that unite them to each other by marriage are more stable and better defined than the ties that unite the *Sha* portion of Lower Bisaasi-tedi to the *Sha* portions of Upper Bisaasi-tedi or Monou-tedi. In structural terms, large villages are congeries of dual organizations each with separate political interests that have largely to do with maximizing their own access to women. Individuals in any particular dual organization are more closely related, consanguineally, to members in other dual organizations, but their political fate is tied up in their relationships to affines, not agnates. They are supported in internal feuds by their close agnates only, and their brothers-in-law; distant agnates are potential rivals for the women in the village, and relationships between such men is restrained and potentially hostile. Leaders of local segments of one lineage cannot expect political support from agnates of the same age; for these reasons, local segments of the same lineage tend to separate from each other when the village splits.

The histories of the villages show that hostility between recently established cognate villages is a common feature of the settlement dynamics and social organization of the Yąnomamö. Appendix A gives the composition of all Namowei-tedi villages by patrilineage affiliation; it is apparent that the war between the Patanowä-tedi and the Monou-tedi is largely a war between agnatically related kinsmen.

*621 *628 613 602 It is more than coincidental that the composition of both Monou-tedi and Patanowä-tedi is more similar in terms of Sha and Hor lineages than the similarity between any other two Namowei-tedi villages. Patanowä-tedi is merely an enlarged version of Monou-tedi in composition, there being more agnatic ties between these two groups in the Hor and Sha lineages than between any other pair of Namowei-tedi villages. Yet the hostilities between them are very intense.

*621 162

## B. Village Size and Warfare

Yąnomamö villages range in size from 40 to 250 individuals. Both limits are determined by the nature of Yąnomamö warfare, but the upper limit is set in large measure by the capacity of kinship and leadership to organize the internal affairs of the village. This capacity diminishes as village size increases.

*621 162 722 The largest Yąnomamö village for which I have complete census data is Patanowä-tedi, a group comprising 212 individuals. The Patanowä-tedi assert that their southern neighbors and allies, the Ashadowä-tedi, are even more numerous, and that a number of Shamatari villages are, in turn, larger than Ashadowä-tedi. It is doubtful, however, that the numbers involved excede 250 per village. Villages of this size, as we have mentioned for Patanowä-tedi, tend to fragment into smaller groups when threat of war subsides, and these smaller groups re-combine to form a larger village when warfare again threatens one or all of the colonies. The reason villages

*621 722 never get larger than 250 seems to lie in the fact that there
162 is no military advantage to be gained in increasing village
size beyond this point, while at the same time, further increase in size creates organizational difficulties that
threaten the internal stability of the village.

*621 Size of raiding parties and tactics of warfare must
722 be understood to appreciate why villages of 250 do not gain
721 701 military advantages by increasing in size, and why village
size can not drop below 40. The median size of Yąnomamö villages lies between 80 and 100 people. A village of this size
can organise raiding parties ranging in size from about 20 to
30 men, as approximately one-third of the village residents
are males between the ages of 14 and 50, the group from which
the raiding parties are recruited. As no village leaves the
women unguarded when it mounts a raid on its enemies, the
size of raiding parties tends to be lower than the number of
*621 eligible men able to raid.[1] Table 4 gives the population
162 break-down of five Yąnomamö villages by age and sex. The
males between the ages of 14 and 50 comprise 32.5% of the
*621 population (19.6 plus 12.9). Thus, a raiding party comprised
701 exclusively of men from a single village having a total popu-
721 lation of 100 will not excede 33 men; but, the raiding party
would include a large number of youths who have no raiding
experience, and older men who are not able to move rapidly.
These men constitute more of a handicap than an asset to the

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[1] See Plate 2.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 136]

Plate 2: Bisaasi-tedi Warriors Lining Up Before a Raid on Patanowä-tedi.

**Table 4:** Age and Sex Distribution of the Yanomamö Population.[1]

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**Frequency Distribution:**

| | Age Intervals | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0-5 | 6-13 | 14-25 | 26-50 | 51-75 | Totals |
| Males | 55 | 48 | 103 | 68 | 14 | 288 |
| Females | 36 | 42 | 77 | 60 | 23 | 238 |
| Totals: | 91 | 90 | 190 | 128 | 37 | 526 |

**Percentage Distribution:**

| | Age Intervals | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0-5 | 6-13 | 14-25 | 26-50 | 51-75 | Totals |
| Males | 10.5 | 9.1 | 19.6 | 12.9 | 2.7 | 54.8 |
| Females | 6.8 | 8.0 | 14.6 | 11.4 | 4.4 | 45.2 |
| Totals: | 17.3 | 17.1 | 34.2 | 24.3 | 7.1 | 100.0 |

[114]
[128]

[1] Based on residents of Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi, Patanowä-tedi, Mömariböwei-tedi, and Reyaboböwei-tedi. I was not able to get age estimates on a number of individuals in Reyaboböwei-tedi and Patanowä-tedi, accounting for the difference in total population given in Table 5, Chapter IV. The sex ratio for the above population is 1.22, and male excess is 9.5%, compared to 1.19 and 8.35% in Table 5.

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[722]

effectiveness of the raiding party. As someone must stay home to guard the women, the guards usually come from the too young and too old. Usually, however, one or two 'waitedi' (fierce ones), men who have a great deal of experience in warfare and who would bravely defend the village, also remain behind. Thus, a village of 100 people could, at best, 78 72 *[62] organize a raiding party of approximately 20 to 25 men.[1]

The smallest raiding party I saw during my field work comprised 10 men. This seems to be the lower limit to the size of an effective raiding party; most raiding parties are of the order of 35-40 men, although I have seen as many as 60 men leave on a raid.[2] There are several reasons why
701 raiding parties require ten or more men. First, the Yanomamö
703 are not brave warriors; in a party of 10 men, a significant
721 fraction of them would rather remain in the village where it is safer, and these men always look for excuses to drop out of the raiding party before the party meets and joins the enemy. The usual excuses given are sickness or sore feet. Thus, even in small raiding parties there is considerable dissent among the men, particularly the younger ones. Such problems would be insurmountable if the party contained fewer than ten men, as even the most determined of the raiders would lose his enthusiasm by listening to the complaints and pessimistic comments of the more reluctant members of the
701 703 raiding party. I accompanied one Monou-tedi raiding party a
721 portion of the way to their objective; most of the younger
123 men in the raiding party complained of having dysentery,
114 malaria, or sore feet. I had promised to give them malaria

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[1] This presumes that there are no sick or injured men in the village; there are always some.

*[628] [2] The larger raiding parties are always composite, involving the members of two or more villages.

701 pills before the raiding party left, but I forgot them.
703 This almost ended the raiding party, as the younger men
721 jumped on this as an excuse to stay home. The older men,
123 however, forced them into line and severly chastized them for
114 being cowardly.

701 Raiding tactics also require that approximately ten
721 men be included in the raiding party. The raiding party
725 usually splits into two or more groups when it approaches
the village of the enemy. This increases the probability that the raid will be successful; two groups are more likely to confront individuals of the enemy village while at the same time splitting up reduces the possibility that the raiders will be accidentally discovered by the enemy. After the raiders shoot one or more of the enemy, they retreat in a standardized pattern. Groups of two men retreat a specified distance, their retreat being covered by two men who lie in ambush along the trail most likely to be taken by pursuers. The guarding pair then retreats, being covered by the first pair who lie in ambush. If the raiding party has separated into two groups, retreat tactics will necessitate at least 8 men.

721 The purpose of a raid is to kill one or more of the
727 enemy and retreat before being discovered. A raid is successful only if one or more of the enemy is killed and none of the raiders is wounded or killed. When a joint raiding party from Mahekodo-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi raided Riakowä's village in the early '50s to revenge the deaths of two

721 727 Mahekodo-tedi men and the victims of the 1950-51 treacherous feast, they succeeded in destroying Riakowä's village and garden, recapturing two of the women abducted by the Shamatari, killing three men, and abducting Riakowä's son.[1] They did not consider the raid a success because the Shamatari succeeded in killing one of the raiders. Again, in 1965 a joint raiding party comprised of Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi men raided the Patanowä-tedi, killing one man. One of the Monou-tedi, Konoreiwä, was badly wounded by the Patanowä-tedi and almost died. The raid was only partially successful according to the raiders.

701 725 721 *[628] The tactic of ambush and retreat does not require the participation of large numbers of men. Raiding parties of 60 men, therefore, are somewhat less effective than raiding parties of 25-30 men, because raiding parties of this size usually involve the cooperation of two or more villages. 701 *628 721 Then, the organization of such large numbers of men is a problem, as each village will have its own leader, and therefore the contingency of raiders provided by allied villages in a joint raid has its own leadership. Thus, joint raids are invariably less effective because of the numbers of men involved and the difficulty of organizing them properly. The contingency of allies in a joint raiding party is less enthusiastic about the raid than the group from the aggrieved village, and if the enemy is not to be found at the site being

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[115] [1] Both Barker and my informants gave me an account of this raid. The two versions were identical.

720 721 *628 raided, the allies usually insist on returning home rather than pursue the enemy further. In 1965 a joint raid involving men from Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, Mömariböwei-tedi, and Reyaboböwei-tedi failed to locate the Patanowä-tedi at their [729] village. The two Shamatari groups refused to go further in pursuit of the Patanowä-tedi, and the entire raiding party returned home, against the wishes of the Monou-tedi, whose dead headman was being avenged by this raid. Occasionally, 721 726 *621 however, the raiders are all enthusiastic about the raid and the possibility exists that an enraged raiding party may attempt to drive the enemy from the village. This partially *[628 [728] accounts for the fact that warfare promotes the re-combination of smaller villages into larger, more defensible ones. If a raiding party of 60 men descended on the inhabitants of a village, the village could defend itself adequately only if there were approximately an equal number of adult men in the village. This would require that the village be at least as large as 180 people. Another factor, however, accounts for the fact that some villages have large populations. When a group has several enemies, it can raid them more effectively if it is able to send out raiding parties recruited from different factions within the village. The same raiders cannot return all the raids mounted against them and carry on the business of making a living as well. Again, larger 722 *621 numbers of men are required to defend the village while some of the men are away on raids, as the probability is higher that the village will be raided in the interim if the village has several enemies.

000 has several enemies.

*621 I pointed out that Lower Bisaasi-tedi was not a
*628 militarily viable village, although its total population
701 falls within the range of such villages. An examination of
721 the village composition given in Appendix A will show that
722 [162] there are only 12 men between the ages of 14 and 50, and not
all of these would be effective in a raiding party. Some of
these men would have to remain home to guard the women, reducing the capability of the village to mount raids against
enemies even more, as the size of the raiding party would
have to be smaller than ten men. Thus, Lower Bisaasi-tedi
depends on assistance from its allies in their warfare and
could not survive as an independent village. Should their
enemies (the Patanowä-tedi) begin raiding them frequently,
they would have to reunite with their agnates, the Upper
Bisaasi-tedi. As a matter of fact, they did exactly this
whenever raids from the Patanowä-tedi threatened them. The
[162] Monou-tedi have 21 males between the ages of 14 and 50, but
two of these are cripples. Nevertheless, they are much more
capable of maintaining a separate existence than the Lower
Bisaasi-tedi, despite the fact that the difference in size
of the two villages is not great. The significant fact is
that they have a larger number of men capable of conducting
*621 raids. However, their size has not permitted them to effectively withstand the raids mounted against them by the
*628
722
[361] Patanowä-tedi, and the Monou-tedi were forced to move to a new
site by the raids stemming from their enemies. Without the

*621 aid of allies such as the two Bisaasi-tedi groups, the Monou-
722 tedi probably could not survive as an independent village
*628 because of the size differential between themselves and their
*621 enemies. It is noteworthy, however, that the Monou-tedi are
722 more independent than the Lower Bisaasi-tedi, for they moved
361 to a new site rather than recombine (permanently) with their
*628 agnates in Bisaasi-tedi. This avoidance pattern is not a probable alternative for the Lower Bisaasi-tedi because of their relative lack of potential to conduct effective warfare, even considering the fact that their allies would aid them. Lower Bisaasi-tedi would invite raiding by moving further away from Upper Bisaasi-tedi, as their erstwhile neighbors and allies, from whom they have managed to obtain so many women, would be more equal in strength and would demand more women from them. Or, other neighbors, such as the Widokaiya-tedi, would descend on them hoping to abduct women, of which the Lower Bisaasi-tedi have many. They have managed to obtain these women from a position of strength, but a large factor in their strength is the fact that they are still dependent on Upper Bisaasi-tedi. Without the latter, they would be in a serious military situation.

## Summary

*621
578 Village splitting develops out of feuding over women;
562 the kinship lines along which villages split reflect the
602 strength of the tie linking descent groups to each other
583 by marriage or promises to exchange women, while at the same time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

000 time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

*621 When villages split, large lineages are redistributed
*628 by local descent group affiliation among the several newly
613 established villages. These new groups tend to be quite
722 small, but never fall below a population size of about 40
583 people for reasons having to do with the successful conduct of raiding. These small villages tend to approximate a dual organization of intermarrying local descent groups. Newly formed villages enter into military alliances with other villages and exchange women with them. Over time, such exchanges alter the homogeneity of the respective villages and promote the development of new lineage segments within each village. As the village grows in size and as new segments emerge over time, internal village stability reduces and the village then splits again. Village splitting is frequently delayed or inhibited by the existence of an active group of enemies, and even after such a split the newly-established villages may reunite when threat of raid is imminent. When military pressures decrease, the village again fragments into smaller groups. The minimum size of these groups is set by the number of adult men required to effectively conduct raiding. It appears that these small villages would fragment into even smaller groups if warfare were to cease.

## CHAPTER V

## THE HISTORY OF FIVE YąNOMAMÖ VILLAGES

128 [114] I shall briefly outline in this chapter the history of the movements of Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, Patanowä-tedi, Mömariböwei-tedi and Reyaboböwei-tedi, including those movements during the fifteen-month period (November 1964 through [175] February 1966) covered by my field work. The historical data [126] I collected on village movements enable me to discuss the village histories from about 1875 to the present.

*628 *62 174 195 103 128 The first three of the above-mentioned groups lived together at one time and the present residents of these villages are closely related. The last site they occupied as one village was called *Mamowei-tedi*, and for sake of simplicity I adopt this name in the discussion of their movements up to that point in time. Similarly, the last two villages of the five mentioned above have a common history, being called *Pararitawä-tedi* immediately prior to their splitting in 1960.

*621 *628 121 722 361 602 I wish to make several points in the discussion that follows. The histories indicate (1) that villages move only when forced to do so by raids from other villages; (2) that villages are structurally unstable and tend to split into factions because of internal disputes; (3) that the newly-established cognate villages frequently enter into hostilities with each other; and (4) that it is necessary to know the

*722 *621 *628 historical relationships between villages to properly inter-
121 361 pret marriage ties between them. With regard to the last
602 point, I found that numerous individuals in Bisaasi-tedi
*628 174 claimed to be from Patanowä-tedi; my initial conclusions con-
582 583 cerning their marriage to individuals from Bisaasi-tedi was
that the marriages were village-exogamic. I was obliged to
reassess these marriages after I learned that the two vil-
lages were at one time one village, and most of the marriages
between the two groups were contracted while the groups were
174 living together. I therefore investigated in detail the
128 historical relationships between all the villages in the
Mavaca area, a portion of the results constituting the subject
of this chapter.

128 I have summarized the village movements in Tables 5
361 and 6 and have indicated these movements graphically on Map
C. The reader may, if he wishes, skip the details of the
histories and turn at this point to the concluding remarks
of this chapter. I can make the four points by using only
128 Tables 5 and 6, in conjunction with Map C. However, I can-
361 174 not illustrate Yąnomamö political behavior without recourse
*628 to details of the village movements and the wars that caused
583 them and, accordingly, I include the details of the histories
in this chapter. The political relationships that presently
obtain between the two Shamatari villages (Mömariböwei-tedi
and Reyaboböwei-tedi) and their allies, the Bisaasi-tedi and
Monou-tedi, can not be completely understood without knowing
their respective histories in some detail. Most of the

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 149 ]

[Namowei-tedi Group]

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Table 5: History of Namowei-tedi, Summarised.

| Site | Dates of Occupation | Reason for Abandoning Site | If Village Split, Cause of Split | Relationships Between Cognates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Konata | 1875-1900 | Raids from Obotawä-tedi, Boreta-tedi, Bokpoiwä-urihi-tedi and Aramata-tedi | None | — |
| Wareta | 1900-1910 | Raids from Shihowä- and Husirawä-urihi-tedi | None | — |
| Namowei | 1910-1920 | Raids from Boreta-tedi | None | --- |
| Mahoyaoba | 1920-1925 | Poor Soil | None | --- |
| Patanowä | 1925-1943<br>(1966) | Internal feud led to split and raiding between factions; site still occupied | Village size and frequent fighting within village | Strained at first, then hostile |
| Shihota | 1943-1949 | Raids from Patanowä-tedi | None | — |
| Mabekodo | 1951-1952 | Suspicion that their hosts planned to kill them | None | — |
| Kobou | 1952-1953 | Fear of Shamatari raids | Internal feuds over women | Friendly |
| Monou and Barawä | 1954-1966<br>1954-1959 | Barawä abandoned because foreigners invited Indians to move to Mavaca; Monou still occupied | None | — |
| Bisaasi | 1959-1966 | --- | Village size and frequent arguments | Friendly |

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Table 6: History of Paruritawä-tedi, Summarized.

| Site | Dates of Occupation | Reason for Abandoning Site | If Village Split, Cause of Split | Relationships Between Cognates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Aramamisi | ? - 1880 | Raids from Shįhowä- and Mokayäaba-tedi | None | --- |
| Aramamisi | 1880-1900 | Raids from Shįhowä-, Konabuma and Mokayäaba-tedi | Feud over a woman | Hostile |
| Shįrakoböwei | 1900-1910<br>[1900-1966] | Internal feuds led to separation of several factions that raided parent group: Karehewä-, Matakuwä-, and previous enemies, Shįhowä- and Mokayäaba-tedi. Aramamisi-tedi group remained at Shįrakoböwei after other factions left | a. 1900: Karehewä's faction left because of a feud over a woman.<br>b. 1900: Waiyahowä's faction left for unknown causes.<br>c. 1910: Matakuwä's faction left to aid Karehewä and to avoid raids from Shįhowä-tedi. | a. Hostile<br>b. Friendly; Waiyahowä's group was decimated by an epidemic and no longer exists.<br>c. Hostile |
| Boraböwei | 1910-1935 | Raids from Karawatari- and Aramamisi-tedi | Feud over a woman | Hostile |
| Kayurewä | 1935-1940 | Raids from Aramamisi- and Namowei-tedi | None | --- |
| Konabuma | 1940-1945 | See next column | Feud over a woman | Hostile |
| Paruritawä | 1945-1960 | Raids from Sibarariwä's village (Möwäraoba-tedi) | Minor internal feud | Friendly |
| Mömariböwei<br>Reyaboböwei | 1960-1965 | Present locations | None | --- |

[Namowei-tedi Group]
[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

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
MAP C
HISTORY OF
NAMOWEI-TEDI
AND
PARURITAWA-TEDI

128 marriage alliances on which I have complete data have taken
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174 place between the Shamatari and the two villages of Monou-
*628 tedi and Bisaasi-tedi. Over 50% of recently contracted
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marriages[1] that represent breaches of the marriage rule preferences were the result of alliances between the villages whose histories are given here. It is, accordingly, important to understand the political and historical circumstances that led to these alliances.

## 174 A. The History of the Namowei-tedi Group

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361 The Namowei-tedi lived in four different areas between
*128 ca. 1880 and 1943, splitting into two villages in 1943 shortly
[621] after they moved to their fifth location. I outline below
the events that led to the abandoning of the first four areas and discuss in more detail the activities of the villages after they established their fifth location. I will treat the Paruritawä-tedi group similarly in Part B of this chapter.

### 174 Area 1: Konata-tedi (See Map C)

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*628 While living in this area the Naomwei-tedi were on
*621 friendly terms with several Shamatari villages, numbering them
among their allies. The Shamatari as a distinct group were
[582] just coming into being between 1880 and 1900. Intermarriages
[583] between the Namowei-tedi and members of several Shamatari
villages occurred and a number of individuals in the present villages of Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi trace descent back to Shamatari ancestors.

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[1] These data on marriages are taken from the villages of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi.

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175 descent back to Shamatari ancestors. Shįhowä-tedi and its
*628
*621 splinter village, Mokayäaba-tedi, were two Shamatari allies of the Namowei-tedi in this period of the latter's history.

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583 The Namowei-tedi got into a war with a cluster of villages allied to Obotawä-tedi over a woman from the latter village. The woman joined the Namowei-tedi against the wishes of her own people. This led to a club fight between the two groups and, later, to a shooting war. Obotawä-tedi recruited aid from their allies, the Bokǫoiwä-Urihi-tedi, Boreta-tedi, and Aramata-tedi while the Namowei-tedi were supported by the two Shamatari villages mentioned above. A number of men from each of the two groups were killed in the raiding that developed and several Namowei-tedi women were abducted.
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722 Obotawä-tedi and their allies forced Namowei-tedi to abandon their garden and take refuge with the Wareta-tedi, a group that had just abandoned the area (ca. 1890-1900) occupied by the Namowei-tedi because of a war with the Boreta-tedi. As the Namowei-tedi had not had time to make a new garden when the raiding became intense enough to force them to move, they moved into the village of Wareta-tedi and lived off the produce of the latter's garden.

## Area 2: Wareta-tedi

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*628
726
000 The residents of Wareta-tedi had their own war with Shįhowä-tedi when they were joined by the Namowei-tedi, but were on friendly terms with Husirawä-urihi-tedi, a village to their north. The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowä,

## [Namowei-tedi Group]

The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowä,

174 *628 574 527 361 241 and some of his kinsmen went to visit their allies on the latter's invitation, but Husirawä's group treacherously killed Shamaiyowä and two of his followers. Not wanting to participate in the raiding against their old allies, the Namowei-tedi established a new garden and moved away from the Wareta-tedi. A number of individuals in the present [581] [583] populations of Patanowä-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi trace descent back to the headman of Wareta-tedi, as the latter had demanded [195] women in return for his protection. In ca. 1910 the Namowei-tedi moved to their new garden at Namowei.

### Area 3: Namowei-tedi

174 361 722 241 [133] [101] [103] This area is quite mountanous and the group took its name from one of the ranges, Namowei-käkö--"sharpness." They lived here long enough to make three different gardens (Makei, Shodemi, and Amatakö), but ultimately were forced to abandon the area because of renewed raiding from their old enemies, the Boreta-tedi. [175] Having no friends to the north and several old enemies to the east, the Namowei-tedi moved west and established their garden at Hąhoyaoba-täka in ca. 1920.

### Area 4: Hąhoyaoba-tedi

174 361 *628 *621 The old allies of the Namowei-tedi, the Wareta-tedi, were forced to abandon their site and move west. They settled in the area immediately south of the Namowei-tedi, splitting into two villages (Hasaböwä-tedi and Ashadowä-tedi), and continued to remain on good terms with the Namowei-tedi.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

174 195 361 241 The new garden at Hąhoyaoba-tedi did not produce satisfactorily so the Namowei-tedi established a new one south of the Orinoco River, Patanowä-täka, and moved there about 1925-30.[1]

## Area 5: Patanowä-täka

174 361 *621 This site has a complicated history. The Namowei-tedi lived here as one group, abandoned it, split into two villages, and each faction returned to it only to abandon it again. Ultimately the site was reoccupied by one of these factions, and that faction presently lives there.

Most of the present generation of adults in Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowä-tedi were born at Patanowä-täka.

174 *622 726 Three important events took place while the Namowei-tedi lived at Patanowä-täka. The first of these was the development of hostilities between the Namowei-tedi and a Shamatari village. As this Shamatari village figures prominently in the later history of one faction of the Namowei-tedi, I make a point of identifying it here: Sibarariwä's village, located on the Mavaca River. The approximate date [195] of the initiation of these hostilities was 1938-40, an estimate based on the ages of older children born at Patanowä-täka of women abducted from Sibarariwä's village. Up to the start of the war with Sibarariwä's group, the Namowei-tedi were on friendly terms with all of the Shamatari villages and visited a number of them regularly. Several marriage

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[134] [1] This is the only case I have of a garden being abandoned for soil-fertility reasons.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

174 Several marriage
*628 alliances were developing between the Namowei-tedi and one
726
583 of the Shamatari villages (Konabuma-tedi) when the war with
Sibarariwä's group started, but these eventually broke down
before any women were actually exchanged.

174 The second important event was the secession of a
*621 section of the Namowei-tedi from the main group and the
*628 development of hostilities between these cognate villages.

174 The third event, occurring somewhat later, was the ini-
361 tiation of hostilities between one of the Namowei-tedi
*628
796 sections (Patanowä-tedi) and villages to its north; this
war is being conducted vigorously at the present time, and
has dictated the movements of the Patanowä-tedi from the
time it began until now.

174 In order, the particulars of these three events are,
*628 briefly: (1) The Namowei-tedi were on friendly terms with
731
721 the Shamatari villages to their south and southeast for a
number of years after they moved to Patanowä-täka. However,
[175] several Namowei-tedi died in an epidemic (probably malaria)
about 1940, and survivors attributed the deaths to the
Shamatari, accusing them of practicing harmful magic against
them. Shortly after the deaths occurred, a young man called
Ruwahiwä, Sibarariwä's older brother, visited the Namowei-tedi. Mamikininiwä, who now lives in Monou-tedi, murdered
Ruwahiwä with an axe while he rested in a hammock, thereby
avenging the deaths of the people who died in the epidemic.

Shortly after Ruwahiwä was murdered, his village
began mounting raids against the Namowei-tedi, but succeeded

174 *628 only in killing a man from Konabuma-tedi. This man was
731 living with the Namowei-tedi while performing bride service.
92 The Namowei-tedi reciprocated the raiding and captured many
(583) women. Some of these women are still living with the Bisaasi-
tedi (Yanarima, Waiyuruma, Hekurama, and Hikarima) and the
Patanowä-tedi (Ishinarima, Rubrobemi, Rǫkuobemi, and Shiaomi),
one died of a snake-bite shortly after her capture, two died
recently after reproducing in Patanowä-tedi (Reisimi and
Brararama), and three escaped (Breiurama, Darama, and Boroama).

174 *624 578 (2) Around 1940 the Namowei-tedi split into two factions,
each making a new garden further up the Shanishani-u River and
361 abandoned Patanowä-täka. The move was stimulated by the fre-
241 (175) quency of fighting within the village: "We were many and were
always fighting with each other," said one of my informants,
"so we decided to separate from the others in order to keep
174 peace." Both groups claimed ownership of the peach palm
245 trees each had planted at Patanowä-täka, and returned to col-
423 *628 lect the fruit each season from their new gardens. Ownership
578 rules stipulate that peach palm trees belong to the individual
who plants them. A man from one of the factions took the palm
fruit belonging to a man from the other faction one year; the
latter reciprocated by stealing plantains from the garden of
the former, precipitating a club fight between the two vil-
lages. The club fight temporarily settled the dispute, but
174 the two groups parted on strained terms. The smaller
361 *628 (Brararaböwei) of the two factions abandoned their site, fear-
ing that they would be raided by the other group (Wanidima),

[Namowei-tedi Group]

174 and returned to Patanowä-täka. A segment of the group that
361 *628 returned to Patanowä-täka immediately began making a new
[241] garden (Shɨhota) about a day's walk to the west of Patanowä-täka, anticipating that further hostilities with the
174 Wanidima group would develop. Within a year of the club
*628 fight the Wanidima group attacked the group at Patanowä-
726 578 täka while the latter were having a feast, but the raiders'
527 arrows missed their marks and no one was injured. The group
602 [361] at Patanowä-täka abandoned their village and rejoined their agnates at the latter's new garden, Shɨhota-täka, whence they began raiding the Wanidima-tedi. On one raid the group from Shɨhota found Wanidima-tedi deserted and followed the trail the villagers had taken. The Wanidima-tedi were found at Hasaböwä-tedi, feasting. The raiders killed one of the Wanidima-tedi men, but in doing so angered both the Hasaböwä-tedi and their cognate group, the Ashadowä-tedi.

174 *628 With the aid of the last two villages, the Wanidima-
726 tedi raided the Shɨhota-tedi and killed a younger brother of Makuwä. The Shɨhota-tedi reciprocated by raiding the Wanidima-tedi, killing Husiwä (Nabäyoma's husband), Hoari, and Siayeikema. This in turn was followed by raids from the Wanidima-tedi in which the Shɨhota-tedi lost Ushuenawä and the two younger brothers of Paruriwä, and had one of their women, Buhiomi, seized.

174 *628 Eventually the superior numbers of the Wanidima-tedi
727 and their allies decided the fighting, and the Shɨhota-tedi
361 were forced to abandon their garden and make a new one else-
241 where.

174
*628 where. In 1949 they moved from Shihota-tåka to Kreiböwei, a
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32 garden on the Shamata-u branch of the Mavaca River.
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[175] (3) The Wanidima-tedi began to split into three groups in
174 the mid '50s: Rashawä and Waiyari were the two new gardens
175 established by the factions of Wanidima-tedi. The separ-
*621
*628 ation was actually completed in so far as each garden was
361 being exploited by one of the factions, but the three factions
241 were forced to reunite when one of them got into a war with
several villages from the north side of the Orinoco. The
three groups abandoned their gardens and returned to Patanowä-
tåka, and became known as the Patanowä-tedi.

174 The war with the villages north of the Orinoco
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721 started when Yabitawä-tedi and Kashorawä-tedi men killed a
578 man from Boreta-tedi in a club fight. The headman of
726
602 Mahekodo-tedi, Shinanokawä, was married to the sisters of
[622] the Boreta-tedi man, and began raiding the Yabitawä-tedi to
[583] avenge his death. A man from Patanowä-tedi was doing bride
[591] service in the latter village and was killed by raiders from
Mahekodo-tedi, involving the Patanowä-tedi in the war against
Mahekodo-tedi. Shortly after this event, men from Yabitawä-
tedi visited Patanowä-tedi and, finding the men gone, seized
174 a young girl who was in puberty seclusion. The Patanowä-tedi
726 then began raiding the Yabitawä-tedi, forcing them to take
*628
722 refuge with their allies, the Kashorawä-tedi. Hasaböwä-tedi,
then an ally to both Patanowä-tedi and Yabitawä-tedi, took
the side of the latter in the dispute and commenced to raid

174 the Patanowä-tedi.[1] Thus, the Patanowä-tedi were surrounded
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*628 on all sides by enemies; only one village, Ashadowä-tedi,
722 remained on friendly terms with them. Beyond the Ashadowä-tedi were the Shamatari villages, bitter enemies of the Patanowä-tedi since the killing of Ruwahiwä.

174 By the time the Patanowä-tedi had gotten into this
*628 situation, the war with their agnates had subsided. So the
361
602 Patanowä-tedi moved west, into the area abandoned by their
722 agnates, whence they harried the Hasaböwä-tedi and the groups north of the Orinoco. They attempted with some success to effect a rapprochement with their agnates, and a few individuals from the Kreiböwei-tedi group visited the Patanowä-tedi. One of these individuals was able to obtain a wife in Patanowä-tedi, whom he subsequently took back to Monou-tedi with him.

361 The Patanowä-tedi are presently living between two
*628 sites: Patanowä-täka and Shamata-täka, a situation forced on
722 them by the hostile relationships they have with all their neighbors except the Ashadowä-tedi.

128 Area 6: Shɨhota-täka

See "Area 5" point (2) above.

174 Area 7: Kreiböwei-tedi
175
361 This site was established in 1949. After fleeing
722 from Shɨhota to avoid the raids of the Patanowä-tedi, the
*628

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[1] At this point the Patanowä-tedi returned to Patanowä-täka from their three sites of Wanidima, Waiyari, and Rashawä.

174 175 Kreiböwei population was in need of an ally to aid them in
361 their raids against Patanowä-tedi. Shortly after they moved
722 *628 to Kreiböwei they made friendly contact with a Shamatari
village, then under the leadership of Riakowä, located on
[574] the Mavaca River. The Kreiböwei-tedi began visiting Riakowä's
village and entered into feasting relationships with his
followers.

174 Riakowä's followers were related to the Shamatari
*175 628 with whom the Kreiböwei-tedi were at war: Sibarariwä's vil-
602 lage. Sibarariwä persuaded Riakowä to invite the Kreiböwei-
527 574 tedi to a feast during which the two Shamatari groups planned
[723] to kill as many men as they could and abduct women. By doing
[721] this Sibarariwä would avenge the murder of his older brother,
Ruwahiwä, who was treacherously killed about 10 years earlier
by the Kreiböwei-tedi, when the latter lived at Patanowä-täka.

174 The Kreiböwei-tedi accepted the feast invitation and
*175 628 went to Riakowä's village in the dry season (i.e., December
527 through March) of 1950-51. Sibarariwä's followers, along
574 726 with a party of men from Hasaböwä-tedi, were concealed in the
[132] [40] jungle outside Riakowä's village. Shortly after arriving at
the village, the Kreiböwei-tedi men were attacked by Riakowä's
men with sharpened staves and axes, and eleven of them were
killed. Those that managed to break out of the palisades
were shot from ambush by Sibarariwä's followers, along with
the Hasaböwä-tedi, resulting in the wounding of a large
174 175 number of Kreiböwei-tedi men. Only six or seven women were
726 727 seized by the Shamatari; but, the greediness of the Shamatari

174 men for the Kreiböwei-tedi women distracted the Shamatari,
175
722 and a large number of Kreiböwei-tedi managed to escape.
[726] These fled to a mountain called Wadubadidiobakäkö where
[103]
[241] they had previously started clearing a new garden, Kobou-täka.
[752] Here, the Kreiböwei-tedi removed the arrow-points from the
wounded and regained their health. They returned to Kreiböwei-
täka, as their new garden had not yet begun producing. Shortly
*[628] after the treacherous feast the Kreiböwei-tedi were visited
by Shinanokawä, the headman of Mahekodo-tedi, and one of his
followers, Shiroba-tedi. The two men had heard of the
Kreiböwei-tedi's unfortunate circumstances and visited them
to extend an invitation to join Mahekodo-tedi while they made
a new garden.

## Area 8: Mahekodo-tedi

174
175 Before they left for Mahekodo-tedi the Kreiböwei-tedi
721 undertook a revenge raid against Riakowä's group. They
*628
361 killed two men and then retreated to Mahekodo-tedi, collecting their women and children at Kreiböwei-täka as they proceeded from Riakowä's village to Mahekodo-tedi. This was early in 1951.

174 For the remaining months of 1951 the Kreiböwei-tedi
175
361 worked on their garden at Kobou, returning to Mahekodo-tedi
241 at approximately 3-week intervals to rest and obtain more
*621 plantains; these latter were carried to Kobou to sustain the
Kreiböwei-tedi while they worked on their garden. Before
Kobou-täka was producing, however, the Kreiböwei-tedi decided

[Namowei-tedi Group]

174 175 to split into two factions and make separate gardens. There
361 241 had been a number of club fights between the two factions
*621 over women, and to prevent the escalation of these internal
174 feuds the group split. Thus, two more gardens were started
175 (Monou-täka and Barawä-täka) before the Kreiböwei-tedi left
241 *621 Mahekodo-tedi to move into their new garden at Kobou. The
578 361 splitting of the group at Kobou was determined by other con-
721 siderations as well (see p. 162). It should be noted here
that considerable fighting took place among the men when
the widows of the Shamatari victims were redistributed to
the survivors.

174 175 The Kreiböwei-tedi left Mahekodo-tedi as soon as
*628 they could. It was rumored that their protectors were
*621 planning to treacherously kill their men and seize their women.
361 This rumor was later substantiated by members of a faction of
Mahekodo-tedi that split from the main group, who informed
the Kreiböwei-tedi several years later of the details of the
plot. The development of two wars involving the Mahekodo-tedi
[578] prevented the latter from carrying out their plan. Shibariwä-
[721] tedi, a group that had earlier split from Mahekodo-tedi, began
raiding the latter, forcing them to move to the south bank
174 of the Orinoco River. Meanwhile, the Shamatari learned that
195 the Kreiböwei-tedi were taking refuge with the Mahekodo-tedi
726 *628 and sent a raiding party there to avenge the deaths of the
[721] two men killed by the Kreiböwei-tedi after the treacherous
feast. The Shamatari raiders succeeded in killing a man and
a boy from Mahekodo-tedi and abducting four women. Thus,

[Namowei-tedi Group]

174 Mahekodo-tedi became directly involved in the war against the
175 Shamatari and needed the assistance of the Kreiböwei-tedi.
726 This prevented them from killing the Kreiböwei-tedi men and
*628 seizing their women.

Makolima-tedi and Karohi-tedi, two allies of Mahekodo-tedi, assisted the latter in the revenge raids against the Shamatari; the Kreiböwei-tedi, of course, participated in these raids. On one raid they found Riakowä's village abandoned so they burned down the houses and destroyed the garden: the plantains were cut down and the root crops dug up. The raiders pushed on, following Riakowä's trail, and caught up with their enemies on the Shukumöna-u River near the village of Karawatari-urihi-tedi where the followers of Riakowä had fled to avoid the revenge raids from the Mahekodo-tedi. The raiders found Riakowä swimming in the river, together with his son, a boy about 7 years old, and two of the girls, Kayoma and Waiimi, abducted during the treacherous feast. They killed Riakowä and took all the children. On their way back to Mahekodo-tedi, however, the raiders were chased by the Shamatari, who managed to get ahead of them. The Shamatari surprised them the following morning, killing one man from Makolima-tedi while he slept. In the fighting that followed, the Shamatari lost another man.

The Kreiböwei-tedi and the Mahekodo-tedi unsuccessfully raided the Shamatari a number of times after this raid, but eventually discontinued the raiding when they concluded that they had chased the Shamatari out of the area.

## Area 9: Kobou-täka

174 175 The Kreiböwei-tedi parted with their protectors as
*628 soon as this garden began producing. They lived at this site
241 only long enough to complete their two new gardens at Monou
361 722 and Barawä, moving into the latter when they, in turn, began
[103] producing. "Kobou" in Yąnomamö means "let it go at that," or, in more vernacular terms, "to hell with that garden." Kobou was abandoned shortly after it was made, having served as a temporary base for the Kreiböwei-tedi while they completed their split. It would not have been necessary to complete the splitting of the village by making _two_ new gardens had there been no war with the Shamatari. But, as one faction of the group made their garden elsewhere, the others were reluctant to remain at Kobou and bear the brunt of the revenge raids from the Shamatari. Thus, they too made a new garden. Again, it would not have been necessary to make Kobou-täka had Mahekodo-tedi been a dependable ally. But as the Kreiböwei-tedi suspected that their erstwhile protectors were plotting against them, they followed that course of action most expedient at the time. As they had already started Kobou, it was simply more practicable to complete that garden and move out of Mahekodo-tedi as soon as possible, rather than begin making two gardens and delay their move until these gardens began producing.

## Areas 10 and 11: Monou-tedi and Barawä-tedi

174 175 *621 *628 After separating into two groups the Kreiböwei-tedi

174
175 remained on good terms with each other. Their split occur-
*621
*628 red in 1954, perhaps a year earlier.

When I initiated my field work in 1964 Monou-täka
361
241 was still occupied, but its population, the Monou-tedi, was
114 in the process of making a new garden (Moyanaböwei) west of
722 Monou to avoid the raids of the Patanowä-tedi, with whom
they had entered into a new war in 1964.

175 The faction that moved to Barawä remained at that
177 site about five years. They moved to the mouth of the Mavaca
361
648 River, taking the name Bisaasi-tedi, in 1959, splitting into
*[621] two villages, each located on opposite banks of the Mavaca
River. By 1958 the Venezuelan Government had initiated a malaria-control program in this area of Amazonas and had established a small field station at the mouth of the Mavaca River. Venezuelans associated with this field station invited the Barawä-tedi to move to the Mavaca River; the Indians accepted the invitation, hoping to gain access to steel tools. This was the beginning of contact with outsiders for the Kreiböwei-tedi; prior to 1959 the only foreigners they had known were the missionary at Mahekodo-tedi, James P. Barker, and the members of the Frobenius Institute Expedition, Meinhard Schuster and Otto Zerries, who they visited occasionally at Mahekodo-tedi.

## 174 Area 12: Bisaasi-tedi

175
*628 The Bisaasi-tedi began friendly contacts with a
361 Shamatari village, Paruritawä-tedi, after they moved to the
mouth of the Mavaca River.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

000 174 mouth of the Mavaca River. The Paruritawä-tedi had split
175 *628 from Sibarariwä's village about 1945, and had not been involved
527 in the treacherous feast of 1950 in which the Kreiböwei-tedi
574 262 lost so many men. The Paruritawä-tedi were still on good
726 terms with Sibarariwä's followers, and the members of Monou-
*[620] tedi and Bisaasi-tedi persuaded them to invite Sibarariwä and his group to a feast. Using their agnatic ties and existing friendship, the Paruritawä-tedi succeeded in getting the followers of Sibarariwä to accept the invitation, but a malaria epidemic prevented all but a handful of people from actually attending the feast: five men and four women. With the assistance of the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, the Paruritawä-tedi killed three of the guests and seized all four of the women.

By participating in this treachery, the Paruritawä-tedi subordinated themselves to the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-
*628 tedi. At the present time the Paruritawä-tedi live in two
583 villages, and are intimately involved in a bride-exchange network with the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, the latter two villages receiving more women (and men doing bride service) than they give. The Paruritawä-tedi have no other allies, as they are the front of the expansion into this region and the only villages to their east are allies of Sibarariwä. Despite the fact that they would like to make friendly contact with Sibarariwä's group again, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, as we shall see, prevent them from doing so by chicane and threat. Thus, Monou-tedi and the

*628 583 Bisaasi-tedi are the dominant partners in the bride-exchange network with their Shamatari allies, a dominance that is reflected in the disproportionate number of women they have managed to coerce out of their allies.

361 *621 114 While I conducted my field work the Bisaasi-tedi lived in two villages on opposite banks of the Mavaca River. The group on the east bank was beginning to split by the time I left the field, and the split took place a few months later,[1] one of the factions moving to the north bank of the Orinoco River, but still within view of the other group.

## B. The History of the Paruritawä-tedi

174 *621 The Shamatari came into being as an identifiable group shortly before 1900. The Shamatari identity, as I have shown above (p. 28 ff.), is a function of the historical connections between the villages that split off from Shįhowä-tedi's parental group, as well as geographical considerations.

My informants consistently spoke of two 'true' Shamatari men: Kayabawä (Shamatari) and Matakuwä. The villages of these two men have a common origin, but I was unable to get data on the nature of the events that led to the separation of these two groups. This event took place long before the life-span of my oldest informants, and none of them knew any details of the splitting. By 1875, however, [195] [101] [361] there were two distinct Shamatari groups north of the Orinoco headwaters, one of which bore the name Shįhowä-tedi. Kayabawä

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[1] Personal communication, James P. Barker.

[Paruritawä-todi Group]

174 175 62 36 [101] (Shamatari) lived in this village and, when the village split, led his faction into the Shukumöna-u basin, becoming known as the Mokayäaba-tedi. This move took place about 1900.

[103] The second village also moved to the south side of the Orinoco, but remained on that river. They settled near a mountain called Aramamisi-käkö, and named their village after the mountain. My historical data on the Shamatari village movements is sparce up to this point.

Between 1900 and 1950 the Mavaca and Shukumöna drainages were populated by the descendents of these two 'original' Shamatari groups, and the process of village splitting that led to the occupation of this large area continues at the present time.

174 175 128 602 361 Although there are two Shamatari groups (Kayabawä's and Matakuwä's), I outline the details of the movements of Matakuwä's group, mentioning Kayabawä's only in so far as it relates to the history of Paruritawä-tedi. Militarily, Kayabawä's group plays a prominent role in the movements of Matakuwä's followers up to 1920, illustrating once again that cognate villages enter into hostile relationships with each other after they separate. Thus, this section deals with the historical movements of the group that ultimately gave rise to Paruritawä-tedi; as this group also gave rise to a number of other villages, I shall have to briefly sketch the movements of these villages after their separation from the main group.

006 It will be immediately apparent that the Shamatari

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

It will be immediately apparent that the Shamatari
174 village histories are more complicated than the one outlined
175
62 for the Namowei-tedi. This stems from the fact that the
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361 Shamatari villages had reached a large size by 1900 and began splitting into smaller groups earlier, in terms of the data I collected, than did the Namowei-tedi. In other words, the splitting that characterized Namowei-tedi's population from about 1940 to 1955 was occurring in the Shamatari population in 1900. Although I do not have census data on the numerous Shamatari villages that subsequently emerged from the two initial groups, I suspect that the numbers of people involved are significantly larger for the Shamatari village histories. Two factors seem to be the cause of this phenom-
[179] enon. First, the Shamatari villages had access to steel tools
[412] in considerable numbers before Namowei-tedi's ancestral population did; my informants asserted that their first source of
[241] steel tools was the group called Shįhowä-tedi. Presumably
[161] the size of the populations involved is a function of their agricultural potentials, and the Shamatari apparently expanded earlier than the Namowei-tedi because they had access to steel tools sooner. Secondly, the Shamatari population expanded unopposed into virgin territory, whereas the Namowei-tedi expanded into territory already occupied by other Yąnomamö; it is significant to note that when the Namowei-tedi ultimately moved into unoccupied territory, their population seems to have increased, and the first split occurred only after virgin territory was colonized.[1]

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[161] [1] I am unable to explain how this affects demographic variables, but my data suggest that Yąnomamö populations expand more rapidly when they colonize virgin land.

## [Paruritawä-tedi Group]

### Area 1: Aramamisi-käkö

174 Matakuwä's group settled here after abandoning their
361 site north of the Orinoco because of wars with Kayabawä's
722 group. The village at Aramamisi-käkö, according to my inform-
*621 ants (who could not possibly have remembered it from child-
[124] hood), was immense. As the populations of the present villages of Yeisi-tedi, Hakiaiyoaba-tedi, Aramamisi-tedi, Konabuma-tedi,[1] Iwahikoroba-tedi, Akawaiyoba-tedi, Möwäraoba-tedi, Karawatari-urihi-tedi, Warabawä-tedi, Kohoroshi-tedi, Mömariböwei-tedi, and Reyaboböwei-tedi trace their origins to this single village, we must conclude that the village was indeed large in 1900.

174 A large segment of the population broke away from the
175 main group and moved to the Rahuawä-u River, splitting into
361 two groups after reaching that area. Their separation from
*621 the Aramamisi-käkö population developed out of a feud over a
978 woman within the village, and the feud escalated to mutual
*628 raiding after the separation was completed. The splinter
721
726 group entered into friendly relationships with the Namowei-tedi and were their allies until about 1935, when a war between
174 them broke out. The present villages of Konabuma-tedi, Yeisi-
175 tedi, Hakiaiyoaba-tedi, and Akawaiyoba-tedi are derived from
*621 the original faction that separated from Matakuwä's group.
*628 The first three of these groups presently live in the Shukumöna-u
361 basin, while the last one lives in the area abandoned by the

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[[103]] [1] There were two distinct Shamatari villages that had the name Konabuma-tedi.

174 175 others. Matakuwä's group was being raided by Kayabawä's
*621 followers and by the splinter group that separated from
*628 Arammisi-käkö. These raids forced Matakuwä and his followers
[722] to abandon Arammisi-käkö and settle at Shɨrakoböwei. This
move took place about 1900, perhaps a few years later.

### Area 2: Shɨrakoböwei

174 175 Matakuwä's followers established several sites in
361 722 this area, as they were harried by the raids from Kayabawä's
*621 followers. An internal village feud developed between the
578 factions led respectively by Karehewä and Orakawä. During
174 175 the fighting a young man from Karehewä's group was killed
*621 with a spear, and Karehewä moved to the Mavaca basin.
361 726 Karehewä's followers raided the group at Shɨrakoböwei, and
the latter reciprocated, forcing Karehewä to move further
174 175 north. Karehewä's son, Riakowä, became headman of this village
622 and played host to the 1950 treacherous feast in which
*628 574 the Kreiböwei-tedi lost a large number of men. This village
578 [103] is presently called Iwahikoroba-tedi, and is led by Riakowä's
*621 son, Börösöwä. In 1965 rumors reached the Bisaasi-tedi that
361 Iwahikoroba-tedi had split into two factions, both moving
*621 down the Mavaca River. In September 1965 I attempted unsuccessfully
114 to make the first contact with this group, but
my guides forced me to turn back when we began seeing signs
(bridges and trails) made by Börösöwä's group. They feared
Börösöwä would kill us.

174 *621 361 Another faction, led by Waiyahowä, split off from

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

174 *221 361 [731] Matakuwä's group and returned to the Orinoco River area. An epidemic later decimated this small group and the survivors were absorbed by other villages.

Finally, Matakuwä and his group separated from Orakawä and his faction and, in about 1910, settled in the Mavaca basin. The group that remained at Shɨrakoböwei retained the name Aramamisi-tedi. They later moved back toward the Orinoco River and are presently in that area.

Matakuwä and his followers separated from Orakawä's group for two reasons. First, Matakuwä decided to support Karehewä in the dispute over the death of a member of the [722] latter's group. Secondly, Matakuwä and his faction wanted to escape the raiding from the Shɨhowä-tedi, who continued *[628] to harrass them. By taking the side of Karehewä, Matakuwä [726] and his faction entered into hostilities with Orakawä's group and, as soon as the two groups separated, they began raiding each other.

### Area 3: Boraböwei

174 195 361 *628 602 726 241 Matakuwä and his followers moved here about 1910. Raids mounted on them by their agnates, the Aramamisi-tedi, forced them to make a new garden at Konabuma, and for a number of years Matakuwä's group lived alternatively between these two sites. Another garden was established at Kaurewä after the raiding intensified; one raid on them by the Aramamisi-tedi resulted in the destruction of their garden at Boraböwei, and Matakuwä's group fled to Kayurewä, temporarily abandoning Konabuma.

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

000 rarily abandoning Konabuma.

174 Matakuwä's group had three factions. Oroshowä, a
175 *621 man belonging to Matakuwä's faction, took a woman away from
578 her husband, a man from Karawatari's faction, leading to an
361 internal feud. One man of Karawatari's faction was shot, and
Karawatari split from the main group to establish a village
of his own on the Shukumöna-u River. This split took place
174 175 about 1925. Karawatari's group began raiding Matakuwä's vil-
*629 lage to avenge the death of Biawawä, the man killed in the
721 feud. Karawatari's village later split for reasons I was un-
174 175 able to determine, and two factions separated from Karawatari's
*621 group to found their own villages: Warabawä-tedi, led by
361 [622] Hewariwä, and Kohoroshi-tedi, led by Ohiriwä. These last two
[799] villages are presumed to be in Brazil at the present time,
as my informants assert that Kohoroshi-tedi includes bearded
foreigners among its members, most probably Salesian Mis-
361 sionaries on the Cauabury River.[1] In 1964 Karawatari's group
[574] lived on the Shukumöna-u River, as men from Reyaboböwei-tedi
*[628] danced there that year. When the Reyaboböwei-tedi left
[721] Karawatari's village, they took a young woman (Dimorama) with
them, thereby becoming enemies to Karawatari. The girl
presently lives in Bisaasi-tedi.

174 361 In about 1935 Matakuwä and his group moved to Kayurewä
722 to avoid raids from Karawatari and the Aramamisi-tedi.

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*[628] [1] Warabawä-tedi, a part of Kohoroshi-tedi in 1934, and
Karawatari's villagers were involved in the abduction of
Nabäyoma.

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

## Area 4: Kayurewä

174 The Aramamisi-tedi continued to raid Matakuwä's
175 *628 group at Kayurewä, so this site was abandoned in about 1940.
726 Matakuwä's group had gotten into a war with the Namowei-tedi
861 by 1940 over the death of Ruwahiwä, who was killed while he visited the Namowei-tedi at Patanowä-täka. Ruwahiwä was Matakuwä's eldest son. After this incident, the Namowei-tedi actively raided Matakuwä's group at Kayurewä, and abducted a large number of women from them. Being raided by two villages, Matakuwä moved back to Konabuma, where his group had previously lived, because the peach palms of that garden were still producing.

## Area 5: Konabuma

174 *621 About 5 years after this site was reoccupied by
361 Matakuwä's group, the group split into two villages. One of
[622] them continued to live at Konabuma, and was led by Matakuwä's
[101] son, Sibarariwä. The other group moved to a branch of the
Shukumöna-u River and took the name Paruritawä-tedi, led by
[578] Weiamamowä. The split at Konabuma was caused by an internal
[721] feud over a woman. A club fight temporarily settled the dispute, but after the groups separated, they began raiding each other.

174 Sibarariwä's group remained at Konabuma for a short
361 *628 time after the Paruritawä-tedi separated from them, but raids
722 from the Namowei-tedi, the Armamisi-tedi and the Paruritawä-
175 tedi themselves forced Sibarariwä's group to abandon Konabuma

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

174 175 and move to Kakamoba. This site was occupied for just a few
361 years, and by 1950 Sibarariwä's group was living at Amąrokobö-
*628 722 wei: the 1950 treacherous feast for the Kreiböwei-tedi was
[527] conducted while Sibarariwä's group was here. After 1950
[574] [726] Sibarariwä's group fled south to avoid the raids of the
survivors of that treacherous feast, establishing the garden
of Dędamoböwei. This garden was abandoned because of raids
mounted by the Paruritawä-tedi, and Sibarariwä returned to
174 Amąrokoböwei about 1955. The Paruritawä-tedi eventually
175 *628 became friendly to Sibarariwä's group and were able to lure
574 some of them, at the instigation of the Monou-tedi and
527 726 Bisaasi-tedi, to a treacherous feast in 1960, during which
three men were murdered and four women captured. In 1964
361 *628 Sibarariwä's group moved to the headwaters of the Mavaca
726 River, being known as the Möwäraoba-tedi. Monou-tedi and
[114] Mömariböwei-tedi sent a raiding party against them at this
location about the time I started my field work, and killed
one man.

## Area 6: Paruritawä-tedi

174 175 The Paruritawä-tedi made friendly contact with the
*628 Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi about 1960, and have entered
527 574 into alliance with these groups. The Monou-tedi and the
726 Bisaasi-tedi persuaded the Paruritawä-tedi to invite members
of Sibarariwä's group to a feast in 1960 and, with the aid
of the Paruritawä-tedi, murdered three men and seized four
[361] [722] women. Sibarariwä's group avenged this by mounting raids

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

174 175 against the Paruritawä-tedi, and the latter abandoned their
*628 site and moved north. When they abandoned Paruritawä-tedi,
527 574 the group split into two factions, each making a separate
726 garden: Mömariböwei and Reyaboböwei. The two factions are
361 *[621] still on friendly terms with each other and both are allied
[722] to the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi. The Reyaboböwei-tedi are presently attempting rapprochement with Sibarariwä's group, and are being forced by their allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, to use their newly established friend-
*628 ship to effect another treacherous feast. In February 1965
527 574 the Reyaboböwei-tedi succeeded in inviting Sibarariwä's entire
726 village to a feast and were intending to trick them after they arrived. However, one of the individuals met Sibarariwä's group half-way and warned them of the treachery, frustrating the attempt by the Bisaasi-tedi, the Monou-tedi, and the Paruritawä-tedi to get their revenge on Sibarariwä's group.

## C. The War Pattern From November 1964 to February 1966

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[178] The effects of raiding and internal feuds on village composition, stability, splitting, and relocation that I have described above may also be observed among these villages at
[114] the present time. Raiding was intense during my field work. Patanowä-tedi, for example, was raided at least 25 times while I was in the field, raids that were mounted by a dozen
[722] different villages. Not all the raids were successful, but the frequency of the raiding was so high that it was never safe for the Patanowä-tedi to venture away from the village.

721 The major effect of these raids, apart from the ten lives
722 361 they claimed, was that the Patanowä-tedi had to move frequently
from one site to another. The Monou-tedi, who were
raiding the Patanowä-tedi, were being raided intensively also.
They, too, had to move frequently to avoid the raids. Both
*[628] groups had to rely on allies to give them refuge during the
[132] [221] dry season, the time of the year when raiding is most intense.
[241] It will be apparent below how crucial allies are to villages
that are being raided frequently, and how agricultural
726 practices necessitate these allies. Finally, the events
602 *628 discussed below will illustrate the degree to which consanguineal
ties between mutually hostile villages are able to
mitigate the hostilities between these villages.

*628 726 The war between Monou-tedi and Patanowä-tedi

After the Namowei-tedi group split at the site of
*[621] Patanowä in the early '40s, the two factions entered into a
[361] period of hostility that lasted until one of the factions,
the present groups of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, moved out
of the area. Raiding between the two factions ceased after
1950, and each group entered into political alliances with unrelated
neighboring villages.

728 In the middle '50s, a rapprochement between the two
574 factions was attempted. A few individuals from Monou-tedi
*628 [581] began visiting Patanowä-tedi, and one of them, Torokoiwä, was
[583] given two wives by the Patanowä-tedi. The rapprochement, however,
was never effected and the political relationships between

*628 728 574 Patanowä-tedi and her two colonies, Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi, were generally of a suspicious nature; only a few individuals trusted the members of the other group enough to visit their village.

726 *628 By 1964 the Patanowä-tedi had become involved in a particularly vicious war with a number of neighboring villages, and were badly in need of military assistance. Their only allies were the Ashadowä-tedi, a large group living two 728 *628 days' walk south of them. Consequently, the Patanowä-tedi 527 informed the Bisaasi-tedi that they were willing to make 574 peace with them. The Bisaasi-tedi extended a feast invitation to the Patanowä-tedi to demonstrate their interest in making peace and, in late November 1964 the entire village of Patanowä-tedi arrived at Bisaasi-tedi to participate in the feast. This marked the first time since 1940 that the two groups as groups visited each other.

726 The Monou-tedi were not involved in the feast, but a 728 *628 number of men from that village came to Bisaasi-tedi intend- 527 ing to abduct Patanowä-tedi women. They succeeded in captur- 574 ing seven women the day that the Patanowä-tedi arrived, and took them back to Monou-tedi without being discovered. The Patanowä-tedi men, enraged at the loss of seven women, sent a party of men to Monou-tedi the following morning to recover the women. The Patanowä-tedi men entered Monou-tedi and forcibly took five of the seven women away from their captors. The Patanowä-tedi retreated before actual shooting broke out and returned to Bisaasi-tedi. The Monou-tedi were furious

726 728 *628 527 514 over the loss of the five women, and Yąnomamö canons of ferocity dictated that this loss would have to be avenged. The Monou-tedi informed the Patanowä-tedi that they were going to shoot them on sight the next time they met.

After the Patanowä-tedi returned to Bisaasi-tedi they packed their possessions and left for home. The feast was cancelled, as the Patanowä-tedi feared being ambushed by a Monou-tedi raiding party if they remained at Bisaasi-tedi. Before departing, the Patanowä-tedi assured their hosts that they still wanted peace with them, no matter what the Monou-tedi eventually did.

*628 721 723 This illustrates dramatically the Yąnomamö political philosophy that it is legitimate to take advantage of a weak village. The Monou-tedi, knowing that the Patanowä-tedi were politically in need of allies, took advantage of this situation when they abducted the women. They also knew that the Bisaasi-tedi would not take Patanowä-tedi's side in the dispute that was bound to follow, as too many of the Bisaasi-tedi had personal grudges against the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi also knew that the Patanowä-tedi were not likely to begin a war over this incident, as they already had more enemies than they could successfully withstand without allies. In short, the Monou-tedi knew that they stood a good chance of gaining women by abducting them from the Patanowä-tedi without great risk of being shot by the latter. As the conclusion shows, they managed to obtain two women and did not get into a
*628 721 shooting war with the Patanowä-tedi. However, their anger at

*628 721 the Patanowä-tedi for managing to overwhelm their own force
led them to declare war on the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi
722 241 immediately began making a new garden at Moyenaböwei, across
726 the Mavaca River from their village and several hours inland, anticipating the war that they knew would follow. After they had cleared the large trees from their new garden site, they raided the Patanowä-tedi in the last week of January 1965, and succeeded in killing Bosibrei.

727 Another important event took place while the Monou-
581 tedi were clearing the trees from their new garden site, an
582 693 event that illustrates the same principle of political philo-
*628 sophy. One of the stolen women, Kakoma, was given to a young man, Karidimö, who had only one leg. Karidimö could not do heavy work, and when his village moved inland to clear their new site Karidimö moved to Bisaasi-tedi with his new wife. Kakoma, however, was not pleased with her new husband, and asked the Bisaasi-tedi if she could stay with them, hoping that she would be permitted to rejoin the Patanowä-tedi if they returned to Bisaasi-tedi to visit. The Bisaasi-tedi men obligingly took her away from Karidimö by force and gave her to a bachelor in their own village. Karidimö, enraged at this, returned to Monou-tedi to recruit aid.

*628 This put the Monou-tedi in a difficult position.
721 578 They were planning to raid the Patanowä-tedi and would have to maintain good relations with the Bisaasi-tedi if the revenge raids from the Patanowä-tedi became intense. They could not, however, overlook the insult to Karidimö, for this

*628 721 578 would have been a display of weakness. They decided to challenge the Bisaasi-tedi to a club fight and settle their grievances by that means. Ten days after Kakoma was taken from Karidimö, the Monou-tedi men arrived at Bisaasi-tedi and settled the dispute in a club fight. The Monou-tedi were thoroughly trounced by the larger number of Bisaasi-tedi, but they nevertheless demonstrated their potential and willingness to fight, thereby warning the Bisaasi-tedi that they better not attempt to seize more women in the future.

The Bisaasi-tedi clearly had taken advantage of the Monou-tedi numerical weakness and political needs to advance their own ends.

726 In the first week of March 1965 the Patanowä-tedi raided the Monou-tedi. They found the village site on the Mavaca River deserted, so they crossed the river and followed the trail taken by the Monou-tedi to their new garden. They [622] caught the Monou-tedi headman outside the new garden and killed him.

*628 728 This attack brought about an immediate rapprochement between the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi. Even Kąobäwä, leader of one of Bisaasi-tedi's main factions, was furious over this killing. Up to this point he was still interested in making peace with the Patanowä-tedi, but this even temporarily changed his mind. 726 Kąobäwä ultimately led the revenge raid against the Patanowä-tedi.

[764] The Monou-tedi burned the corpse of the slain headman and sent small gourds of his ground bones to members of allied

726 villages (Bisaasi-tedi, Mǫmariböwei-tedi, and Karohi-tedi).
[764] [766] These ashes were to be consumed prior to revenge raids on
[245] the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi then set about transporting plantain cuttings to their new garden and spent the next
several weeks working on the garden. They intended to delay
[132] [221] their revenge raid until the beginning of the rainy season
in order to make it difficult for the Patanowä-tedi to raid
[361] them in return. The Monou-tedi moved into Bisaasi-tedi at
*[628] the end of March both for military protection and for respite
from their heavy agricultural labors. They stayed with the
Bisaasi-tedi until the end of April, fearing that they would
be raided by the Patanowä-tedi if they returned to their own
village before the rains started. They also planned to raid
the Patanowä-tedi from Bisaasi-tedi at the beginning of the
wet season, knowing that a revenge raid from Patanowä-tedi
[132] would be difficult once the rains started. They could return
[221] to their own village during the rainy season, as the jungle
separating their village from the Patanowä-tedi is inundated
at this time of the year and cannot be traversed.

[769] On April 19th the Bisaasi-tedi sponsored a mortuary
*[628] feast for the slain Monou-tedi headman in preparation for
the revenge raid. The participants in the revenge raid were
to include the Mǫmariböwei-tedi, but they did not arrive as
scheduled, so the raid was delayed until the 21st. Only
a few Mǫmariböwei-tedi arrived to participate in the raid,
and the Bisaasi-tedi immediately suspected that the Mǫmariböwei-tedi were plotting to abduct women from them after

726 the men left on the raid. One faction of Bisaasi-tedi did
[722] not participate in the raid in order to protect the women while the others were gone.

The raiding party left on the 21st and returned on
[361] the 2nd of May. They killed one Patanowä-tedi at Shɨhota, a site abandoned in 1949 by the Bisaasi-tedi now being used by the Patanowä-tedi. The Patanowä-tedi chased the raiders, outflanking them at one point, and shot one of the Monou-tedi, badly wounding him. The man, Konoreiwä, was pierced with a bamboo point just above his heart. Although the tip of the point protruded out his back, he recovered.

726 The Patanowä-tedi could not avenge this killing until
36 the rains subsided. Accordingly, the Monou-tedi returned to
*628
[221] their own village after they retreated to Bisaasi-tedi on
[132] May 2. They remained in their village until June 20, at which time they rejoined the Bisaasi-tedi; they did so because travel through the jungle was becoming possible by that date, as the rains subsided early in 1965. On July 10 the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi, assisted by their allies, the Mömariböwei-tedi and Reyaboböwei-tedi, raided the Patanowä-tedi again, leaving from Bisaasi-tedi. The raid proved to be unsuccessful, as the Patanowä-tedi had moved into the village of their only ally, the Ashadowä-tedi. All the raiders except those from Monou-tedi wanted to turn back, as the trail to Ashadowä-tedi was a poor one and retreat would have been difficult. The raiding party did turn back, but the Monou-tedi were angry with their allies for forcing them to

726 *628 361 return.

The Monou-tedi returned to their own village after this raid, angry because their allies refused to prosecute [241] the war more vigorously. They collected food from their garden and moved into their new site at Moyenaböwei, extending their garden. For the next two months the Monou-tedi lived alternately at Bisaasi-tedi, their old village, and their new garden, to which they carried food from their old one as needed. By now the Patanowä-tedi were raiding them frequently to avenge the attack of April 21, and signs of the Patanowä-tedi raiders were found numerous times at the old site of Monou-tedi.

The Patanowä-tedi were also moving between several gardens to avoid raids from their enemies. They lived alternately between Patanowä-täka, with the Ashadowä-tedi, and their new garden, Shɨhota. Moreover, they were actively engaged in another war at the same time. So effective were the Patanowä-tedi raids against the Hasaböwä-tedi that, in mid 1965, the latter had to abandon their site south of the Orinoco River and move to the north side near the village of one of their allies, Kashorawä-tedi. They made a new garden near Kashorawä-tedi and abandoned their old one.

726 The war between the Patanowä-tedi and the Hasaböwä-tedi had taken some unusual turns. On one raid in July, the Patanowä-tedi fired a volley of arrows into Hasaböwä-tedi's village, killing two women. A few weeks later the Hasaböwä-tedi deliberately waited for a woman, Huhuma, to come out of

726 the Patanowä-tedi village and killed her. In subsequent raids both villages resorted to killing even young children.

Thus, the Patanowä-tedi and the Monou-tedi had similar military problems and were solving them in essentially the same way. Both groups made new gardens, but were unable to move to them because the gardens could not support the populations until the plants matured and bore fruit. Both groups were being raided actively by enemies and could not remain 726 *628 at their producing sites. Therefore, each had to rely on aid from an ally. Of the two military situations, that of the Patanowä-tedi was the more critical; they were being raided actively by a dozen villages, whereas the Monou-tedi were being raided by only one enemy. Of the dozen villages raiding the Patanowä-tedi, only five had legitimate revenge reasons for doing so. The remaining villages were participating in the raiding with the hope that their raiders would be able to capture women. The members of these latter villages knew that the Patanowä-tedi could not possibly raid them in return, as there were too many villages enemy to the Patanowä-tedi in the path. Hence, they had women to gain and were almost completely immune to possible revenge raids.

726 *621

### Kinship ties mitigating the hostility of the war between the Monou-tedi and the Patanowä-tedi

Up to the middle of 1965, the upper group of Bisaasi-tedi behaved as a single political unit with respect to the war between the Monou-tedi and the Patanowä-tedi. There were,

726 There were,
*621 however, two recognizable factions within this group; one
622 was led by Kąobäwä, who had many relatives in both Patanowä-
602 tedi and Monou-tedi, and the other was led by Paruriwä, who
had no consanguineal relatives in Patanowä-tedi, but many in
Monou-tedi. Paruriwä's group was linked to Kąobäwä's by a
number of marriage ties.

*621 Kąobäwä was the acknowledged leader of the entire
622 upper section of Bisaasi-tedi, including Paruriwä's group,
although Paruriwä had some influence in the affairs of the
village. After the middle of the year, Paruriwä began to
emerge as leader in his own right, and began duplicating many
of the activities normally the prerogative of the village
[527] headman. Thus, when Kąobäwä initiated a feast for members
[574] of an allied village, Paruriwä duplicated his efforts by
sending out his own hunters to provide meat for the guests,
and furnished an equal amount of cultivated food, which he
disposed of from his own section of the village. Normally,
the headman sends out the hunters and disposes of the cultivated
food from his own house. Paruriwä, by duplicating
Kąobäwä's efforts in these activities, announced that he was
a headman.

726
622 The emergence of Paruriwä as an important leader was
*628 largely the result of his active prosecution of the war
[728] against the Patanowä-tedi. Kąobäwä, after he led one revenge
raid against the Patanowä-tedi, decided that he wanted to
remain neutral in the fighting and wanted to make peace with
the Patanowä-tedi. This led to a political vacuum within

726 #628 Bisaasi-tedi, as the Monou-tedi were demanding military aid
622 from them. Paruriwä seized upon this as his opportunity to
[564] advance his prestige, and after the middle of 1965 initiated
several raids against the Patanowä-tedi without the support
of Kąobäwä. This enhanced his prestige with the Monou-tedi.
[602] As Paruriwä was not related to the slain Monou-tedi headman
(consanguineally), his participation in the war is best seen
as an expression of his attempt to advance his status.

156 Paruriwä's behavior in other respects changed after
622 [123] the middle of the year. He constantly reminded me that he
was a 'big man,' as if I would fail to notice this. Again,
[593] he went out of his way to be brutal to his wives; on one
occasion he nearly killed one of them with an axe because she
responded slowly to his demand for food while Paruriwä was
entertaining visitors. His outburst was a display to the
visitors, and to his own followers, that he was indeed a
#621 force to contend with. Shortly after I left the field,
622 Paruriwä and his group separated from Kąobäwä's and moved
361 529 across the Orinoco River. He had started building his house
574 on that side of the river about the middle of the year. This
move underscored his postion as a headman, as he could
initiate feasts for other groups from his own village. Up
until the time he moved, visitors from other villages consistently sought out Kąobäwä as Bisaasi-tedi's headman during
the feasts and the trading after the feasts, no matter how
much effort Paruriwä spent in emphasizing his own role in the
feast. As far as the visitors were concerned, there was just

*621 622 one real headman, Kąobäwä. Thus, Paruriwä had to separate
361 527 from Kąobäwä's group to achieve a status equal to that of
574 Kąobäwä.

728 In July 1965 Kąobäwä sent his brother-in-law, Kumamawä,
*628 to Patanowä-tedi to inform them that his group did not intend
622 574 to raid the Patanowä-tedi in the future. When Kumamawä returned to Bisaasi-tedi, he brought two older people with him, demonstrating that the Patanowä-tedi trusted Kąobäwä and were anxious to promote good relations with his group. The older couple brought the message that three young men from Patanowä-tedi were coming on a visit soon. Three days later the young men, Hąrokoiwä, Masiwä, and Koiyeiwä, arrived. Paruriwä's group was visiting the Widokaiya-tedi, and when word reached him that a delegation of Patanowä-tedi had arrived at Bisaasi-tedi to visit Kąobäwä, he and a group of men from Monou-tedi immediately returned to Bisaasi-tedi, intending to murder the three visitors. Kąobäwä, however, warned Paruriwä and the Monou-tedi that should they attempt to harm the visitors, he and his followers would defend them with force. A crisis developed out of this situation, and for a whole day Paruriwä and his Monou-tedi supporters debated the wisdom of their
[203] plan. Finally, Paruriwä decided to desist from the murders
[606] and even participated in a news chant with one of the Patanowä-tedi--the father of his youngest wife. This emphasized Kąobäwä's influence as a leader, and Paruriwä decided
*628 to move away from Kąobäwä's group after this incident. The
574 726 *621 Monou-tedi who were to participate in the murder of the three

*628 674 726 *621 visitors were enraged because Paruriwä failed to execute the plan, and they returned to Monou-tedi to recruit a raiding party, hoping to intercept the visitors on their way back to Patanowä-tedi.[1] Paruriwä placated the Monou-tedi by organizing a series of raids against the Patanowä-tedi, and by inviting the Monou-tedi to stay in his section of the village when they fled from their other two sites. Prior to this, the Monou-tedi had been staying with the members of the lower group of Bisaasi-tedi. By early November, the Monou-tedi had begun raiding the Patanowä-tedi with great frequency, supported by members of Paruriwä's group. Paruriwä himself sent three raiding parties against the Patanowä-tedi between November and February, all of which included men from Monou-tedi. [622] Kąobäwä did not participate in or encourage these raids, but some of his followers took part in them.

*621 622 *628 602 726 578 This split was not the outcome of an internal feud. Rather, it developed out of the different political interests of two leaders, one of whom was ambitiously striving to improve his status as a headman. The other refused to prosecute the war against the Patanowä-tedi, as he had a large number of kinsmen there. The existence of these ties, however, did not preclude the war, as the Bisaasi-tedi are in fact raiding the Patanowä-tedi. The kin ties at best mitigate the intensity of the raiding. The situation is a problem for the Patanowä-tedi, as they do not want to kill the few Bisaasi-tedi friends

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[123] [1] Their plan failed, as I took the Patanowä-tedi back to their village part way in my boat, and we went the remainder of the way on a trail the Monou-tedi could not reach.

*621 622 they have, but they must revenge raids coming from Bisaasi-
*628 tedi. Now that Paruriwä and his followers have moved away
602 726 from Kąobäwä's group, the Patanowä-tedi can raid Paruriwä
978 without having to 'look twice' before shooting. As Paruriwä's faction is a small one, it is vulnerable; one raid from the Patanowä-tedi will force it to rejoin Kąobäwä's group. The internal stability of the reunited groups will suffer if this happens, as Paruriwä will be obliged to demonstrate his leadership capacity. This will involve making an issue out of an incident that probably would have been overlooked prior to the separation of the two groups, and internal friction will be high.

The split within Patanowä-tedi

726
*621 The incessant raiding from Hasaböwä-tedi, Kashorawä-
*628 tedi, Yabitawä-tedi, Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi and their
152 respective allies brought about a high degree of tension among
[722] the Patanowä-tedi. It was not safe to leave the village at
*621 any time. The Patanowä-tedi had attempted to split into
578 three groups several years earlier, as the population had
726 [161] reached a large size and internal fighting was a nuisance. The development of the war with the Hasaböwä-tedi forced them
[152] to reunite. Factionalism, however, was pronounced within the village, and the added tension brought about by the new war with Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi and the latter's two Shamatari allies ultimately led to an internal split within Patanowä-tedi a month before I left the field.

*621 Moiyoawä had two wives, Borehima and her older
595 sister, Kumaiema. Borehima thought she was being treated
526
578 badly by her husband and deserted him, taking refuge with
[592] another man, Makerawä. Moiyoawä attempted to get his wife
back from Makerawä, precipitating a club fight between two
factions of the village. During the club fight, Makerawä
stabbed Moiyoawä with the sharp end of his club, wounding him
badly. This enraged the leader of Moiyoawä's faction, Rakoiwä,
who then attacked Makerawä, running him through with a sharp-
*[628] ened club, killing him. Makerawä's faction fled from Patanowä-
[361] tedi and joined their relatives in Monou-tedi, knowing that
the latter would welcome their assistance in future raids
726 against the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi, assisted by the
*628 Patanowä-tedi refugees, raided the Patanowä-tedi two times
shortly after the refugees joined them. On the second raid
they caught two Patanowä-tedi men hunting outside the village.
[602] They killed one of them, but let the second one go, as he was
Kąobäwä's actual son by a previous marriage and they did not
want to risk a war with the Bisaasi-tedi by killing this man,
[115] Shinahewä. In a recent letter from James P. Barker, I
learned that a part of the refugee faction joined Bisaasi-
tedi.

The woman over whom the internal feud started was
[593] taken away from Makerawä's group. Moiyoawä cut both her ears
[624] off to punish her.

105 **Summary**

36 [128] Tables 5 and 6 broadly summarize the movements of
the five villages. As the details of the text indicate,
considerably more village movement goes on than can be in-
cluded in tables of this sort. The micro-movements, however,
[722] merely express in greater detail what is immediately apparent
from an examination of Tables 5 and 6: the Yąnomamö abandon
their gardens and move to new locations because of raids from
[134] other groups. In only one instance was the movement of a
village stimulated by economic considerations: site 4 was
abandoned by the Namowei-tedi because of poor soil. Another
exception was the abandoning of Barawä (site 10) by the
[412] Bisaasi-tedi in 1959. They moved to the mouth of the Mavaca
[177] River to gain access to steel tools, marking the beginning
of their sustained contact with foreigners.

105 The tables also show that there were ten village
*621 splits relevant to explaining the origins of the five villages
578 *628 considered in this chapter. Five of these splits were due to
721 feuds over women. In four of the cases the factions that
were involved immediately entered into hostilities with each
other. The recent split within Patanowä-tedi, discussed in
the text (pp. 188-89), again over a woman, is not included in
Table 5, as the refugee group did not form a new village of
their own. Three village splits in Tables 5 and 6 developed
out of minor feuds, usually over women, brought about by
large village size. In one case, the factions ultimately
entered into hostilities with each other, whereas in two cases
the factions still remain on friendly terms.

000 the factions still remain on friendly terms.

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Material presented in the discussion above--details of the movements of factions that are not relevant to the origin of the five villages considered here--also support the contention that villages split over internal feuds. That villages are structurally unstable is evidenced by the sheer number of village splits and the fact that the related factions enter into hostilities with each other after separating. Data I collected on village movements for other Yąnomamö groups support the conclusions I reach here.

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[613]

One can see that the process of village splitting leads to the formation of independent villages that comprise closely-related kinsmen. Intuitively, one can also see that marriages "between" such villages, i.e., between spouses that each claim to be of different villages, do not necessarily represent political alliances between those villages, for in many cases the marriages were contracted between the local lineages involved before they separated. This is not to say that all the cases of this sort can be dismissed in this fashion. Some marriages between ambilateral cross-cousins are in fact properly interpreted as marriage alliances between villages, for occasionally related villages enter into alliances with each other. In these cases, the marriages between them come about for essentially the same reasons that the exogamic marriages between unrelated groups occur. In short, the existence of the marriage rule alone does not account for alliances between related groups that enter into politico-military pacts.

## CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUSIONS

128 In the body of this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate that two variables in particular exert an overriding effect on Yąnomamö social structure. These are, respectivley, the shortage of women and the intensity of actual warfare. In this final chapter, I should like to accomplish two ends. First, I should like to set my conclusions against different material recently gathered among the Yąnomamö in northern Brazil.[1] Second, I should like to bring my material to bear on the discussion between Leach (1957) and Fortes (1959a, 1959b) regarding the relationship of kinship, marriage ties, descent and politics.

121 721 582 183 Let us turn first to comparative Yąnomamö ethnology. If it is true, as I have argued, that warfare enhances the

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[114] [1] After I had completed the text of the thesis I had an opportunity to discuss with Ernesto Migliazza the social organization of a number of Brazilian Yąnomamö groups. Migliazza, a linguist, spent nearly six years among the Uraricaá Yąnomamö, working for a Baptist Mission and, more recently, for the Goeldi Museum in Belém. I thank him for permission to use much of the comparative material presented below; some of it has already been published in his 1964 work. I introduce this new data because it very effectively demonstrates the interrelationships between the variables discussed in the thesis. I would have arrived at the same conclusions, by employing arguments similar to those used by Meggitt (1965), but the contrast provided by this new material makes the conclusions more defensible.

121 likelihood that marriage practices will depart from the
721 rules governing ideal marriage behavior, then we would expect
582 a reduction in warfare to produce a reduction of this gap.
183 *[628] A decrease in warfare should obviate the need for military
[583] alliances validated by exchanges of women; under such conditions marriage practice should conform more closely to preferential rules.

101 The Yąnomamö who live on the Upper Uraricoera and
131 Uraricaá rivers of northern Brazil differ markedly in a
184 number of traits from the Venezuelan Yąnomamö of the Mavaca
721 basin considered in this thesis. A major point of difference is that among the former warfare is much less common than it is among the Yąnomamö described in the preceding chapters.
[177] It is likely that this reduction in warfare is partly due to
[797] more frequent contact of the Brazilian Yąmomaö with Carib-speaking Indian tribes (Makiritare and Arekuna) and, since 1958, with Christian missions. There appears to be a cline in the decreasing intensity of warfare from southwest, the area in which I conducted my field work, to northeast, the area from which these new data are drawn (see Map D, next
*[621] page). Yąnomamö from the Upper Padamo River, an area about
[578] on the mid-point of this cline, told me that fighting with
[754] clubs was very rare in their villages. Migliazza[1] asserts that raiding between villages on the Uraricoera River occurs only every four or five years and is usually provoked by

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[1] Personal communication.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 195]

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
MAP D
The Location of
Uraricaá and
Mavaca Yąnomamö
SCALE: 25 50 100 km.
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N
URARICAÁ
URARICOERA R.
Brazil
PARIMA R.
PARIMA MOUNTAINS
ORINOCO R.
SHUKUMINA R.
MAVACA
PADAMO R.
Venezuela

721
101
131 accusations of sorcery or by the desire to abduct woemn.

184
(164) Another major difference between the Uraricaá and
184 the Mavaca Yąnomamö is the manner in which they treat extra-
837 marital liaisons. On the Uraricaá, liaisons are tacitly
578 permitted and fighting rarely develops between a man and his wife's lover. Should fighting occur, it is generally caused by some incident unrelated to the affair itself. In short, men permit their wives to have extra-marital affairs, provided the women are discreet.

184 Of major analytical significance is the fact that
*628 the Uraricaá Yąnomamö closely adhere to their rules of
582 ambilateral cross-cousin marriage.[1] This stems from the fact
583 that political alliances between villages there never involve the transfer of women from one group to the other. The Yąnomamö of the Uraricaá are endogamous within each congeries
721 of villages having a common history. It would seem, therefore,
182 that the absence of intensive warfare permits marriage practice
582 to follow marriage rules.

184 The Uraricaá settlement pattern and village organiza-
361 tion differ considerably from those found among the Yąnomamö
*621 of the Mavaca basin. What I have called a small village of 40 people among the latter segments, on the Uraricaá, into clusters of extended family units separated from each other by as much as half a mile (Migliazza, 1964). The village in which Migliazza lived, for example, comprised 80 persons

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(114) [1] Migliazza was not able to give me statistical data on actual marriage practices. I intend to collect this kind of information in January-February 1967 when I visit the Uraricaá area.

184 occupying five different sites, each having its own house
361 and garden. These five groups recombined into a single
*621 unitary village only when warfare threatened. To the south-
*628 [722] west of the Uraricaá area, in the headwaters of the Parima
River, the villages tend to be larger and more nucleated.
On the Upper Parima River villages have a permanent centralized
site to which the dispersed extended families may retreat when
184 raids are imminent. Warfare is more common in this area than
721 on the Uraricaá. The Parima Mountains separate this group of
[131] [133] Yąnomamö from those whose social organization is described in
this thesis. Southwest of the Parima Mountains intensity of
warfare is similar to that found in the Mavaca basin. Cor-
[361] responding to this increase in intensity is a change in type
of settlement: palisaded villages are general southwest of
the Parima Mountains, whereas they are found only sporadically
or not at all to the northeast.

184 There is likewise an apparent cline in population
361 131 density isomorphic with the cline in warfare intensity.
721 161 Yąnomamö villages in Brazil are progressively smaller and
more widely scattered as one proceeds northeastward from the
Parima Mountains. It is tempting to correlate the reduction
in warfare intensity with the demographic pattern. However,
[177] another factor complicates the picture: the Yąnomamö have more
contact with other tribes (Makiritare and Arekuna) in the
northeast extension of their territory; in many cases they
184 648 live in the same villages with these tribes. I suspect that
721 the contact they have with the Carib-speaking groups also

184 648 contributes to the reduction in the intensity of warfare.
721 This stems from the fact that the Caribs have long had access
to firearms, and the Yąnomamö avoid attacking Carib villages.
[411] It is not likely that Yąnomamö villages settled close to or
[179] among Caribs would be raided by other Yąnomamö, for the Caribs
would either defend their co-residents or provide them with
firearms to retaliate. Certainly, I know of no cases of
Yąnomamö villages mounting raids on other Yąnomamö who live
near or among Carib Indians.

184 Throughout the thesis I have emphasized the causal
562 relationship between the shortage of women and the develop-
*621 *628 ment of hostilities within and between villages. The same
578 relationship appears to hold in the Uraricaá area, as the
721 following incident illustrates. The missionaries discovered
721 *628 that one of the Yąnomamö women had two husbands. They felt
562 that this was an unacceptable situation and persuaded the
726 797 woman that she should abandon one of the men. This man then
177 could not find another eligible woman of the appropriate age
[595] and relationship to marry, so he organized a party of men to
accompany him on a wife-hunting trip to a neighboring, but
unrelated, village. On arriving he informed the people that
he had come to teach them a new and powerful institution,
prayer, which he had learned from the missionaries. He had
his hosts kneel and bow their heads; then he and his companions
fell upon them with machetes and killed them. The
visitors seized the hosts' women and fled. In an area where
warfare is rare, this incident indelibly underscores the

721 *628

562 relationship between the shortage of women and the initiation
726 of inter-village hostilities.[1]

797 177 One conclusion I reach, therefore, is that the fre-
121 quency of hostilities within and between villages varies
*621 *628 directly with the opportunities for males to satisfy their
578 sexual desires in a socially acceptable way. In other words,
562 internal village fighting and inter-village warfare should
831 721 diminish in proportion to the increase in number of women
to which each man has sexual access. Several kinds of data support this conclusion. First, the histories of the five villages and the data on village movements and warfare during 1964-66 show that most village splitting and most village warfare arise from feuds over women. Second, there was no fighting within Lower Bisaasi-tedi during the 15 months of
[162] my field work. This village has no adult bachelors, and
has a male/female sex-ratio close to 1.0. Third, when mis-
[797] sionaries changed the Yąnomamö attitudes toward coitus with
[177] [834] pregnant and lactating women in one village, internal feud-
[833] ing reduced markedly.[2] Fourth, the data from the Uraricaá
[837] Yąnomamö on extra-marital sexual relationships imply that

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[1] I cite this incident because it is an unambiguous--perhaps even classic--example of a war developing due to a shortage of women. I am in no sense criticizing the missionaries; they can not be held responsible for the violent nature of their charges in this or any other case. Their kindness and good example have, in a number of cases with which I am familiar, prevented bloodshed among the Indians.

[2] Personal communication from Mr. Wallace Jank, a New Tribes Missionary working among the Yąnomamö on the Padamo River.

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*621

*628 fighting and warfare are reduced when the available women
578
562 carry on affairs. Thus, I conclude that any factor which
831 increases the sexual activity of females or increases the
721
[837] female/male ratio reduces the frequency of fighting.

121 The second conclusion I reach is that Yąnomamö marriage
183 practices can be predicted, in a broad sense, once the
58
721 conditions of warfare are specified. The greater the intensity
*628 of warfare, the more marriage practice will deviate from the
preferred types. This follows from the fact that the Yąnomamö
are forced to base military alliances on exchanges of women,
limiting the degree to which ideal marriage preferences are
expressed in practice.

121 We may now turn to a more theoretical discussion.
58 Writing on the functional significance of marriage ties,
602
613 Leach (1957) drew attention to the importance of economic
factors in the integration of affinally-linked corporate
descent groups, concluding that such integration as did occur
was due largely to the delayed payment of bride price. The
existence of this debt had the effect of consolidating the
weak affinal ties, for the debtor group was economically
bound to the bride-giving group. Although it has been shown
above that the solidary ties between any affinally-linked
Yąnomamö descent groups are due largely to military, marital
and economic obligations, the problem of the lack of solidarity
between agnatically related descent groups has not been satisfactorily
explained. The instability of relationships between
agnatic Yąnomamö corporate descent groups can be reduced to

121 58 two major structural problems: the lack of corporate functions
602 of the local descent groups due to the nature of the corpor-
613 ation's estate, and the ambiguous nature of agnatic kinship
ties. Within a framework such as this, affinal ties are capable of promoting solidarity between corporate groups because marriages among the Yąnomamö are political alliances that involve military obligations. Local descent groups enter into marriage alliances to advance their military status; the context, therefore, within which marriages are contracted decidely influences the relationships between [illegible] corporate groups in question.

121 The debate between Fortes and Leach arose out of the interpretation of the importance of matrilateral kinship ties in patrilineal societies, as these ties are the focal points in any analysis of the means by which solidarity is achieved between corporate descent groups. Briefly, Fortes maintained that the solidarity between lineal descent groups was ultimately due to the inherent tendency of kinship to promote amity. Leach, on the other hand, argues that such an analysis confuses affinal relationships with descent and fails to take notice of the effects of the economic and political contexts within which marriages take place.

Leach drew attention to the fact that ethnological perspectives developed from analyses of patrilineal societies such as the Nuer, Tiv, and Tallensi have biased later workers to focus their attention on lineal corporations and on the common descent ties between corporations when they analyze

121 societies characterized by lineal descent. The result has been that structural ties between different lineal corporations that are based on marriage have largely been ignored, or have been assimilated into the discussion of descent:

> Thus Fortes (1953), while recognizing that ties of affinity have comparable importance to ties of descent, disguises the former under his expression of 'complementary filiation.' . . . marriage ties, as such, do not form part of the structural system. They are of interest only because they serve to distinguish the individuals from one another.
> (Leach, 1957:54.)

Leach then argues that his data from Burma demonstrate that affinal ties are in fact a part of the social structure; the issue then is whether the existence of important matrilateral kinship ties in these societies can best be understood by treating the social organization as a 'double-unilineal descent' system, or by examining the relationship between 'corporateness' and 'descent.' He pursues the second alternative, showing that the Burmese natives do not conceive of the matrilateral ties as descent and pointing out that marriage alliances between the corporate groups result in economic relationships that bind them to each other. These economic relationships, Leach shows, are the real bases of solidarity between the groups. He then concludes that the context--economic and political--within which marriage operates is critical to an analysis of the stability brought about between lineal descent groups by the marriages.

Fortes (1959b:209) recognizes the importance of explaining the ties between corporate descent groups, but

121 emphasizes the importance of the inherent qualities of kinship in effecting this solidarity:

> It seems to me that a social structure based on an association of exogamous, corporate patrilineal descent groups is not likely to hold together in a permanent political system unless it is either subject to some form of overriding, centralized government, or is knit together in the field of dyadic social relations by a web of kinship ties that counter-balance the centrifugal tendencies of the descent groups; and the main mechanism involved is complementary filiation, not marriage as such.

To Fortes, the ties that unite lineal descent groups arise out of the 'web of kinship' and the inherent properties of cognatic kinship itself. Inter-group stability

> . . . is the result, not of marriage, but of ties of cognatic kinship mediated by combinations of links of matrilateral filiation operating in a complementary way to patrilateral filiation and patrilineal descent. (1959a:195)

The reason that cognatic kinship, rather than affinal ties, is capable of bringing about the stability between corporate descent groups is that

> . . . kinship, being an irreducible factor in social structure, has an axiomatic validity as a sanction of amity and solidarity. (1959b:209)

Thus, we have two distinct interpretations regarding the source of solidarity that stabilizes relationships between lineal descent groups. Leach maintains that we must examine the context within which marriages between corporate groups are contracted to see if the relationship between descent and corporateness itself constitutes part of the stability. Fortes, arguing from first principles, attributes the stability to inherent properties of the 'web of kinship.'

114 Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not
121 have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes,
602 and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists
in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal
ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö
descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the
reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a
political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants
not predictable from first principles regarding the
613 putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange
583 women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a
582 milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability
472 brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a
581 function of the politico-military ends served by marriage
and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

121 I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

121 frequently include as elements of their estates, exclusive rights to myths, ritual functions, names and emblems. Finally, rights over persons with respect to their relationships to both property and other persons constitute the last category of elements commonly found in most lineal descent group corporations.[1]

Ethnological discussions of corporate lineal descent groups and of their principle of recruitment by descent usually focus on property. This has been characteristic of the re-examination of Polynesian social organization (Goodenough, 1955; Firth, 1957; Davenport, 1959) and of cognatic kinship systems (Murdock, 1960). Thus Davenport redefines descent in such a way that cognatic societies may be said to have corporate descent groups (ibid., p. 558). He was prompted to define descent in this way by the fact that these cognatic groups function like lineal descent groups with regard to regulating the relationships between group members and real estate.[2]

It is important, however, to recognize that estates may consist of rights other than those involving control of real property and that special problems arise in societies

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[1] See Radcliffe-Brown, 1935 and Befu and Plotnicov, 1962, for a general discussion of estates and corporate lineal descent group types.

[2] See also Goodenough, 1955. Note that Fried (1957) has established a classification of corporate lineal descent groups that is based in large measure on the relationships of members of the groups to 'strategic resources.' For the most part, these resources are real property.

121 having such estates, particularly in those societies to
613 which real estate is totally irrelevant. The Yąnomamö
562 corporate estate consists entirely of rights in disposing
421 of female members belonging to that corporation. As such,
males and females have different kinds of shares in the
corporation. Males, on the average, tend to inherit more
rights, while females tend to inherit more duties and
[423] obligations. Land to the Yąnomamö is not a scarce item, as they
[841] are pioneer slash-and-burn horticulturists expanding into
[424] virgin territory.[1] Myths, names and ritual functions do
not comprise elements in these corporations.[2]

121 It would seem important to distinguish between lineal descent corporations which control property and those which do not, as Befu and Plotnicov (1962) have done. A further distinction, however, seems warranted on the basis of the data presented here: between *societies* having any corporate groups that control real property and societies that have corporate descent groups, none of which have control over property as their estate. The possession of real estate tends to reinforce the lineality of corporate descent groups in both dogma and composition,[3] and invites the addition of

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[184] [1] This is true of the Mavaca Basin Yąnomamö. Elsewhere the Yąnomamö may not be pioneers, but land is not scare in those areas either.

[2] I am aware that the Yąnomamö have lineally transmitted totems; these have nothing to do with the descent group recruitment or its estate.

[3] See Meggitt, 1965, for an excellent account of the relationship of agnatic kinship, real property, and lineage

121 new functions for the corporation, thus leading to greater
integration among its members. These qualities are weak or
absent in descent corporations which lack real property.
[613] The Yąnomamö descent group corporation, therefore, presents
[423] a number of theoretical problems not encountered in the study
of societies having corporations whose estate consists,
above all, of real property.[1]

One of the problems is the definition of the group by a criteria other than descent alone; both descent and residence are critical in recruiting members to the corporation. The factor of residence as a criterion of recruiting members into corporate groups has been dealt with by Firth (1957). He showed how residence was critical in establishing affiliation to 'ambilateral' (ramage) descent groups among the Tikopians, and how individuals, in some cases, have a choice ('option') in affiliating with one of a number of lines of descent in, for example, the Maori hapu. Although Firth argued that property alone was not the basis of the individual choices,

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dynamics and Sahlins (1963) for a discussion of the important difference between group dogma and group composition.

[1] I do not think that the problems raised can be satisfactorily solved by classifying corporations by function. The Yąnomamö have a solidarity problem largely, I feel, because the descent groups compete rather than cooperate. It would seem that the overall integration of this or any society would be enhanced by the existence of additional corporate group functions besides the disposition of marriageable females. In order to appreciate the contribution land controlling corporations have in total social integration, we must distinguish landed societies from others.

121 he acknowledged that the corporation did in fact function in the context of property control as well, suggesting once again that the nature of the estate (land) accounts for the quality of the corporation: that is, that the functions of the corporation are seen to lie largely in the regulation of real estate.

Leach (1963)[1] drew attention to the analytical significance of the local descent group in terms of its function
in arranging marriages. He argued that the social groups
that arrange marriages in tribal societies are essentially the
same in all such societies: they comprise local males of three
generations who live together. Membership in these social
groups necessarily depends on residence. Yąnomamö descent
121 groups are of this type: to participate in the disposition
613 of local females, one must be related to the patrilineally,
602 [611] as well as live in the same village with them. Both the im-
*[621] portance of the marriage arranging functions of the Yąnomamö
[584] descent group and the lack of other corporate functions seems
to account for the fact that affinal ties promote inter-group
solidarity in a way that consanguineal ties can not.

121 On the basis of these findings, Leach's approach to the analysis of social organization would seem to hold more promise in the analysis of marriage alliance systems. To the extent that cultural variables such as warfare and the nature of marriage ties demonstrably affect the outcome of

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[1] The article to which I refer, "The Structural Implications of Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage," was originally published in 1951.

121 marriage practice, these necessarily constitute components of the social structure and must be considered in the analysis. By the same token, structural analyses that fail to take into account these kinds of variables should be permitted to fall by the wayside, for they can never lead us to adequate description let alone prediction. Leach's summary of his analysis of Sinhalese social organization applies also to this exercise:

> The study of social structure in societies organised according to unilineal descent has not only thrown the emphasis on kinship but has given the impression that kinship structures can be considered in isolation, without reference to the economic [and political, N.C.] background. It has also suggested that social structure is a matter of clearly defined rules, e.g., of descent, of inheritance, and of preferential marriage. In the society considered in this essay social structure is likewise a matter of kinship, but kinship arrangements are not clearly constrained by rules. . . . Although, as in other primitive and peasant societies, the language of kinship plays a dominating role in the expression of social relationships, social behavior is not constrained by the existence of kinship corporations. (1960:123)

Although Leach's summary came in a paper dealing with a society characterized by cognatic kinship and social organization, his observations likewise hold for a large number of societies organized along lineal descent principles.

## APPENDIX A

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## VILLAGE COMPOSITION AND GENEALOGY OF LOWER BISAASI-TEDI

1. Lower Bisaasi-tedi

| Lineage | Male | Female | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sha | 9 | 7 | 16 |
| Tom | 9 | 3 | 12 |
| Hor | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Kio | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Shamatari | 3 | 9 | 12 |
| Other | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 25 | 26 | 51 |

2. Upper Bisaasi-tedi

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sha | 11 | 13 | 24 |
| Hor | 8 | 5 | 13 |
| Kio | 5 | 11 | 16 |
| Kah | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Shamatari | 3 | 7 | 10 |
| Bob | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Other | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| Total | 37 | 48 | 85 |

3. Monou-tedi

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sha | 11 | 9 | 20 |
| Hor | 15 | 8 | 23 |
| Kio | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Shamatari | 3 | 9 | 12 |
| Other | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Total | 34 | 32 | 66 |

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4. Patanowä-tedi

| Lineage | Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hor | 58 | 33 | 91 |
| Sha | 25 | 14 | 39 |
| Rob | 14 | 15 | 29 |
| Kah | 17 | 8 | 25 |
| Kar | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Shamatari | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| Ashadowä-tedi | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Other | 5 | 6 | 11 |
| Total | 122 | 90 | 212 |

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Lower Bisaasi-tedi inhabitants. (Numbers preceding names correspond to those next to individuals given in genealogies.)

| Name of Individual | Patrilineage | Sex | Age | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ahimi | Hor | F | 20 | |
| 2. Ahimi's son | Sha | M | 0.2 | |
| 3. Auhewä | Tom | M | 25 | |
| 4. Auhewä's son | Tom | M | 1 | |
| 5. Auma | Kio | M | 21 | |
| 6. Bäkäböwä | Sha | M | 29 | Becoming headman |
| 7. Bäkäböwä's da. | Sha | F | 1 | |
| 8. Boarama | Shamatari | F | 6 | Alliance |
| 9. Bokosiwä | Sha | M | 23 | |
| 10. Caracs-tedi | Sha | M | 3 | |
| 11. Didihoma | - | F | 5 | See p. 213 |
| 12. Dimörama | Shamatari | F | 20 | See p. 213 |
| 13. Dodoiwä | Tom | M | 52 | |
| 14. Heihúnioma | Sha | F | 19 | |
| 15. Hekõwaiyowä | Sha | M | 2 | |
| 16. Hesiwä | Tom | M | 65 | |
| 17. Hikarima | Shamatari | F | 36 | Abducted |
| 18. Hoahemi | Kio | F | 52 | |
| 19. Huimashima | Sha | F | 6 | |
| 20. Irokaweikö | Sha | M | 20 | |
| 21. Kakoma | Sha | F | 19 | Abducted, see p. 213 |
| 22. Kakoma's da. | Kio | F | 0.1 | |
| 23. Katabema | Shamatari | F | 3 | See p. 213 |
| 24. Kąobauwä | Kio | M | 26 | |
| 25. Kräömi | Kio | F | 20 | |
| 26. Mamorakomi | Shamatari | F | 34 | See p. 214 |
| 27. Mamoshiklabema | Tom | M | 4 | |
| 28. Manasinawä | - | M | 56 | See p. 214 |
| 29. Mioremi | Sha | F | 28 | |
| 30. Monokoiwä | Tom | M | 13 | |
| 31. Monomi | Shamatari | F | 19 | Alliance |

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| Name of Individual | Patrilineage | Sex | Age | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32. Monomi's Da. | Tom | F | 0.2 | |
| 33. Makakami | Sha | F | 56 | |
| 34. Miaiyowä | Sha | M | 14 | |
| 35. Ömonoiwä | Tom | M | 28 | |
| 36. Reromawä | Sha | M | 53 | Headman |
| 37. Rosa | Sha | F | 8 | |
| 38. Ruwisa | Tom | F | 7 | |
| 39. Shiborowä | Shamatari | M | 35 | See p. 214 |
| 40. Tiaböwä | Shamatari | M | 5 | See p. 214 |
| 41. Tomahewä | Tom | M | 21 | |
| 42. Tomasi | Tom | M | 6 | |
| 43. Ugushi | Hor | M | 22 | |
| 44. Waiimi | Hor | F | 21 | |
| 45. Waiyamobemi | Shamatari | F | 19 | Alliance |
| 46. Waiyamobemi's son | Sha | M | 0.5 | |
| 47. Waiyuruma | Shamatari | F | 50 | Abducted |
| 48. Wakarabewä | Shamatari | M | 16 | Son-in-law to #6 |
| 49. Yäbänäma | Kio | F | 33 | |
| 50. Yareama | Shamatari | F | 2 | See p. 214 |
| 51. Yotoma | Tom | F | 24 | |

Comments on particular individuals

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1. Ahimi. Her present husband (Bokosiwä) visited the Patanowä-tedi within the past 5 years. Ahimi then lived in Patanowä-tedi and was married to a Sha man there (Makoakuwä), by whom she had already had one daughter (Huimashima). When Bokosiwä returned to Bisaasi-tedi, Ahimi followed him, taking her daughter with her, and became Bokosiwä's wife. As the Patanowä-tedi were technically at war with the Bisaasi-tedi, there was not much they could do to recover the woman. As they also wanted to make peace with Bisaasi-tedi, they did not press the matter.

000 11. __Didihoma__. See #28, Manasinawä, below.

159 12. __Dimörama__. This girl was abducted from a distant Shamatari
593 village (Kohoroshi-tedi, probably in Brasil, on the Upper
583 Cauabury River) by the Reyaboböwei-tedi and Mömaribowei-
*621 tedi. Her husband--the man to whom she was given after
578 being abducted--shot her in the stomach with a barbed
arrow, wounding her gravely (see Shiborowä, below). The
man was forced to flee from the village and take refuge
in Lower Bisaasi-tedi, as other men in the village
planned to use this incident as an excuse to take his
159 wives from him. In late 1965 a party of men from Lower
*628 Bisaasi-tedi, including Shiborowä, set off for Mǫmaribowei-
123 tedi to 'visit.' I accompanied them on their invitation.
721 They were going to Mǫmaribowei-tedi to take Dimörama away
from her protectors by force, if necessary, and asked me
to come along knowing that I always travelled with a gun,
presuming that my presence, with a gun, would aid in
their objective. The girl was very nearly dead when we
arrived (four months had passed since she was shot, and
the wound was badly inflected). As the Bisaasi-tedi were
one of the only allies of the Mǫmaribowei-tedi, they gave
up the girl without much argument, since she would have
[797] died anyway. (The New Tribes Missionaries took the girl
to the Territorial Capital by canoe for surgery in
January 1966. She recovered from the wound and is
presently living in Lower Bisaasi-tedi.)

159 21. __Kakoma__. This is one of the seven women abducted from the
583 Patanowä-tedi in late 1964 by the Monou-tedi. She was
587 taken from her Monou-tedi husband by force by the Lower
*628 Bisaasi-tedi and given to Kǫobauwä, one of the village
721 bachelors.

000 23. __Katabema__. See Shiborowä, below.

000 26. **Mamorakomi**. See Shiborowä, below.

159 593 586 589 *628 28. **Manasinawä**. This man is originally from Hasaböwä-tedi, but he moved to Bisaasi-tedi around 1940-45, along with a brother, a wife, and a daughter. His wife deserted him in Bisaasi-tedi, fleeing to Shibariwä-tedi. After the treacherous feast of 1950-51, in which Manasinawä's brother was killed, he was given Hikarima, one of the widows of that incident. He had one daughter by this woman (Didihoma, above); she is promised to Bokosiwä. His other daughter, by his first wife, is married to Kąobäwä, headman of Upper Bisaasi-tedi. Manasinawä's
[921] father was killed by Husiwä of Patanowä-tedi, so he joined the Bisaasi-tedi to take revenge on the Patanowä-tedi, as the two villages were at war then.

159 593 *621 *628 39. **Shiborowä**. He fled from his native village, Mǫmariböwei-tedi, to avoid a fight and the possible loss of his wives. He shot one of his wives in a fit of rage (Dimörama, above), and his rivals took the girl away from him. To avoid a fight in which he had no supporters, he fled to Lower Bisaasi-tedi, as he had given one of his daughters (Monomi) to a man in that village. He brought his second wife (Mamorakomi) and his three juvenile children with him (Tiaböwä, Yareama, and Katabema). The Lower Bisaasi-tedi welcomed him, as he had two daughters to claim as wives; they assisted him in recovering his second wife.

000 40. **Tiaböwä**. See Shiborowä, above.

50. **Yareama**. See Shiborowä, above.

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# APPENDIX A

## [P.215] Genealogy of Lower Bisaasi-tedi

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
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10: Chagnon SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

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[For information on Yanoama community structure including data on the community population, tendency to exogamy or endogamy, cohesive and fissive tendencies, socio-political and economic structure and organization, etc., see category 116, Introductory p. ii-Introductory p. iii, pp. 2-14, 23, 33-34, 43-44, 53, 58-61, 64-70, 74-76, 79-85, 88-90, 92, 96-118, 121-137, 140-156, 159-175, 183-199, and 207-215.]

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[For information on relationships between various Yanoama communities, see category 116, Introductory, p. iii, and pp. 2-14, 22-24, 34, 53, 57-61, 64-66, 69-80, 84-88, 92-96, 99, 102-109, 111-116, 123, 127-133, 137, 139-165, 168-199, and 213-214.]

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[For information on club fights as a means of settling disputes between individuals or factions within a village, see category 578.]